By Msc. Selami Zalli
Part One
-Shkodra in the Years of the Establishment of the Dictatorship, 1945-1953, from the Perspective of the State Security History-
Memorie.al / Without delving into the historical role of Shkodra as a political, economic and cultural center over the centuries, I will attempt through this study to focus on: “Shkodra in the Years of the Establishment of the Dictatorship, 1945-1953”, from the perspective of the State Security History, concentrating on several main issues.
With the entry into force of Law 45/2015 and the start of activities by AIDSSH (Authority for Information on the Files of the former State Security), the existing Archive was taken over, consisting of a considerable fund of documents. Among the documents important for the study of this period, an integral part of this fund are the “History of the State Security” and the “History of the Shkodra District Internal Affairs Branch”, selected as the main reference material for an analysis of the way this structure was organized and functioned, without prejudice or reminiscences, in a legal, analytical and comparative perspective, highlighting and stripping away hyperbolizations (megalomania), without aiming to ignore or denigrate it, but only through the optics of the time, in a comparative framework.
Shkodra before the war, in the History of the State Security
The first official study of the secret service history, the “History of the State Security” (HSSH), which appears to have been made in 1974 and subsequently reworked, and the “History of the State Security Weapon of the Shkodra District Internal Affairs Branch” (1941-1975), show that the history of the intelligence service, its intelligence activity during the years (1941-1943), considered “the eye and ear of the war” during the Anti‑Fascist National Liberation War, passed through two phases:
- March 1943 – May 1944,
- May 1944 – 29 November 1944.
According to this official study, the intelligence activity during the years (1941-1943) was established without defining by whom and how, with the aim of uncovering the enemy’s plans and attacking him by surprise, as a necessity, to penetrate key places in the administration, the questura, prisons and everywhere.
In the introductory part, describing the internal situation and the “Intensification of the activity of foreign agencies”, “agents” of fascism in Shkodra are sought and identified, identifying as such Anton Harapi, Father Gjergj Fishta, etc., who “… aimed at the annihilation of the CPA (Communist Party of Albania)”.
From the study of this documentation, in the presentation of the state and situation during the war, events are treated that deserve analysis and comparison, such as: the panorama and treatment of the situation in the country, the existence as early as 1937 of the “Albanian Christian Democratic Organization” created by the clergy, its progress and transformation; the demonstration of the Shkodra high school on 28 November 1939, with the hymn of the flag and anti‑fascist slogans, followed by the arrest of 4 students the next day; the demonstration of 30 January 1940, opposing the fascists’ expulsion of 71 activists from school; the demonstration of the girls of the “Donika Kastrioti” school on 4 February 1943, held with political slogans, which was dispersed.
The action of the political prisoners of Shkodra on 24 February 1943, to prevent their transfer to Italy. A protest that lasted 8 hours, where the prisoners hit the carabinieri with any means, taking the fascist marshal hostage. This led the fascists to withdraw from their decision.
From the content of the documentation, no repressive measures of killings, isolation or re‑sentencing of the protest participants among the prisoners are evident. I find it appropriate to make a leap to compare with the incident nearly 30 years later in the political prison of Spaç, where, despite lawful and almost peaceful demands, 4 prisoners were shot, 8 were re‑sentenced to 25 years each, and 56 prisoners were re‑sentenced to over 10 years each.
For all the events listed above, from the security documentation, it does not appear that the events and the repressive measures taken by the fascists were analyzed or treated in detail – perhaps because of their own record?!
The activity of foreign espionage in Shkodra is analyzed carefully and with special attention. According to this documentation, it was carried out through the Austro‑Hungarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Italian, English and German consulates. Until the establishment of the monarchy, Austro‑Hungarian espionage had dominated. Under Zog, Yugoslav espionage dominated which aimed and worked to create the conviction of the “impossibility of Albania’s existence as a state” without Yugoslav help.
According to this history, before the war, this situation motivated and inspired Yugoslav persons who had emigrated to Shkodra for economic reasons; they became a suitable contingent in the interest of Yugoslav intelligence, together with the gentry and the leaders of the Muslim and Orthodox clergy.
This finding, consulted with the “History of the State Security”, does not continue to appear as such – especially the reflection of the Yugoslav element, its minority and the Orthodox clergy. A reasoning and continuity that we do not observe to appear or be the object of security work and repressive measures after the war?!, in the years 1944-1949, when the Defense Division operated in Shkodra, until the “break” with the Yugoslavs.
