By Mentor Nazarko
Part Three
Memorie.al / This interview with Ramiz Alia, part of a series published in the Abc newspaper in the autumn of 2005, is undoubtedly the longest, most complete, and most unconstrained exclusive interview of the former communist president at the end of his life. We have chosen to offer the perspective with which he sees Mehmet Shehu, and it is clearly evident that Ramizi has broken away from Enver Hoxha’s official line, according to which Mehmet was a poly-agent.
Continues from the previous issue
Mr. Alia, was it a lack of this support from the Yugoslav pressure that drove Nako Spiru to suicide, or not?
Alia: This is not correct. I don’t know why people want to rehabilitate Tito and Yugoslavia in relation to Albania. No, brothers. Albania has always been, and is today; don’t forget this, in the crosshairs of the Serbs for their own reasons. Just as it has been for the Greeks as well. Now, by seeking the fault for Nako’s suicide in others, my impression – and I would say this to Liri Belishova’s face as well – is that Tito and the Yugoslavs are being defended.
No, they are the ones who killed Nako Spiru, they drove Nako Spiru to his death. And even if they had given him the time he asked for to convene the Bureau, that is, even if Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe (Koçi Xoxe at that time had great power, even greater than Enver’s) had let Nako speak, Nako’s fate was determined by the Yugoslavs, period. I am not defending Enver Hoxha.
I agree that Enver Hoxha made a mistake, because by listening to Nako, he might have learned some things he did not know. But still, I will also play the devil’s advocate for Enver, because there are also extenuating circumstances. Don’t forget the situation, it’s 1947. Enver Hoxha was a victim of Berat, of the Yugoslav attack in Berat. So Enver Hoxha was also in the crosshairs of the Yugoslavs, so he was not entirely free in his actions. As I said, Koçi Xoxe had full power.
Was he not free, since he [Enver] asked for Tito to be appointed Secretary of the Communist Party of Albania as well, right? Does it appear from the documents that Enver Hoxha asked for such a thing?
Alia: I don’t know, I don’t know that he asked for it. I have the impression that these are abuses of history.
They are not retouching of history…!
Alia: No, no, they are abuses.
They [the historians] removed it, those who wrote history in your time, and now it appears from a compilation on relations with Yugoslavia that he asked for such a thing…?!
Alia: I don’t know if they removed it or put it. I have not heard it, this is the first time I hear this matter.
Those who have examined the documents on Albanian-Yugoslav relations say this…!
Alia: Possibly, but I haven’t read about this matter myself. The problem is that history must be viewed with one’s feet on the ground, that is, by judging according to the specific time. At that specific time, Enver might have said what you are saying, because it is known that in 1947, both Enver and Koçi Xoxe, in the first place, were walking towards strengthening relations with Yugoslavia, towards close cooperation with the Yugoslavs, unifying customs, even the currency. So, we were supposedly going to become one and united.
Confederation?
Alia: Close to a confederation.
He agreed with the idea of confederation…?
Alia: At that time, he may have agreed and may have said what you say. But the problem here is that it became clear with Nako’s suicide that all the cards were revealed.
Since you say we must maintain a critical stance towards Tito – I am among those who do – I am asking you how do you explain your stance at that time not being taken against a terrible crime that was committed against a portion of Albanian nationalists, who were taken from Kosovo and killed in Montenegro, in a march that had deaths, killings along the way and then a mass execution in a place near Ulcinj. I want to ask you about this: you too were accused a bit…?!
Alia: I had no connection to this phenomenon, nor did I have knowledge at the time, because when this happened, I was in Sandžak with the Fifth Division, so I don’t know at all what was done down there. But regardless of this…!
When did you find out?
Alia: I found out after liberation, after a long time had passed.
When did the Party find out?
Alia: I don’t know when it found out, but it must have found out at the time, because, after all, they passed through Albanian territory to go to bar. I don’t know how to explain anything to you about that phenomenon, I only know that those people were taken as soldiers, but also suspected as people who had been collaborators with the occupiers.
… Under the pretext that it was easier for them to take them to their divisions by passing through Montenegro and further on to join the forces, they took them and massacred them. So, the Yugoslav plan was practically to kill these people who were labeled as collaborators. It is similar to what Zerva did to the Cham Albanians. Zerva killed as many as he wanted there. While 30,000 other Chams were escorted, taken out of the border, brought to Albania, meaning expelled from their lands. Do the Albanian communists feel any remorse towards this fact that they ignored this…?
Alia: The Albanian communists could not do anything at that time. I heard at a scientific conference a speaker who calls himself a scientist, who said: “Our divisions should have stayed in Kosovo and kept Kosovo united with Albania.” Now such people, where do I know, they are like those little kids when they play war games and can say such a thing, but if you think seriously, a mature man who calls himself a “professor”, when he says that a division consisting of 5,000 people should stay in Kosovo and say that Kosovo is ours, without considering anything…!
Not even international norms?
