Part Twenty-Seven
Memorie.al / The United States of America worked for many years to overthrow Enver Hoxha’s regime, but did not succeed. In 1951 what frightened the Americans most was the danger of war in the Balkans. According to some documents declassified by the CIA, the Americans feared that if they overthrew Enver Hoxha, then Tito might extend his influence over Tirana.
Continued from the previous issue
June 1951
Conflict in the Balkans
The use of unconventional means is for the moment limited by the explosive nature of the conflict and the situation in the Balkans, since a primary concern is the avoidance of provocations that could upset the delicate balances of war and peace in this region. But in any case it seems there is room for careful actions on the part of the US, which would not upset the balances of power and which could establish preliminary structures for further action at the appropriate time. It is also thought that clandestine diversionary action could be undertaken against Soviet movements in other countries, such as the annexation of Burma.
It is proposed to continue the current activities, with the aim of preparing the appropriate position for organization and preparation both inside and outside Albania. With the above suggestions the US agrees that the first two steps of the British memorandum should be carried out if and when the outbreak of conflict in the Balkans is inevitable. In the event of Yugoslavia’s and Greece’s intervention in Albania, the US must also participate militarily in the intervention, to secure and exert strong pressure against a conflict between them, as well as to ensure that the intervention is temporary.
The US agrees with the British suggestion for communication with the three Albanian neighbors, assuring them that no foreign power would be allowed to take a privileged position in Albania after the fall of the current regime, and that the neighboring countries would be consulted on the new democratic power that would be established. Regarding “internal stresses,” the British seem to refer to subversive movements that are not instigated by the Yugoslavs. The US strongly believes that in such a case the US and Britain should not allow Yugoslavia to prepare to replace the Soviet regime in Albania with a Titoist regime. All diplomatic pressures should be made to emphasize that the character of the new regime in Albania will be the object of close consultations among all interested parties such as the US, Britain, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia.
Aims
The movements suggested in the above paragraphs have as their aim the obtaining of guarantees from Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy that they do not claim a superior position in Albania and on the other hand that no foreign power will do so, something that can be achieved much better by joint multilateral action and not only by the US and Britain. If NATO were to consider the defense of Yugoslavia as a way of dealing with the situation, then it should act according to its suggestions for the Albanian problem. The US welcomes Britain’s comments on the matter, even though no change of ideas is expected after the consultations carried out between the State Department and the CJS branch of the CIA. The opinions are considered as projects and not an approved action plan.
July 1951
Albania – Yugoslavia Relations
The problem
a) Preventing the taking of Albania by the Yugoslavs or its partition by the Yugoslavs and the Greeks
b) If conditions permit, the liberation of Albania from Cominform control and the coming to power of a pro-Western regime, without risking retaliatory attacks by the Cominform on Yugoslavia
- Important facts for the problem
a) Cominform control over Albania is becoming increasingly weaker.
(1) Public dissatisfaction is increasingly widespread.
(2) Economic conditions are deteriorating rapidly.
(3) In isolated areas revolts appear to have broken out.
(4) The other Cominform states have been isolated from land routes with Albania since Yugoslavia’s defection; therefore the security of psychological suppression and of the proximity of Cominform armies is less in Albania than in other communist countries.
b) Yugoslavia is preparing seriously for military intervention in Albania.
1) An Albanian liberation army sponsored by Yugoslavia has been created near the Albanian border.
2) About 100 resistance groups sponsored by Yugoslavia are currently operating in Albania.
3) It is believed that from 2000 to 4000 Albanians are receiving paramilitary training in military camps in Yugoslavia.
4) Yugoslavia has dropped at least one pamphlet over Albania inciting popular resistance against the regime.
- Yugoslavia is already publicly known to receive military and economic aid from the US and there are rumors circulating that Yugoslavia has received a free hand from the US for the invasion of Albania and the replacement of the communist government with a pro-Yugoslav government.
