By DASHNOR KALOÇI
Part Three
Memorie.al – About twenty-odd years ago, during one of our conversations with the renowned scholar and historian Sherif Delvina (“Teacher of the People”), together with two of his close friends, Professor Luan Malltezi and Gani Demiri Ratkoceri (“Teacher of the People,” originally from Kosovo, who came to Albania as a political emigrant in 1961, and a former prisoner in Enver Hoxha’s political camps and prisons), Sherifi – who had spent most of his life in the state archives and the National Library – told us that: “Enver Hoxha not only never wanted Kosovo to have the status of a Republic within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation, but he fought by all means to prevent that from becoming a reality!” He explained to us that if Kosovo were to enjoy the status of a Republic, like the other six republics, it would receive great attention and become much more widely known on the international stage, thus eclipsing communist Albania led by Enver Hoxha, which would be relegated to a secondary position as a state. Based on this, the “support” that Albania and Enver Hoxha gave to Kosovo after the March 1981 demonstrations – for Kosovo to be granted Republic status – was merely for public consumption.
Upon our request (to Professor Luan Malltezi and Gani Ratkoceri) that we conduct an interview for “Gazeta Shqiptare” (where at the time I covered the historical dossier section), in which he would publicly explain in greater detail what he was telling us, Sherifi categorically refused, telling us: “What I am telling you, I have heard, and I have not yet found the archival documents in the Central State Archive or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But I assure you that these documents are there, and if you ever find them one day, you will prove me right. I cannot speak without documents!”
Of course, we did not press him further to say these things publicly in the press, as Sherifi was firm, and we knew his nature well. Sherifi told us many different events and stories, mainly about Enver Hoxha, whom he had known since childhood (during the war period, 1939–1944), when he would go to the house of his uncle, Esat Dishnica, where Enver, as his very close and confidential friend, was often there for lunches and dinners.
Likewise, many of the events and stories concerning Enver Hoxha, Sherifi knew from former Prime Minister Ibrahim Bey Biçaku (his mother’s uncle), or from his father, Neki Delvina, a former member of the Supreme Court during the Zog Monarchy and the first years after the War, who was sentenced to political imprisonment. Sherifi “took all these events and stories with him to the grave” and never agreed to make them public in the media, even though his close friend, Professor Luan Malltezi (or the author of these lines), would occasionally plead with him that they should be published in the press, as they were of public interest!
But, returning to the main topic of this article, we emphasize that the renowned scholar and historian Sherif Delvina was entirely right about what he told us, namely: that Enver Hoxha never wanted Kosovo to gain Republic status, a fact which has become known from several archival documents recently extracted from the Central State Archive (the fund of the former Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania), marked “Top Secret” (now declassified), dating from 1970, which include a minutes of the meeting between Enver Hoxha and the diplomat Lik Seiti, the Chargé d’Affaires of the People’s Republic of Albania in Belgrade.
In all these documents, which for the first time shed light and officially make known what for years had been rumored orally about the occult links between Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito (the messages they sent to each other through Fadil Hoxha), as well as the minutes in question, it is written in black and white that Enver Hoxha never wanted Kosovo to have Republic status; indeed, he made every effort as much as he could to ensure that this never happened. Regarding this, etc., we are informed by the documents in question, which are published for the first time and in full (along with the relevant facsimiles) by Memorie.al
Continued from the previous issue
ARCHIVAL DOCUMENT WITH THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF ENVER HOXHA WITH LIK SEITI, THE CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA IN BELGRADE
MEETING OF THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC OF THE PPA, COMRADE ENVER HOXHA, WITH THE CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA IN YUGOSLAVIA, LIK SEITI, IN TIRANA, ON 19.9.1970
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: And indeed we see that Fadil maintains contact with teachers, with professors, he cultivates relationships with those who have sympathy for Albania, etc., and all these are cadres. He speaks about these, I think, but concretely he does not mention anyone. Therefore, we too must remain with him on a general platform; whenever the opportunity arises, discuss with him on this platform, avoid delicate questions of an informative nature, because they can cause us a lot of trouble.
We should maintain contacts with him at all times on a broad political platform, instilling in these people trust in the correct Marxist-Leninist line of our party, so that they may see that the Yugoslav revisionists are traitors to Marxism-Leninism, to the Yugoslav peoples, and also to the Albanians of Kosovo. We must strive to make them understand this policy of ours. Their tactics are another matter.
Fadil Hoxha cannot tell the young Kosovars: “Men, raise Enver Hoxha’s photograph everywhere,” because to demand such a thing is provocation. Enver’s photographs cannot be placed in Kosovo; the flag is another matter. The Kosovars have already won that right. Likewise, the Kosovars have the right to listen to Radio Tirana; indeed, anyone who wishes may record its broadcasts and distribute them to others, but if they take to the streets with photographs, no one will allow it.
