Dashnor Kaloçi
Part Thirty-Two
Memorie.al /publishes a voluminous archival dossier extracted from the institution of the Authority for Information on the Files of the former State Security, containing hundreds of documents with the classification “Top Secret” belonging to the former political prisoner, Xhavit Qesja, originally from the city of Kruja, whose family during the period of the country’s occupation, 1939-1944, was closely linked to the Anti-Fascist Movement, being one of its main bases and placed all its wealth at its disposal, since Xhaviti was one of the first members of the Albanian Communist Party for the Kruja district, leading the Krujë-Ishëm partisan battalion and the 22nd Assault Brigade. The political career of Xhavit Qesja after the end of the war, where he was appointed and served in high positions in the Albanian Army, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, and several districts of the country, from where he was sent for studies to the Soviet Union, where he remained until 1957, when he was notified to return urgently to Albania, because he had openly expressed his views in favor of the political line being followed by the main leader of the Kremlin, Nikita Khrushchev, regarding the condemnation of the cult of Stalin. Enver Hoxha’s conversation with Xhavit Qesja in his office at the Central Committee, where he harshly criticized him for the erroneous views he had shown during his studies in Moscow, calling on him to reflect and make self-criticism, but Xhaviti refused the suggestion of the first secretary of the Party of Labor of Albania, which caused him not to be allowed to return to the Soviet Union to finish his studies, but to be sent to work as vice-chairman of the Executive Committee of Elbasan, from where, a year later, he would be expelled from the ranks of the Party and interned on the Island of Zvërnec, where the communist regime kept isolated some of the former high party and state cadres whom it had condemned for their anti-party views. The long ordeal and persecution of Xhavit Qesja from 1957 until 1990, where he spent a full 32 years in prisons and internments, being one of the rare convicts of Burrel prison who carried out long hunger strikes as a sign of protest against the treatment and brutal stance that Enver Hoxha’s communist regime was taking against him. The complete file, investigative and judicial dossier against Xhavit Qesja, published for the first time by Memorie.al, containing documents of the former State Security that reflect the surveillance and wiretapping against him, reports of Security collaborators with their pseudonyms, correspondence with letters he sent to high party and state instances, as well as the highest leaders of the PPSH, until 1991 when he was released from prison!
Continued from the previous issue
The secret document with the plan of agent-operative measures of Operational Worker Esat Lata, approved by the Head of Section, Ramiz Hoxha, regarding the convict Xhavit Qesja, in Burrel prison
APPROVED “SECRET”
HEAD OF SECTION Single copy
RAMIZ HOXHA Burrel, 10/4/1975
PLAN OF AGENT-OPERATIVE MEASURES FOR THE PROCESSING II/A OF XH. QESJA
Xhavit Qesja is followed by our Organs in active processing II/A, as an anti-Party element. During the serving of his sentence, he has shown and continues to show marked hostile activity.
With the aim of being able to process him and document his activity, we think to also take these agent-operative measures:
Since Xhaviti no longer works as a translator, agent “Beni” shall call him to his workplace and during conversations with him, tell him that we were very comfortable with those translations, but although I ended up here, I feel sorry for you because you have no income, because I get a small amount; after conversations, enter into conversations with him of a political provocative nature, especially regarding comments on the 6th Plenum of the P.P.SH.
Performed by Op. W. E. Lata. until May 1975.
Given that agent “Beni” has been given a line of conduct regarding Dilaver Radëshi, after meeting with his wife, “Beni”, according to the order given, Beqiri, Hito and Petriti have been arrested, but what charges they have been given, the woman knew nothing.
To be carried out by April 1975. Also talk with Xhaviti.
For agent “Beni” to draft a line of conduct, to direct him towards Xhaviti and at the same time to try to eavesdrop on his conversations with O.W., until November 1975.
All his correspondence to be kept under control.
Performed by Op. W. Esat Lata. Continuous task.
To secure his handwriting and his family certificate and to place them in his dossier. By June 1975, performed by Op. W. Esat Lata.
OPERATIONAL WORKER
ESAT LATA
Implementation of tasks
Agent “Beni” has been directed towards Xhaviti, since lately Xhaviti hardly says anything, which is noticeable both from “Beni’s” data and from O.W., therefore no data has been secured.
