Part Three
Memorie.al / Today it is undeniable that the communist state led by Enver Hoxha had an extremely significant and potent Intelligence and Counterintelligence system. Also undeniable is the fact that very little has been said about the Albanian agents and intelligence networks, which have been shrouded in a mysterious fog conditioned by the very nature of this profession. Everything was done in secrecy and perfectly camouflaged. The goal was clear: to inform the state about any possible activity against it. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, with their intelligence sectors, had to work hard.
Continued from the previous issue
A strange and dangerous order would be received by the head of State Intelligence during the time he was running one of the most enigmatic offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Jonuz Mersini never imagined that at that time, the Minister of Internal Affairs himself, Kadri Hazbiu, would ask him to explore the possibilities of eliminating Ahmet Zogu, who lived in France with his family.
Despite the secretive nature of the activities of the Intelligence office and the Albanian state’s espionage network around the world, until then its leaders had never before received orders of such a nature. The task of Political Intelligence had been more informational in nature and had never gone as far as the elimination of such high-ranking personalities. Considering all this, Political Director Mersini opposed the minister, who, apparently, was determined and therefore insisted on having the possibilities for action examined.
This was an order, and the Director of State Intelligence had to carry it out. Everything began in the office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to be transmitted via coded messages to the Albanian state intelligence officers in France. But what was the response given by the Albanian agents in the French metropolis? Did they have the means to act? What would happen next? Who were the people ready to make the King of the Albanians disappear? How did Ahmet Zogu manage to escape a possible elimination? A witness to a most rare order, Jonuz Mersini recounts in detail all the moments of this unusual command.
What were the actual stances of the Albanian state towards the royal family in exile and all the Zogist supporters? For a long time a leader of intelligence activities across Europe, Mersini recounts the espionage activity in the French capital. What had our agent “Çika” told intelligence officer Mersini regarding Leka Zog? How had he come to know the heir to the Royal throne and what exactly did he know about his activities abroad?
Mr. Mersini, in the final years before you retired, you led one of the most enigmatic directorates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, that of Political Intelligence. What can you tell us today about the purpose of this directorate’s work?
As I have said before, our main goal was to uncover any kind of anti-Albanian activity and consequently to recognize in time any hostile plan against us, from whichever side it might come.
Where this activity was more focused, or more precisely, who were the enemies that endangered our country?
Since my activity in intelligence duties began in the early years of liberation, I can say that at different stages the threat appeared differently, so intelligence work was focused in different directions.
And what were these directions more concretely?
In the early years of the creation of the intelligence sector, there was rightly a concentration on the activity of Albanian emigrants, especially nationalist groups and supporters of Zog, who had fled Albania during the war, but who had not ceased their activity against their country even in the countries where they had gone. In those years, our aim and goal was the creation of agent networks, especially in the countries neighboring Albania and in the countries of Western Europe, where there was information about the preparation of armed bands. Later, the work of the intelligence networks was also extended towards the activities of various countries’ policies regarding Albania, selecting for information purposes even high-ranking officials of various states, as I have also mentioned in my previous writings.
Did you receive valuable information in that period, and were there truly diversionist intentions to overthrow the people’s power in Albania?
Yes, certainly. The sending of diversionist bands and their annihilation is a known reality.
Did they constitute a real danger to the then-government?
In fact, the government in Albania could not be overthrown by means of diversionist bands, but by killing activists and exercising terror, they made the lives of citizens insecure and presented Albania as incapable before its own people. They could do no more than that. However, there was also information that came in inaccurately.
Which were the countries where this diversionist activity was most developed?
At that time, the greatest danger came from neighboring countries, because from them it was easier to penetrate into Albania, although other European countries were not excluded either. During my time at the directorate of political intelligence, signals often came from our residency in Paris that the intelligence services of some states, in cooperation with King Zog and the Legality Party that operated in exile, using their sympathizers among the Albanian emigration that had fled to Western states, were organizing a diversionist group to land by air or across the state border.
And how did you act in this circumstance?
We decided that we had to find someone to “escape” and penetrate into the ranks of this organization and inform us about the possible preparations of this group. Our intelligence studied the contingents that had had connections with members and sympathizers of the Legality Party during the war. A sympathizer of Abaz Kupi who lived in the city of Vlorë was deemed suitable. After several conversations we had with him, he agreed to act by “escaping,” even though he had a family. He escaped through the Greek border and would communicate with us under the pseudonym “Çika.”
After a short time, he managed to establish contact and friendship with the royal family, which at that time lived in France.