- Some signals point to a possible agreement between Yugoslavia and Greece for the partition of Albania between them. But even if such an agreement does not exist, if Yugoslavia succeeds in overthrowing the regime in Albania, this would necessarily bring about the partition of the country between it and Greece.
- The Albanian people, who oppose the communist regime, would prefer Western assistance for the change of regime, instead of Greek or Yugoslav intervention.
Current American and British operations have not had sufficient success in creating a single resistance organization. But by the end of summer it may turn out that activities strengthen the core of a resistance group.
Conclusions
Yugoslavia is not much concerned about causing a Soviet attack in the event of open or clandestine intervention in Albania. If the Cominform does not attack Yugoslavia within the coming year, there is a possibility that without US intervention, only Yugoslav activities in the country, as well as the worsening economic situation, will bring about the collapse of the current regime, and consequently the arrival of a government sponsored by Belgrade or perhaps the partition of Albania among the neighbors.
In such a case, the Cominform would not intervene, only in the event that it has decided on the liquidation of Tito’s regime, regardless of whether Albania is threatened or not. A possible overthrow of the regime in Albania would be taken by Europe as giving a free hand to Yugoslavia for the elimination of the communist regime in Albania with the approval and help of the US. Such a mentality would have harmful effects on various resistance groups in other Eastern European countries where developments would be interpreted as a US scenario.
The elimination of the current regime in Albania would on the other hand help to encourage other resistance movements in Soviet satellite countries, becoming a proof of the successful clandestine movement for the overthrow of a communist regime. For reasons of Western sympathy with Albanian officials, it would be simpler to organize a coup in Albania with American elements, perhaps with fewer personnel than a Yugoslav attempt. It is believed that under certain circumstances, a successful revolt could be launched by the US, entering from outside the country with 1000 to 2000 people. A training operation with 1000 to 2000 Albanians could be created in Germany under the cover of Guard companies, at relatively low cost.
Recommendations
The current US operations aimed at creating resistance movements will be expanded in a non-provocative manner for both the Albanians and the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav government will be advised that such activities are not viewed favorably by the US, and if they continue, the US position regarding Yugoslavia will be reviewed and possibly interrupted. If the Yugoslavs continue their operations in Yugoslavia, it should be made clear that the US will carry out even stronger operations to stop a domination of Albania by Yugoslavia.
US capacities will be expanded immediately, adding Albanian Guard units in Germany up to 1000 people, who will be trained as paramilitaries and as guerrilla units in the future. Enough weapons for 10,000 people will be accumulated in Mediterranean countries and clandestine air assistance will be given up to the successful support of the operation. The cooperation of the British government will be sought for this plan.
Conditions affecting political and psychological activities in Albania
Although a scientific study cannot be made, all facts show that the majority of the Albanian people oppose and despise the communist regime. The main reasons for this are
(a) the economic shortcomings suffered by the peasants and also the citizens as a result of communist programs, the suppression of private trade and the collectivization program. Also the heavy taxes on agricultural products, compulsory military service, forced labor and the incompetence of the administration are other factors.
(b) The suppression of traditional family values and personal honor that have been characteristic of Albanian life.
(c) The police state methods of the regime.
(d) The servile behavior of the regime toward a foreign power (the USSR)
Since Albania is an agricultural country, the peasantry is our main target for developing a sense of friendship toward agents and anti-communists, and at the appropriate time, also for participation in active resistance. Other targets are the Army, which is reported not to be loyal to the communists, or people in government posts, most of whom were educated by the previous regime. In addition there is also a large number of dissatisfied communists who could be the target of special defections. The old tradition of guerrilla warfare against foreign domination and central authority is a favorable psychological factor.
Limitations and disadvantages of activities
- Some claims of neighboring countries, especially the territorial ones of Greece, which cause the regime to appear as if it is protecting Albania’s sovereignty.
