From Dashnor Kaloçi
-Janko Konomi: “The most positive period was the time when it was led by comrades Llambi Gegprifti and Alfred Moisiu, for the Ministry of People’s Defence, and comrade Feruz Mataj, for the assembly”-
Memorie.al / The Special Operative Group that was created immediately after the arrest of the former Minister of Internal Affairs, Kadri Hazbiu, and his deputy, Feçor Shehu, in mid-October 1982, headed by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Zylyftar Ramizi (who also held the function of Director of State Security) and with Enver Zeneli and Hasan Ulqinaku as his subordinates, among other measures, such as the study and analysis of a large number of archival files belonging to a long period (1945-1982), also called upon and requested some of the former high officials of the leadership of the PPSH (Albanian Party of Labour) and former senior leading cadres of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security officers, etc., to submit in writing what they knew or suspected regarding the “hostile activity” of Kadri Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu, or other persons with whom they had been connected by work or not, during the period they had served in that ministry, or in the Internal Affairs Branches in districts, in the Political Detection sector, near our diplomatic representations accredited in various countries of the world, etc.
Among the former high officials of the PPSH and leading cadres and State Security officers, etc., who responded to this call, providing their written testimonies to the Special Operative Group, were: Liri Belishova (former member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the PPSH for propaganda, art, and culture), Nesti Kerenxhi (former Major-General, Director of State Security and Minister of Internal Affairs), Xhule Çiraku (former Lieutenant-General, Director of the Second Directorate of State Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Rexhep Kolli (former Lieutenant-General, Director of State Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Zija Kambo (former Major-General and Commander of the Republic Guard), Zoi Themeli (former Lieutenant-General, Director of State Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Myftar Tare (former Colonel and Deputy Minister for Political Detection, arrested in 1949 and released), Nevzat Haznedari (former Major-General and Head of the Investigation Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Veli Llakaj (former Corps Commander and Chief of the General Staff of the Army at the Ministry of Defence), Hekuran Pobrati (former Colonel and senior State Security officer), Feti Smokthina (former Colonel and Commander of the Republic Guard), Zylfi Saliu (former Colonel, senior State Security officer, head of Internal Affairs Branches in several districts, and deputy of the People’s Assembly), Lelo Sinaj (former senior officer and Director of State Security), Halil Zeneli (former Colonel of State Security and head of Internal Affairs Branches in several districts), Ilo Manushi (senior officer and Director of the Cadre Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Mark Dodani (former Lieutenant-Colonel, senior State Security officer and deputy head of the Sarandë Internal Affairs Branch), Xhemal Bejto Fasllia (former judge and senior State Security officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Ibrahim Kubati (former agronomist graduated in Bulgaria, director of hunting reserves in several districts of the country where the high leadership of the PPSH went hunting, political prisoner), Ali Kubati (former officer of Political Detection in several countries of the world and deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of Tirana, political prisoner), Nexhip Pajo (former officer of the escort group for Hysni Kapo), etc.
From the aforementioned letters sent to the address of the Special Operative Group at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or personally to Minister Hekuran Isai, in the years 1982-1983 (which were later used against Kadri Hazbiu and Feçor Shehu during the investigative process and in the indictments at trial), in previous issues we have published the letters of Liri Belishova, Hekuran Pobrati, Xhule Çiraku, Mark Dodani, Ibrahim Kubati, Nexhip Pajo, Nevzat Haznedari and Sotiraq Zavalani, whereas in this article we are publishing the letter of former officer Janko Konomi, sent to the Minister of People’s Defence, Kadri Hazbiu, in 1982 (a few months before he was arrested), which was used in the investigative process and in the indictment of his trial in September 1983.
From the document in question, Janko Konomi, in his letter addressed to Minister Hazbiu, not only raised a series of problems and concerns regarding the progress of the construction and assembly of equipment and technology of “Object 2575” in Mjekës, Elbasan (as the military factory for the production of ammunition and explosives was called at that time), which was being built with the help of Swedish engineers and specialists, but he did not hesitate to accuse some of the main leading cadres dealing with the construction of that military work, one of the most important that communist Albania had at that time, such as: Mendu Backa, Nuro Brati, Rexhep Saraçi, Spiro Milo, Orhan Bacellari, etc. For more on this, etc., the document in question (part of the archival fund of the Authority for Information on the Documents of the former State Security) informs us, published in full and together with the respective facsimiles by Memorie.al.