“Beni” has been directed towards Xhaviti, since he has no opinion about the putschist group of Beqir Balluku and no data has been secured.
His correspondence has been checked regularly, but there has been nothing of interest.
His handwriting has been secured (see back pocket).
E X T R A C T
TAKEN FROM THE TESTIMONIES OF HALIM XHELO ABOUT XHAVIT QESJA
From the conversations held, Halim Xhelo showed that Xhavit Qesja is the person who comments the least; he speaks with me more than anyone else, yet he has not spoken to me about the first trial or about the second. He has told me that it is a misfortune that his case has never been taken in hand by the main leader of the Party (for whom he has much sympathy and respect), while for the others, he has no respect.
10/6/1975 OPERATIONAL WORKER
ESAT LATA
Report-information of the State Security Operational Worker, Esat Lata, with data from the Security collaborator with the pseudonym “Beni”, regarding the wiretapping and surveillance of the convict Xhavit Qesja, in Burrel prison
GIVEN by Agent “BENI”
Received by Op. W. Esat Lata
Burrel, 28/10/1975
No. 199
R E P O R T
He reports that on 15/10/1975, during the morning airing, he was walking in the yard with Xhavit Qesja and the conversation turned to the latest news brought by Fehmi Frashëri.
Regarding Beqir Balluku and the group of arrested generals, Xhaviti expressed himself thus: The fact that they were forced to arrest the entire military leadership, mostly generals and colonels and a part of “People’s Heroes,” shows that the leadership finds itself in difficulty and deep political and economic crisis, both internally and externally.
They did not find it easy to strike all the cadres who made the War and who kept our army on its feet. The military not only did not conspire, but were loyal to the end to the leader of the Party and the people, but the latter have been frightened by the supposed conspiracy that was being prepared.
Alright this, but why were Abdyl Këllezi and Koço Theodhosi struck in this way, to have failures in the economy thrown on their necks. The policy of these has entered a dead end and this has caused dissatisfaction among the people. The people cannot be kept with violence and the leadership will certainly understand this.
On October 25, 1975, when he was lying ill in his room, in the evening, in the presence of Bardhyli and Dilaveri, he addressed a question to Todi regarding the new constitution that would declare Albania Socialist, while he (Todi) opposed it, saying that to declare it socialist, the construction of the material and technical base of socialism must be completed, which according to the head of state, should continue for several more five-year plans.
Todi said that is true, but we will not wait for that; the leader of the Party is ill and wants to be alive when it is declared, therefore he wants to do it. Certainly, Todi continued: This will not correspond to reality, as it will be a premature step and a compromise for socialism, but these will do it, and he bet with him that this will certainly happen.
“BENI”
Evaluation of the data:
The data has operative value, because the convicts Xhavit Qesja and Todi Lubonja speak about hostile activity.
TASK: The agent was instructed to talk with Xhaviti and other persons and to tell them that there is no way the strike of all those cadres could have happened, and we cannot imagine they would do this without having hostile activity, and the arrest of all these persons leads you to understand and creates the conviction that there must have been organized activity, therefore their arrest was made.
With Todi, talk and tell him that the declaration of socialist Albania happens when conditions are ripe, and this is not achieved because we or someone else wants it, therefore here I do not agree.
OPERATIVE MEASURES
The data was printed in two copies for Xhavit Qesja and Todi Lubonja and placed in their dossiers.
No copy was sent to the First Directorate.
OPERATIONAL WORKER
ESAT LATA
Notes of the Head of Section:
I agree with the tasks.
R. Hoxha
29/XI/1975.
Notes of the Deputy Chairman:
Seen. 3/XI/1975.
I. Musta
The document with the plan of agent-operative measures drafted by Operational Worker Bekim Budo, approved by the Head of Section Ramiz Hoxha, for the wiretapping and surveillance of the convict Xhavit Qesja, in Burrel prison
APPROVED “SECRET”
HEAD OF SECTION Single copy
RAMIZ HOXHA Burrel, 20/1/1976
PLAN OF MEASURES
AGENT-OPERATIVE FOR THE PROCESSING 2/A OF XHAVIT QESJA
The CONVICT Xhavit Qesja, has been raised to processing 2/A as an anti-party element, because during the serving of his sentence he has shown marked hostile activity. In order to be able to process him and document this hostile activity, I think to take these measures:
The subject 2/A Xhavit Qesja, has for some time withdrawn from conversation; for this, agent “Beni” shall be directed to approach him in conversation, helping him with some service, without letting him understand.