- Operational activities of some governments within Albania, especially by Yugoslavia, which has brought certain confusion in people’s minds.
- The news reaching the population about the lack of unity in emigration circles has created confusion as to which group in fact has Western support, which brings hesitation in supporting various agents who have no personal acquaintance.
- The limited number of radios in Albania which casts doubt on the effect of propaganda and radio broadcasts.
14 February 1951
Reassessment and revision of OPC branch plans regarding Albania
Some changes in the international situation since the drafting of the current OPC plan on Albania bring the need for a re-examination of the factors determining policies toward this country, as well as the objectives and nature of the action.
The original plan against Albania had been approved on 22 June 1949, at a time when Yugoslavia’s position regarding the Soviet Union and the Cominform office was not clear, and when Albania was an important factor for supporting communist guerrillas in Greece. At that time the main objective of the efforts was the overthrow of Hoxha’s regime by means of a force that would strike quickly, which would be recruited from Albanian refugees in Greece and other Mediterranean countries.
In December 1949, as a result of new developments, including a new mentality of the US and Britain toward Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia, as well as the cessation of anti-communist guerrilla operations in Greece, the project for Albania was modified by defining more modest objectives. The objective of overthrowing the Hoxha regime has been set aside for the moment.
Abandonment of the operation
The main reasons for withdrawing from the original project and abandoning the general rebellion by means of guerrilla military intervention are as follows:
a) The attempt to overthrow the regime could bring about military action by the USSR against Yugoslavia with the pretext of providing assistance to the Albanian operation.
b) Wide-scale unrest in Albania could bring about the use of Soviet tactical units and an increase in Soviet military activity which would not only bring about the failure of the rebellion, but also the strengthening of Soviet control in Albania, and in the Mediterranean area.
- According to the revisions, the mission for Albania should include the following goals:
a) Reducing the importance of Albania for the Soviet Union by means of the continuous damaging of the communists’ authority and by means of internal harassment. Such harassment limits the importance of Albania in the event of aggression against its neighbors or against Western countries
b) Encouraging and assisting the Albanian people in resistance to Hoxha’s regime and keeping alive the hope of liberation from it. Psychological preparation for possible action for the liberation of the country from communist tyranny.
c) Creating and instilling clandestine support for resistance groups that could later be used as the base of the movement for the liberation of the country.
- The machinery for implementing the OPC project against Albania has already been created and is functioning. There are several operations in development which have given results, despite the relatively small activity. It remains to be determined according to the new assessments whether it is appropriate to change the scale, speed or nature of the operations.
New assessments of the situation
Among the new or changed factors that should receive attention we mention:
a) There are some signals that Yugoslavia may be attacked by the Cominform countries in the near future, or by one of the neighboring satellite countries, or with the active participation of Soviet armed forces.
b) There has recently been an increase in Soviet military personnel in Albania, which points to the intention of strengthening Albanian military power.
c) Yugoslavia, which fears a military attack by the Soviet Bloc, plans to invade Albania as soon as the aggression begins, which it considers possible within a period of ten days.
d) Yugoslavia is involved in a series of clandestine activities in Albania, and is believed to be gathering a force of Albanians in Yugoslavia, with the aim of creating and striking an invading force, similar to that foreseen in the initial OPC plan, for the overthrow of the Hoxha regime.
e) Tito is worried by American and British activity in Albania and has made it clear that he would feel calmer if this were interrupted.
f) In addition to Yugoslav activities, the Greeks, Italians and British are also carrying out clandestine actions, and the situation is further confused by the fact that some governments are using rival political elements for intervention among the Albanians.
g) The Italians and Greeks do not agree with US policies and oppose our objectives of the political groups of the emigration.
h) As a result of taking into consideration the involvement of Italy or Tito, the British Foreign Office would welcome the interruption of our activities in Albania, even though it might accept the continuation of activity at current levels for another year. /Memorie.al
Continued in the next issue