THE LETTER OF MILITARY OFFICER JANKO KONOMI, ADDRESSED TO THE MINISTER OF PEOPLE’S DEFENCE, KADRI HAZBIU, REGARDING THE PROBLEMS THAT HAD ARISEN IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECRET FACILITY OF THE MILITARY FACTORY IN MJEKËS, ELBASAN
THE SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA
MINISTRY OF PEOPLE’S DEFENCE
GENERAL SECTOR
No. 1 – 17 Prot.
Tirana, June 28, 1983
Subject: Sending of letter
TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATION DIRECTORATE
(Investigation Group)
TIRANA
According to your request, attached we send you the original and typed letter of officer Janko Konomi, sent to the enemy Kadri Hazbiu, with the notes he made on this letter.
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE GENERAL SECTOR
ZENEL FRANGU
Comrade Kadri,
A few days before the New Year, you held a meeting with the comrades who direct the work at Object 2575 Mjekës. The tasks and deadlines set by you were communicated to us immediately. Judging by the deadlines set, I became fully convinced that you have been misinformed about the real state of the work at this object. For some time, I have been impressed by the manner of work organization and direction of work at Object 2575, but I have justified the very serious shortcomings and defects I observe with the lack of experience and inability of the comrades charged with directing the work to respond to the tasks of this level.
The fact that in the last meeting, comrades Mendu Backa, Nuro Brati, and Rexhep Saraçi, with full awareness, disinformed you, or half-informed you about the real state of the work at the object, forced me to make a synthesis of the facts and main events from the beginning of the construction work, and to make known to you personally the personal conclusions I have drawn.
Below I list in chronological order some of the main facts that have impressed me.
The preliminary project of this object was approved without sufficient consultation with relevant specialists by comrades Nuro Brati, Mendu Backa, and Rexhep Saraçi, and it is a known fact that this project turned out to have many shortcomings. Even for the placement of the objects, the most expensive variant was chosen, reportedly on the orientation of Mehmet Shehu.
The funds necessary for the construction of the work, calculated in advance by specialists, turned out to be 70 million lek. This value was reduced to 40 million, on the initiative of comrade Mendu, eliminating many work and hydro-sanitary facilities, warehouses, and auxiliary units, as well as incorrectly evaluating those that would be built, due to the participation in the work of the engineer corps unit, which was assigned tasks that can be very easily verified as being unrealizable.
In parentheses, I want to emphasize that the participation of the Engineer Brigade in this object seems to me a poorly thought-out task that has caused much damage (given the composition of the soldiers). Just on the eve of the 8th Congress, from the personnel working in Mjekës, several persons have been arrested for hostile activity, and even for attempted escape. Dozens of acts of damage to equipment have been recorded, as well as many poor quality works, which there is no reason not to consider acts of sabotage.
It should be mentioned that the implementation projects of the object have been exposed to this element. If we assume an organized agency work within this personnel, which in my opinion is not impossible, the damage is certainly not small (in terms of de-conspiracy of the secret).
The deadlines for completing the object were initially unrealistic, and this was justified by the need to secure equipment from Sweden, which to some extent is acceptable.
Later, the deadlines set were always too rushed, and since they were not always accompanied by effective organizational measures, these deadlines have played a significant discouraging and demobilizing role. The real state of the work also shows this. In my opinion, in January, the first objects should have been put into operation, while others should have been at a very advanced stage.
The most positive period during which work was done exactly as the tasks required was the time when it was led by comrade Llambi (Gegprifti) and comrade Alfred (Moisiu), for the Ministry of People’s Defence, and comrade Feruz Mataj, for the assembly. Later, this work has constantly declined, while currently it has completely degenerated. Among other things in this regard, we have been put in a difficult, and I might say ridiculous, position even before the foreign specialists.
To speed up the work at the object, an order was given by comrade Mendu Backa to work in parallel on construction and assembly.
In my opinion, this decision was completely wrong and led, as was thought by the majority of specialists, to considerable delays and damages, which are still well known today. In connection with this, an order was also given to open the equipment and send it to the various objects, which led to their mistreatment to such an extent, that the Swedish specialists declared that they would not take responsibility for their operation.
From the contact period and onwards, the persons sent abroad to solve problems have often been assigned in a very subjective manner. Thus, comrades Spiro Milo and Rexhep Saraçi went abroad twice, to accompany and verify equipment without any need, as did Orhan Bacellari, who had and has no connection whatsoever with this object, but was sent simply for “tourism”.
Likewise, comrades Mendu Backa and Nuro Brati have gone several times for problems they were not competent in, and this has had its own negative consequences regarding the decisions and contracts made, which are documented and felt every day even today.
In this regard, you should be aware of the loss of the most expensive cash register of all those that arrived, which was discovered as early as July 1981, but was kept closed until recently, without any attempt to determine responsibility.