One cannot help but notice the fact that the main and most prominent leaders of the communist movement in the Shkodra district are from this minority, which in the introductory part of this documentation appears as economic emigrants of Yugoslav origin, a contingent and predisposed as agents of Yugoslav intelligence.
Specifically, according to this documentation, it was Vasil Shanto who led and maintained contacts with most of the informants and information centers.
- Based on these facts and circumstances, it remains to solve and answer several questions that naturally arise, concerning the factor of economic emigrants of Yugoslav origin in Shkodra:
- What happened to this factor, which in Zog’s time was considered a contingent, but now not?
- Did this factor join the war against fascism, or against its policies, regarding the Albanian issue in relation to Yugoslavia?
- How is it explained that within this political grouping (CP), the contingent with this affiliation stood out and came to the forefront, holding a monopoly over everything, such as direction, information, etc.?
How is it explained that in this documentation and period, there is no data on the activity and role of the Orthodox clergy in Shkodra?! At a time when all the rest of the clergy collaborated with the fascists, while coexistence, agreements and religious tolerance are claimed – is this trajectory broken?
Relations with the Yugoslavs are treated as mutual assistance. At the same time, the existence of mercenaries from Kosovo in Shkodra is highlighted? Through a report from the Shkodra Communist Party branch on the presence of 700 Kosovar troops, part of the “Kosovo” regiment, while the direction and control of the information sector were as above.
Throughout the documentation and texts of the “History of the State Security”, when it comes to the Italian consulate and espionage, the emphasis is placed (they are presented) on the wealthy strata, landlords, merchants and northern chieftains, above all with a pre‑dominant role of the leaders of the Catholic clergy, distinguishing and targeting the foremost, Father Gjergj Fishta – already known and universally accepted as a nationalist and anti‑Yugoslav, a preacher and one of the greatest champions of the Albanian cause.
His work was banned under Yugoslav influence and pressure, and its possession and propagation were declared heresy. The issues and problems it addresses troubled all parties, due to its value as a “national political program”, an “explanatory dictionary”, for making an autopsy (identikit) of the friend and enemy of the Albanian nation.
This documentation also anathematizes priests: Frano Gjini, Pal Dedaj, Bernardin Palaj, etc., who are said to have propagated pro‑fascist ideas through the press organs of the Catholic clergy. At that time there were 10 such publications, some of which have begun to be republished, not only for their contemporary value but also because they sound relevant even today. (“Hylli i Dritës”, “Zonja e Shkodrës”, “Leka”, etc.).
In the treatments of this history, what stands out is the hostility and war against foreign capitalist states that had old predatory aims towards our country, to illustrate which not only Yugoslavia is mentioned.
In justice, and naturally in science, the postulate “There is no crime without traces or undiscoverable, only bad searchers” can be used and has its place. Archaeological experiences and expertise support this argument, which through fossils and various objects has managed to construct and interpret how human society functioned since antiquity, determining the socio‑economic formation, political system, level of development and material and spiritual culture. The most significant example remains the burning of the Library of Alexandria – a treasure – but the history of Egypt has been written; the lack of documentation on the Holocaust and the treatment of Jews by the Nazis, yet they have recovered and written their history.
The activity of the State Security after the war
Phase I (December 1944 – September 1946), known for the cleansing operations with the military forces of the People’s Defense, which spread throughout the country, especially in the north.
- Stage I (December 1944 – February 1945) (Resistance: Kelmendi – Koplik)
- Stage II (March 1945 – September 1946) Change of tactics by the pursuing forces.
- Creation of small pursuit units (South),
- Infiltration with informants into the ranks of the bands,
- Transition to offensive with large military units (North).
Phase II (October 1946 – January 1947) The Cleansing Operation in the North. During this period, the Defense Division was reinforced with 4 battalions; the support from the ally (the Yugoslav side) was narrowed and reduced.
This phase is characterized by “punitive operations” for the “disarmament of the population” – very little researched. In this process, from oral testimonies of the time, endless horrors have been heard and described. People, due to the “democratic” forms used, took out loans, crossed the border to find and hand over weapons, because if you did not hand over a weapon – a product of their imagination – security officers did not hesitate to kill, cracking nuts over the victim’s head.
Such stories and events have been told endlessly even before the 1990s, boastfully by their authors, but unfortunately they have been little or not at all documented, and now living witnesses have diminished. Even the Jews do not have official documents for the crimes committed against them, because the Nazis tried to erase the traces, but the living human evidence through memories built the legacy.