Performed by Op. W. B. Budo, until March 1976.
Based on the subject’s attitude in relation to the agent, initially direct the agent with tasks.
Performed by Op. W. B. Budo.
To direct agent “Beni” to the subject with an approved line of conduct. Until October 1976.
All his correspondence to be kept under control.
Performed by Op. W. B. Budo – continuous task.
OPERATIONAL WORKER
BEKIM BUDO
Report-information of the State Security Operational Worker Bekim Budo, with data from the Security collaborator with the pseudonym “Beni”, regarding the wiretapping and surveillance of the convict Xhavit Qesja in Burrel prison
Given by AGENT “Beni”
Received by Op. W. B. Budo
Burrel, 4/3/1976
R E P O R T
On 23.2.1976 during the morning airing, while walking with Xhavit Qesja, the conversation turned to the Draft Constitution, regarding the point on amnesty. He defended the thesis that in this case a large, if not general, amnesty will be given for political prisoners.
Xhaviti persistently rejected this thesis, saying that at this time, when the class struggle has been artificially intensified, there can be no question of anything significant. Something small might be done. These (the leaders) have entered the path of using violence and cannot give it up. They are physically eliminating their comrades (the news brought by Dh. Kotefa, after the meeting on the shooting of B. Balluku, P. Dume and H. Çako).
On 25/2/1976, after having read the 19th volume of the works, Xhaviti told him, referring to the part that talks about Koço Tashko: “I had said it when I was in Zvërnec, that Koço Tashko, as the fool and idiot that I knew him, could not have committed the act of opposing the leadership on his own, but he must have been pushed by the Soviets.”
Now that I have read the 19th volume, it is clear that Koço Tashko had turned into a tool of the Soviets and even of a certain Bespallovi, secretary of the embassy, a K.G.B. agent.
Regarding Liri, Xhaviti said that Liri in China had acted contrary to the rules of her Party, when she transmitted the conversation she had with the Chinese leaders to the chargé d’affaires of the Soviet embassy in Peking. There she represented the Party and not only herself, and without the permission of the Political Bureau, she had no right to do that. It appears that they used Liri at that time for their own purposes; her thesis of not “mixing” the Party leader in this matter did not aim, as she claims, to protect the Leader, but the Soviets’ goal was to isolate him; here the Leader understood this, therefore he struck Liri.
Regarding Liri, Xhaviti said that he has long thought, and is still of this opinion, that in 1960 Liri played a trick, she wanted to benefit from the created conjuncture, therefore she indirectly opposed the Party Leader, since he (Xhaviti) knows well that in 1956, at the time of the Tirana Conference and when Xhaviti was expelled from the Party, Liri had been firmly against the line of the 20th Congress. This stance she expressed openly in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, when Xhaviti was called there, after he returned from Moscow and expressed himself in favor of the line of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
“BENI”
Evaluation of the data:
The data has operative importance, since Xhavit Qesja, regarding the problem of the class struggle, distorts it in a hostile manner. While regarding the problem of Liri Belishova, he again distorts the truth that the Party states, that Liri Belishova opposed the Party leadership, became a tool of Khrushchev and the revisionist course of the 20th and 22nd Congresses.
Task:
In future conversations with Xhavit Qesja, treat objectively the ongoing topic dealt with in the 20th work of the Main Leader, which deals with the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union and the factors that influenced.
Also, do not limit yourselves to a few processings, but carefully talk with others as well, throwing out ideas in the various discussions that will take place.
OPERATIVE MEASURES
Notify the Department Leadership.
Print the report in one copy for Xhavit Qesja. /Memorie.al
OPERATIONAL WORKER
BEKIM BUDO
Seen.
Deputy Chairman of the Internal P. Department
Ismail Musta