Alia: Not even international norms. It must not be forgotten that there were some international norms at that time, such as the Atlantic Charter. But, secondly, against a force like that of Yugoslavia which, in the war against fascism, after the allies France and England, in Europe I mean, came Yugoslavia, and for our division to stay and “conquer” Kosovo, was impossible. These are fairy tales and absurdities.
But regarding Kosovo was a voice raised?
Alia: A voice was raised, what do you mean? The thing is, you have read it, Enver Hoxha wrote about the meeting he had with Tito, he raised the issue of Kosovo as early as that time. Tito told him that this problem must be looked at, – but we, he said, – cannot do it now, because it would create a problem for us with the Serbs, etc., and it was left to be looked at later.
These were problems that could be discussed among allies, just as it is discussed today among allies. There are many problems today that are discussed and closed. Today, the American tells the EU, the OSCE, and as he orders, they comply.
Well, did you tell those Yugoslavs to do as you ordered?
Alia: Yes, certainly. The Yugoslavs at that time were our allies who had fought against fascism. You can throw stones at the Soviet Union now as much as you want, but for the Soviet Union in World War II, raise a toast. Even in Kolonjë, toasts were raised.
Clear, clear…!
Alia: Look, I am saying that it is not easy to speak about the past, as you speak about today’s troubles…!
You are now at an age where a person looks critically at what they have done, that is, the active part of their life. For this part, therefore, regarding relations with Yugoslavia, what are some of the things briefly that you would look at critically, that is, I put in the coefficients – lack of experience, international conjuncture, personal weaknesses of one or the other, agency work of the Yugoslavs with one or the other, we are talking now as a leader of the Party of Labour. I am now asking you about some of the moments that you consider as mistakes, as faults in the stance or relationships between the two countries…?
Alia: Look, I will tell you this way, if we talk about Albania’s relations with Yugoslavia in the first phase, I always speak for the period ’45-’48, we did not have the experience that was needed and the Yugoslavs may have tricked us in matters of economic relations. Here we had no experience at all and I am convinced of this. They tricked us in those plans that were drawn up, for the unification of the currency, unification of customs and others.
But Nako Spiru, and this is a great merit of Nako’s, understood this trick and therefore opposed them. And by opposing them, Nako caused everything that was later revealed, that policy of the Yugoslavs which aimed at including Albania in the Yugoslav Federation. As for the problem of Kosovo, I say with conviction that we absolutely made no mistake. Throughout the entire period, even up to 1990, when I was the last one in power under socialism, we fought and raised the issue of Kosovo even before world opinion, under those conditions that could be raised.
We did not seek war with the Yugoslavs, we did not do it and we could not do it. Whoever thinks so is an adventurer. But to raise the issue of Kosovo in all aspects – and our press, if you take it, has dozens and dozens of articles written, meaning to create world public opinion for Kosovo. No tolerance has been shown, especially in the period from ’48 onwards, on this matter.
Tell us something about the fall of communism in Albania. Could it have been avoided and, if so, how? What role did the rigid conception of its economic system play in this fall?
Alia: The fall of communism was not only an Albanian phenomenon. This phenomenon was the result of the “Cold War”, of the efforts that the anti-communist Western world made over decades against the Soviet Union initially and the Eastern European countries later, with the aim of overthrowing the system established in this part of the world.
After World War II, within the framework of the “Cold War”, the West dragged the Soviet Union into the feverish arms race. This caused huge financial resources to be concentrated in this direction, leaving behind both the reconstruction of the country destroyed by the war and the standard of living of Soviet citizens.
In his book “The Future Belongs to Freedom”, Eduard Shevardnadze, who was one of Gorbachev’s closest people, his Foreign Minister, wrote: “We managed to become a superpower, thanks, above all, to our military potential. But precisely this excessive development of this potential, as well as its uncontrolled expansion, have reduced the country to being a third-rate power and have generated processes that have pushed it to the brink of disaster…!
We secured first place in the world arms market… but we found ourselves in 60th place in the world, in terms of the standard of living of the population, 32nd in life expectancy and 50th in infant mortality.” Naturally, the Western diversion also profited from these weaknesses in the internal development of the Soviet Union.
As for Albania, the fall of communism came as a consequence of the overthrow that occurred everywhere in the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall. So the primary factor was external, the influence of events in the East, as well as the direct (political and economic) pressure exerted on the “last domino”, in many ways and means.
But undoubtedly, the overthrow also came as a result of the difficult situation the country was going through, the economic difficulties in which Albania was trapped. You ask whether the overthrow that happened could have been avoided. When the socialist order fell throughout Eastern Europe, it was difficult, not to say impossible, to keep this social order standing in a small country like Albania.
But my opinion has been and is that it could have been passed more easily from one system to the other, that by following a gradual transition, those destructions that accompanied the famous “shock therapies” or starting from “zero level” could have been avoided, that anti-communist madness that accompanied and accompanies the transition, that “class” hatred that is still displayed today between the two main parties on the Albanian political scene. / Memorie.al
Continues in the next issue