In this documentation, values are revoked; the impossibility of any invader to disarm this people, despite the tortures and massacres they had used, is described. “These” succeeded with “persuasion” – which is a paradox.
One of the most effective forms in this period remained the exploitation of the ritual of *besa* (pledge of honor), which was never kept by its contractors in power; likewise the use of amnesty, family hostages, and the incitement and exploitation of feuds, etc.
In the Security documents, popular anti‑communist movements are called “bands”. No dictionary, explanatory manual, encyclopedia or serious scholar can call or define them thus. This is because of the territory and extent they had, the participation and way of organization, looking objectively in the light of facts and statistics, at the actions and behavior of the “liberators”. The number of members of the “bands”, according to this documentation, consisted of 50-400 persons and was led by career military officers trained in the West.
Interesting remains the contradictory and unclear figures when it comes to the liquidation of bands, killed, surrendered and those who remained in the mountains or escaped – for example, if we look at p. 206, Vol. II. At the end of the cleansing operation in 1947, 1,764 bandits were liquidated, of which: destroyed in the years 1945-1947, total 1,194 persons,
- 393 were killed (without trial)
- 601 were captured (nothing about their fate)
- 770 surrendered (nothing about their fate)
- 764
- 774 remained in the mountains (small bands)
Total: 3,538 persons.
What historiography or serious scholar can accept these figures, call and define as a band and bandits these individuals forming such a fighting formation, in conditions of a population of 800,000 inhabitants?
In this period, the intelligence war and its success are attributed to the construction of the informant network, denunciations from the people, surveillance and the data that came out of the investigation?!
Phase III (January 1947 – January 1948), coincides with massive pursuit in small groups, according to the tactics of the bands.
Phase IV (February 1948 – August 1948), called the ebb and flow phase, because of K. Xoxe and the OZNA, and their activity under the mask of assistance.
An interesting and valuable fact for better understanding the organization, activity and dependence of the State Security on the Yugoslavs (OZNA), their dictatorial and paternalistic role in the Security, remains the attachment of Albanian intelligence officers abroad, at their diplomatic representations, and the administration and taking control of all information and foreign service.
From the study of this phenomenon and of the individuals trained and educated in Yugoslavia, its intelligence practices and recruitments, especially the chain recruitment system, through analysis and deduction we can reach correct conclusions as to whether the State Security ever managed to break away from its tutors (Yugoslav or Russian) – this also seen from the subsequent strikes against anti‑party groups within the State Security ranks, where 90% of the agent network in that period (1944-1949) were party members and trusted people of the regime.
In the State Security materials, mention is made of the existence of “black lists” drawn up by the Security, which included even elements from the party ranks. Imagine how these lists could have functioned against ordinary citizens, especially in Shkodra (merchants, those educated abroad, clergy), etc., in conditions where 6,000 files existed.
According to this historiography, in 1948, Zhakonov’s theory was placed at the foundation of Security activity: “Slander became the basic weapon to secure control over the party” and “… if you want to uncover the enemy’s secret nests, look for them near slander…”.
– In September 1948, the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPA was held.
– In December 1948, the Political Bureau of the C.C. approved the “1st Political and Organizational Platform of the State Security”.
What catches the eye and constitutes the greatest paradox is “the fact of setting boundaries (limits)” for the security organs, which could not put into processing anyone from a member of the party’s CC plenum, plenum members in districts, leaders of mass organizations, government members down to deputy ministers??!! and party members only when necessity required.
This does not mean that they were exempt from the obligation to provide information, but they were forbidden to give it to the security operative – they had to inform the party. (the “Chekist” variant).
It is claimed that communists were not collaborators of the security, because they were forbidden by law – making two mistakes at once: one, calling the Political Bureau’s Platform a law, when in fact it is at most an annex to the Party statute; and the deception that they were forbidden to be collaborators and informants.
In fact, the truth is quite different, because it was only forbidden to be called agents, but their intelligence activity was camouflaged under the term vigilance, patriotism and partisanship – yet the platform also provided for exceptional cases “… when necessity required”.
These categories could not be arrested without the approval of the Party’s CC, providing them with a “strange immunity”, which shows the functioning and level of “independence” of the law‑enforcement institutions, prosecutor’s office, court as instruments of the party, dictated and directed by the State Security, regardless of the fact that their appointment and recruitment to duty was carried out through the mechanism of “elections” by the people, and they gave decisions in his name.