Nevertheless, the patriotic enthusiasm of Kosovar youth is a very great thing, even of colossal importance for us, except that the policy of these people is not crystallized; we do not know who they are. However, these are the ones now at the forefront. Two courses remain open to them: either subversive activity, or to work by exploiting legal and illegal forms. Naturally, it is possible to develop some activities today on a legal platform, and this is a good thing, but at the same time it is our duty to clarify what kind of people these are who are at the forefront in Kosovo.
Therefore, we respond in this manner and maintain this platform. In these situations, we must be very measured with them, not ask them questions that might make them feel we are provoking or dictating to them, but tell them that we are brothers, only we have our opinions (which we tell them openly on the platform I mentioned), while you have your opinions. We should also tell them that you see your own affairs better, because we, not knowing the situation in Kosovo properly, might even make mistakes, and indeed it is true that we might make mistakes on some issues, for how can we know who these people are and how determined they are? We think they are with Tito, and that is so, but even in this regard, to what extent?
What is certain for us is that they are Albanians, but it is known that Lumo Skëndua and Ali Këlcyra and their companions were also Albanians, yet they sold themselves to fascist Italy. Let us not forget this. These too are of that kind. Therefore, the basis for our work in Kosovo must be the people. During conversations and questions with these people, we must be reserved, not compromise ourselves before the people of Kosovo, and not give them the opportunity to tell the masses that they are with us. We will tell them that we are with the Kosovars and, within the possibilities that exist in Kosovo in these circumstances, we try to help you. This we must make clear so that the Kosovar people may see it, and they do see and understand our efforts.
COMRADE RAMIZ ALIA: What you have just read has been calculated precisely so that Fadil, if he is a relatively good man, the response will do him well; it strengthens his Albanian positions. If he is not good, even if he wants to inform Tito about the response we give him that does not harm us, because our position is principled, and you have publicly declared these matters in the Tropoja speech in May.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Fadil may say to Tito that Comrade Enver is not right, and I (Fadil) will prove that Tito loves Serbs, Croats, and Albanians equally…! It is not good to speak to him with a letter, so speak orally. This places upon you the duty to study these ideas well that have been set down here, chew them over well for yourself, or prepare them point by point, then tell them to Fadil with composure. Inform us of any reactions there may be, because they interest us, although we do not overdo anything there.
Be that as it may, Fadil was more persecuted than others during Ranković’s time; he does not accept the creation of a republic within the framework of Yugoslavia, although by this he does not declare that he wants Kosovo to unite with Albania. Let us be clear that this unification will come in other situations. Neither he nor we can say this, because there is still a lot of water to flow under the bridge. Fadil seeks only full autonomy, and in these circumstances we too agree with that much.
The goal is that Serbs should not rule in Kosovo; they should go to their own place, while in power in Kosovo, Kosovars should rule; they should be at the forefront there in all sectors – in power, in the economy, in the army, in the security service, etc.; indeed, they should fight to bring in good people everywhere so that, when the moment comes, the fig will have ripened and unification will happen by itself. The matter, therefore, must be handled dialectically, because these things are not done by mere desire. Desire is something else; our hearts truly ache for Kosovo, but reality is different. We must follow the course of history, but for the situations we wish to create, we must prepare the events well in advance.
COMRADE LIK SEITI: I wish to point out that, after the articles that were published and after your speech in Tropoja, Xhavit Nimani and Ali Shukriu greet me more than before and give signs and opportunities for rapprochement. Especially Xhavit, speaks with the same joy and warmth and offers more opportunities for rapprochement in state relations. Both of them say that Comrade Enver spoke very well, that after his speech a warm climate is being created and gives us the opportunity to speak more.
Ymer Pula holds the same stance. Before coming to work in Belgrade, I was serving in Turkey, where my main direction in the field of intelligence was the Kosovo sector. From the agent information I had at that time, Ymer Pula emerged as the most positive person. When Xhavit Nimani praised your speech in Tropoja, Ymer turned to me and said: “It falls to you to serve these matters well in Tirana.”
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Stay close to these as well and tell them that the party has taught me to serve everything correctly to the leadership. Approach them and tell them that the created situation is good for Kosovo, and my opinion, that of my government, and of Comrade Enver, is that in the Tropoja speech our viewpoint was made clear that in Kosovo education should be strengthened, the positions of the Kosovars should be strengthened in all the directions I mentioned earlier. You have now created cadres; therefore, as long as Yugoslavia says it is a people’s democracy, strive to put people of the people in charge everywhere and as much as possible in the councils, in the courts, and everywhere else.