Was the agent physically prepared before leaving on his mission?
Certainly. Every agent, before departing on a specific mission, was prepared in secret by our instructors for a short period of time and received the appropriate orientations depending on the task.
And then how did his transfer to France take place?
Usually, such agents left through “escape.” Çika would leave the same way. He “escaped” one night and arrived in France as a political emigrant.
What information did you receive from Çika?
I personally met Çika several times in France. From the very first meeting I had with him, he told me that from what he had learned through contacts with members of the Legality Party since he had gone to France, the information that a group of diversionists was being prepared by members of the Legality Party to be dropped into Albania was not confirmed. But by then it was clear to us. The first piece of information from our intelligence in France was not confirmed, because many months had passed since that information and it had not been verified. No such group had landed in Albania.
And during other meetings with this agent, what information did he give you about the royal family?
As long as I had him in contact, during the meetings agent Çika remained correct to the commitments he had made before “escaping.” He also expressed satisfaction with the good treatment we gave his family. In these meetings, Çika gave me quite a bit of information regarding the family of Ahmet Zogu and the Legality organization that operated in exile. I even remember one time, in a meeting I had with him in a café in Paris, while discussing the family of Ahmet Zogu, the agent told me that his son Leka was “a wedge over two meters tall who didn’t understand anything about politics.” “I don’t believe that,” I said, “he is an educated son, raised in the West.”
“If you want to prove what a simpleton he is, I can connect you with him right away,” the agent said. I agreed to speak with Leka. Çika called him from the café phone and spoke with him very friendly. Then he passed the phone to me. On the other end of the receiver, I heard Albanian being spoken. I greeted the interlocutor. He immediately asked who I was. “I am an Albanian emigrant, escaped from Albania,” I replied. “I am a friend of ‘Çika’ and I live in Belgium.” He asked me if I wanted any help from him, but I replied that I needed nothing. That was the end of our conversation. He didn’t leave a bad impression on me.
Did you have any other contacts with Leka Zogu during that period?
No. That was the first and only time I spoke with him.
How interested was the Albanian government of that time in the activity of the legalists and especially of Ahmet Zogu in that period? Did it feel threatened by him?
I said above that especially in the early years after liberation, but also afterwards, the Albanian state was very attentive to the activity of Albanian emigrants abroad and especially to the activity of the political opponents of the communist state. One such potential opponent was Ahmet Zogu, because we must bear in mind that his activity continued even in exile. In fact, I must say that perhaps for this reason the Albanian government thought to physically eliminate Ahmet Zogu.
And when did this happen? What do you personally know about this fact?
At that time, I was the Director of Intelligence in the Directorate recreated in 1972, and I received such an order personally from Kadri Hazbiu, former Minister of Internal Affairs, on whom the Intelligence Directorate depended. The minister called me to his office and told me that “the physical elimination of Ahmet Zogu could be raised; therefore ways of implementing this task should be studied and found, if it is given to us. Look more into the possibility of using poison.” At that time, the Albanian royal family lived in France.
How did you respond to this request?
I told the minister that we had never applied this method, especially against personalities. This had been an inviolable principle. However, since you are giving me this task, I am studying the possibilities of such an action. I asked for time to consult with the comrades of our residency in Paris, to see if they were able to take this step. And so I did. Immediately through the liaison, I contacted our intelligence comrades in France and asked them what solution they could find to accomplish this mission.
And what was the response that came from France?
They also told me that they needed time to study the problem and to see the possibilities of intervening up to the royal family.
How did you act then?
I told them that I would get in touch again and that they should not take any concrete action, apart from studying the situation. As an old intelligence officer, I knew that in none of our tasks was the elimination of personalities included. I knew that such an illogical action would cause a storm of accusations against us and would lead us to even greater international isolation. Therefore, even after a few days when I happened to meet him, I mentioned it once more to the minister, but he didn’t answer me. As it seemed, this matter was not within his competence.
Did you continue to be interested in this matter?
No. I left it in silence as long as the minister did not ask me. It was completely contrary to our work and I personally was not at all in agreement to continue in this direction. After a few days, Kadri Hazbiu called me again, but surprisingly, the minister had given up. Perhaps my words had found understanding. “Leave this order forgotten,” he told me.
Did he give you the reasons for this second decision?
No, he didn’t give me any reason, except to add that such an action was impermissible.
Is this true?
Yes, this is true. Our intelligence tasks never practiced the elimination of personalities; however, from the response the minister gave me, he let me understand that he had received an order from above to cancel such an action. / Memorie.al