From the examination of the existing documentation, it is established that until 1948 the State Security operated only with orders and decisions of the General Staff, was organized according to the structure and used the forms of the OZNA, later transformed into the UDB, from which they declared they had abandoned their use. In many studies and publications to date, it turns out that nothing has changed. Over time, they were enriched with even cruder Russian forms and practices, accompanied by the replacement of Yugoslav advisors with those from the Russian KGB.
In the documentary acts of this period, it was claimed that they would abandon the Xoxe‑ist methods and practices of assessing the guilt of suspects based on formal suspicion, moving to concrete activity, abandoning suggestion, provocations, torture, etc., but the documentation and living evidence show the exact opposite, especially in Shkodra, where, continuing through this period, the cream of the north died under torture and were killed without trial, especially the famous clergy, even beyond the period under treatment.
If we look at the composition of the State Security personnel in the 1950s, only 9% of them had not participated in the National Liberation War, with uneducated elements – they might even be illiterate (77% with complete or partial primary education and semi‑illiterate with anti‑illiteracy courses). In 1951, 20 senior cadres who had attended the one‑year security course in the Soviet Union were appointed as branch heads and section chiefs; they installed Stalinist working methods and practices in these organs.
This may justify the fact that the main forms of work in this period were means of force, physical and psychological violence, the use of torture in the framework of intensive investigation, methods of coercion through family hostages, unkept promises of impunity (amnesty).
At the foundation of the work was the recruitment of agents from the ranks of “enemy” contingents and their connections, based on compromising material.
This period also saw the obligation to document intelligence and agent activity with signature and corresponding date, and rules for their preservation, but surprisingly, although mandatory by their “law”, very few such documents have been inherited and exist today. This shows that, from time to time, the authors erased traces.
The Albanian‑Yugoslav Communist Dictatorship!
I begin this treatment with the phrase “Albanian‑Yugoslav communist dictatorship”, because in my opinion and as historical sources show, during the war and after it in the five‑year period 1945-1949, the communist savagery constantly fed by the presence of Tito’s Yugoslavia was spread throughout Albania but especially in its north, particularly in Shkodra.
After the withdrawal of German troops from Shkodra, with the entry of the partisans into the city, Yugoslav partisans also entered. This marks the first time in history that Slavs entered this city without a fight.
With this event is linked the attempt to displace Shkodra, based on values, from the center to the periphery, and its targeting as the “black sheep”. At first, it’s economic, cultural and above all human values were struck and destroyed, through the looting of archives, libraries, works of art, as well as every other value created over centuries, attempting to erase the identity of this region.
In the official line studies until now, there were no documents or literature about these events, except what was written in the press of the time – information deformed under ideological weight – as for school curricula, publications of the Academy of Sciences or the Institute of History, etc., they are not even mentioned.
In the documentation used, problems are noted in terminology and figures that do not appear precise or clearly defined, but are relativized as: “some, dozens, hundreds, band, criminals, fugitives, annihilation, cleansing”, even “revolt”, without in any case defining the parties and its reasons, without giving any explanation as to by what legal or moral right a people or region could be placed in quarantine, under military and police regime, violated, deprived of fundamental rights such as the right to life, property, free speech and the opportunity to decide their own fate, by a power that calls itself popular.
One cannot help but notice the inaccuracies in description, naming and information, which show not only the low level and ignorance, but also the deformation of the issue, while it was “claimed” – and there are still people who believe – that the security knew and had everything under control.
Throughout the treatments, the illegality expressed by the use of torture, hostage‑taking, killings and “suicides” in prisons, the treatment of women, the use of inhuman methods in investigation, recruitment by violent means, etc., is evident. Their existence and functioning are not mentioned at all, but remain in general terms, to be implied and referred to in other sources, but never in official documentation.
During the discussions in the Constitutional Assembly and the preparation phase for the first elections to be held, among the first opposition voices would be those from Shkodra, just as in 1921. This time, savagery, because of power and to please the “friends”, would sacrifice the people. Given the Yugoslav presence even in supervision and on the ground, the attempt to bypass and hide this leads us to think and believe that behind it were the Yugoslavs, who coveted land and sea, aware that they could not realize this aim as long as there were Albanians here – “so that Albania would not remain without lads” – so they wanted the land emptied.
We clearly observe the phobia and tendency of political fabrication that was projected to come to power, unfortunately under the noses of Western allies, about whom history and documents have not yet reached a clear and scientific conclusion as to whether they erred or wanted it this way. /Memorie.al
To be continued in the next issue