Objects 009 and 012 were placed on terrain with unsuitable geological data, which considerably increased their cost. Moreover, due to negligence or inability, Object 009 was lowered by 3 meters from its predetermined level, instead of raising the road by 3 meters, creating the need for massive excavations, at least about 80,000 m³ more than necessary.
The work on the engineering network was dragged on without any reason during July-October and was left to be done precisely now, when the weather is completely unfavorable, placing a big question mark on the completion time of the work. Precisely during that period, the Construction Staff of the work almost did not function, causing great disorganization and all the resulting delays.
The technologists of the work have made remarks both on technical and organizational problems, but they have been kept away from discussing these problems; indeed, they have been oriented to deal mainly with personnel training, while also being deprived of the rights recognized by Council of Ministers Directive No. 8 and the investor’s representation.
During the construction-assembly period, significant defects in the quality of work have been observed, which have either been covered up or glossed over. These poor works have caused considerable losses in time and funds. Thus, the water reservoir has turned out to be cracked, and it has not yet been clarified how its operation will proceed. The retaining wall in front of Object 001, because it was implemented incorrectly, was demolished by order of comrade Nuro Brati and has created a very serious situation at this object. This is the main cause of the delay at this object, not the bad weather, as presented in the information you receive.
Regarding this, a hasty taking-over is being done outside the technical conditions of the objects, in my opinion to create the false impression that the objects are being handed over and work is progressing well. Thus was done with the boiler, the pump station, and the compressor station. The same is intended to be done with the laboratory, this time, they say, by your order.
I do not believe that you have given such an order, but if this is true, I think, comrade Kadri, that you should reconsider it, because in my opinion it is not valid.
There have been significant defects in the laying of cables, in the quality of their assembly, but they have never been treated with the necessary seriousness. Even in this regard, we have been put in a difficult position with the foreign specialists.
As a result of the violation of Council of Ministers decisions to complete the cost estimates of the objects and to work at least on partial cost estimates, the way has been opened for abuses and waste regarding the settlement of situations. In this regard, strong resistance has been made, but the persons who insisted on implementing these directives have been called saboteurs.
In relations with foreign specialists, both regarding work problems and in free relations with them, there has been a lack of correctness on the part of comrades Nuro Brati and Rexhep Saraçi. Not only have they spoken irresponsibly about work problems, but there has also been a lack of correctness in adhering to the meeting schedule, and often, without need, they have used banalities that do not honor us.
Regarding the tasks assigned for 1982 to Military Unit 3202 (engineers), they are completely unrealizable, since they were set without consulting the relevant specialists. It is thought that this unit will realize 8 million lek of work, while not even 100,000 are realized per month! It should be noted that in February 1981, this unit realized about 1 million lek of work, with the organizational measures taken then, while this month not even 50,000 lek will be realized.
Analyzing the above facts and many others I have encountered during my work in Mjekës, I think that due to inability, or lack of commitment to work, or deliberately, the work for the completion of Object 2575 has been sabotaged.
The very serious real situation has no objective reason to be justified. This situation, in my opinion, charges comrades Mendu Backa, Nuro Brati, and Rexhep Saraçi with serious responsibility.
Comrade Mendu and comrade Nuro, in my opinion, bear responsibility for the extremely poor organization of work, for issuing unfounded orders that have had serious consequences for the progress of work at the object, and for making decisions in areas where they were not competent. They bear responsibility for hiding the situation and for its non-realization in time and realistically.
Comrade Rexhep Saraçi also bears serious responsibility for making some incompetent decisions and especially for his opportunistic stance in presenting the real situation, although he has faced great pressure and constant remarks from the specialists around him.
I think, comrade Kadri that the situation at this object, although quite serious, is not beyond repair.
To become better acquainted with the situation, I think it would be good if you came to the object yourself and also met with the other specialists, to have a complete and clear pictured of the situation. Regarding this, I also have a criticism for you that you have not come until now.
I also have the opinion that the staff of the object should be reorganized this time without comrade Nuro Brati, who has shown himself not only incapable of bearing such a burden, but has also gone too far with his irregular conduct at the object, mainly with excessive use of drink, although others have also not lacked opportunities to overindulge.
The Directorate of Military Industry, which has remained relatively indifferent, should also be properly engaged in this work. I think a general shake-up is necessary, to be done as soon as possible. Currently, the deadlines set by you cannot be met, but much can be done to postpone the completion of the complex for as short a time as possible.
Otherwise, with the current pace of work, the first objects expected to be put into operation will not be ready before the end of the semester, and perhaps even later. While the complex could be postponed until 1983, when the object’s warranty period will have expired. Memorie.al
With respect
Janko Konomi