Such is the situation there now, Comrade Lik Seiti, but a lot of water will have to flow under the bridge to achieve what we want. We cannot act today with the Kosovars as we acted with the Albanians during the National Liberation War. Then, as we know, we made many efforts with people of reaction, with bourgeois elements and with the agas, with Lumo Skëndos and Ali Këlcyras and their companions, to turn them onto the people’s path, but, of course, we were convinced that they would not change their course, but after all our efforts, when we saw that even the people were convinced of their betrayal, then we gave them a strong blow on the head and routed them. But we reached this point only when the entire process was completed.
Now in Kosovo the situation is different. True, the Kosovars are our brothers, but we cannot interfere in the affairs of another state. We are clear that the example of our People’s Republic cannot fail to influence positively the minds of our brothers in Kosovo, on the path we want. Now, the more time passes, the more this influence is reflected; it has already begun, and we try to benefit from the created situation. Listening to Radio Tirana, for example, Tito cannot stop; our books and newspapers, we see, are being introduced more and more into Kosovo; people from there come to us; teachers and professors will come and will keep coming; tomorrow the people in Kosovo will also see Albanian television, etc.
The issue here is that we cannot go according to the view of some who say that we should not work with Xhavit Nimani, because he was with Ranković, was a man of the UDBA, etc. We cannot say this; firstly, because we do not know to what extent this man was involved in cooperation with Ranković; then, we do not know whether the Kosovar people hate him or not, how many wrongs he has done to the masses and how he has done them, etc. We could say the same about a series of other people like him who are there now again in power in the created circumstances. Among them there are elements who are completely bad, some who are three-quarters bad, some half bad, others who are one-quarter bad.
By this I mean that all these leaders, some more, some less, are tainted. In Kosovo, only the masses of the people are untainted. To be able to orient yourself in your work, bear in mind that you must try to penetrate their ranks with the existing possibilities, but without interfering. Therefore, when Xhavit Nimani says that Albania is helping us a lot, we have no reason to say that he is a living Ranković and to avoid him and not work with him. Now, for the interest of the matter, we will use these people, but always being careful about what I said, so as not to expose ourselves before the Kosovar people.
Thus, when there is a reception and opportunities arise, try to meet them to greet them, telling them that we are very glad that you have these views about Albania and we wish to show you what we have achieved in Albania, what objectives and successes we have reached and will reach, and we wish that the brother Kosovar people may also achieve such objectives. To Fadil, you may say specifically that you have been in Albania, you have great experience, you have developed a part of your activity in Albania, and therefore we believe that you will never separate yourself from your people, from the Albanian people. In a word, try to encourage them on this path, because such work with them plays a great role; after all, he is an Albanian nationalist, and as long as he does not side with the Serbs, this is of great interest to us.
Then we must bear in mind that we will not cut off his head; if he has committed faults, and to whatever extent he has committed them, the Kosovar people will judge him when the day of reckoning comes. But, as I said, there are also some who say that it cannot be done with Fadil Hoxha, Comrade Enver. But why can it not be done? We know that Fadil has done what he has done, but during Ranković’s time, however, he was persecuted. Well, they say, but Fadil is now at the head of the Yugoslav leadership. But how do these people want it, that he should not be at the head there? To those who think this way, it seems to me, regardless of the fact that Fadil has also spoken against us, there are some infantile judgments that are not politics.
COMRADE RAMIZ ALIA: In the circumstances he finds himself in, it is not possible for Fadil not to speak against.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Therefore, seize the opportunity; as soon as you find the chance, tell him that I got along with Comrade Enver, so whenever you wish, we can talk a little in response to what was touched upon during the conversation we had together.
COMRADE LIK SEITI: Where do you think our meeting place should be, at a reception? We know that in Belgrade he has a house; we also know on which street he lives.
COMRADE ENVER HOXHA: Judge and resolve this matter yourself as to where you can meet. Haven’t you made it a practice with him regarding meetings? If you find the opportunity, try to meet him at some reception. If, after you notify him, he proposes that you come for a coffee at his house, give a positive answer; tell him you will come with great pleasure. Only if he tells you to meet at the office, i.e., at the Party’s Central Committee, tell him that you cannot go there, lest they take it badly for you; besides, we have no connection with your Party’s Central Committee, therefore, if you wish, I could pay you a visit at home, in case it does not inconvenience you.
Or bear in mind not to meet at some reception, if the opportunity presents itself soon. At the beginning, when you are getting acquainted at the entrance, as is customary, try to tell him your purpose quickly, that you wish on that occasion to talk with him; then during dinner, find the opportunity and take some corner to speak together.
Taken from the stenogram and edited by H.K.
Typed by V.K. 3 copies
The first copy was taken by Comrade Ramiz to deliver to Comrade Lik Seiti, Chargé d’Affaires of the PR of Albania in Belgrade, on 9.4.1971. / Memorie.al
