Part Eighteen
Memorie.al / The United States of America have attempted to exploit Albania for its own interests. Even though there were hundreds of operations during the communist regime to overthrow Enver Hoxha, it seems the goal was something else. The Americans were afraid of the spread of Soviet influence and all the operations had to do with their interest in damaging the Kremlin, and they were not all that interested in Albania. In a declassified CIA document, it is stated that for the Americans, even in the event of war, Albania would have no value at all. For this reason, it is stated there, only 3-4 agents were engaged, who exploited Albanian émigrés for their own purposes.
Continued from the previous issue
Year 1952
The Importance of Albania
The importance of Albania in general is minimal, but in the event of conflict, it may need considerable attention, in order to determine the enemy’s intentions regarding it. But given the more urgent demands in other countries, there is not much justification for expending valuable resources in wartime. We can use the two or three persons we currently have, who have had operational experience in Albania, giving them and other persons with or without experience with Albania the necessary training.
Support for the military mission in wartime
Any discussion of this point is difficult until the type of military mission regarding Albania is known. But in any case we can foresee that our function will be limited by the general nature of the enemy’s intentions regarding Albania, in the course of which our activity too will intensify.
After a possible 24-month period, activities will be reduced, since the enemy’s intentions in all likelihood will no longer have to do with Albania, as happened in the Second World War, where neither side had anything to gain, but only the possibility of losing military manpower, and therefore no efforts should be made to create large military bases or to occupy and control the country.
Our mission in all likelihood will be, at least initially, to determine the veracity of the hypothesis. For this, intelligence elements gained in infiltration operations will be used, whether by air or other routes. Since this has been done in the past as well, our efforts do not need new orientations.
Intelligence Possibilities
Currently there is no reason to believe that in wartime Albania would be different from what we face now. Because of its geographical position, the country would play a very small role in a new conflict. It is far from the main routes of advance of ground forces and has no advantages for air bases.
In all likelihood it would be controlled by the Soviets in wartime, but even logistically it is of little value, since it has no major road or rail connections with neighboring countries, and finally, it would not be logical for European countries to attempt a landing in a hostile country with strong defenses.
For these reasons, the “confusion and chaos” that war brings to Albania would be absent, unless it were provoked by external factors. The task of inciting such conditions would be very interesting, but this document does not aim to discuss the organization of resistance, since that is the competence of the OPC branch and not the OSO.
The need to benefit from inciting chaos in wartime is considered a given, but in this case there are many unknown factors that make such an organization impractical for the moment. In this regard it should be noted that Albania can be considered important for resistance in wartime, and therefore it would be possible to supplement our intelligence missions in order to understand the Soviet Union’s intentions for the region.
Operational Tasks
According to the defined framework, it is ordered that CIA operations in Albania be carried out according to the following instructions. These operational tasks will reflect the demands placed on the CIA by the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. These will take into account the CIA’s capacities, interpreted according to several basic principles:
State priorities show how the emphasis of actions should be placed. Low-priority tasks should not be neglected while carrying out high-priority tasks.
During the collection of intelligence, including observations and operational-type movements, actions must be separated from one another at all times, and resources used according to the established order of priorities in national policy.
Agent potentials
There are contacts between some officers and two members of the Albanian legation in Rome. Some meetings have not given much hope for a possible defection, although one has shown possibilities of conversion. There are means for audio intercepts, but covert infiltration into the embassies of Rome or Paris is not currently possible. In Paris we can carry out intercepts, but there are no American personnel available.
Usually in such operations a liaison point is needed, and we are informed that there may be complications. While in Rome we have the equipment and personnel, but for reasons of the low priority assigned to Albania compared to other areas, there is little chance of exploiting them. Usually the search for agents is conditioned by the lack or the emergence of chance opportunities. We will continue to seek and exploit every opportunity that arises.
CIA Cover
As a result of the operational situation, operations in Albania have been mainly based on the use of the means of other countries. They have been carefully examined and used to the maximum. These means of the past and that may be used in the future are listed as follows: Émigré groups centered in Italy and Greece have provided people for operations and for liaison missions in Albania in the past.
The possibility of exploiting these groups has diminished over time for several reasons, including the emigration of a large number of refugees, recruitments by other OPC services, as well as the death of some leaders who were sent initially to Albania.
CIA bases in Germany, Greece and Italy
The CIA still has a broad number of personnel, such as a company with 250 people in Germany. It is hoped that in the event of war they will serve as a group for possible agents from the OPC. In peacetime there is not much chance that we will use people from this group. In Greece, the base has a suitable infrastructure to train agents in communications, parachuting or other aspects of operations.
In Italy, we can use the assets made available by the Italian services, but for reasons of Italy’s geography, they are less important than Greece. Italy’s operations in Albania have so far included air drops of packages, while Greek missions in the south and center of Albania have included ground and sometimes maritime infiltrations.
Plans for economic aid
This will come in the form of basic food items, equipment for roads and railways, with the aim of securing an anti-communist government. A major precondition of this document is that during this time Albania remains outside any direct contact with the countries of the Soviet orbit.
If this condition is changed by a Soviet coup in Yugoslavia, removing Tito and establishing a red regime on the Adriatic, or by the return of Macedonia to a Soviet country, including parts of territories in Bulgaria, Greece or southern Yugoslavia, the entire project for overthrowing the Hoxha regime must be redrawn, if not completely abandoned.
The 3 categories of Albanians in emigration
90 percent of Albanians who earn their living honestly on different continents by working in factories, mines, restaurants, not to mention the professions they have had or the posts they have previously held, for which Albanians should truly be proud.
Another group is those who call themselves leaders, politicians and their satellites, who consciously or not infect the emigration with their partisan machinations, thus contributing to the rise of Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu in Albania.
The third group consists of those who, for reasons of old age, cannot emigrate or cannot earn a living and find themselves followers of political doctrines.
Here are the plans for border crossing
Our current needs for intelligence support and those for the near future are very limited. We have devoted in the past and will continue to devote importance to intelligence from Albania. But this has been done more in support of the OPC branch (Office of Policy Coordination) and not for our operations, since for the OSO it is generally useless to document illegal agents for travel to a state where the population is completely static and where every foreigner attracts a great deal of attention.
More important for the OSO is finding Albanian currency for our border-crossing missions. This is because the Albanian lek is not used for exchange in non-communist countries and finding it has been a constant problem in the past as well. But it is believed that soon we will find a solution, since the UDB has promised us a limited amount that is supposed to come from their operations or from refugees crossing the border.
How would the CIA bases in Italy and Greece be used?
In the event of war, some selected Albanian agents in Greece, Trieste, and Italy will be evacuated according to the respective plans for these areas, toward a base in North Africa. Plans for the accommodation of agents will be drawn up with competent people and we have the possibilities to make realistic plans. The scale and intensity of operations for Albania cannot be foreseen, so we can assume that during this period as much information as possible must be gathered on the enemy’s actions and intentions.
We must also carry out the distribution of around ten groups of four people each with normal supplies of weapons, ammunition and radio, and therefore measures must be taken for their supply. In the first 12 months of the war we must take into account that five groups of four people each will be distributed at six-month intervals. During the final phases of the war the accumulation of materials will be based on the requirements of the operations for Albania, which for the moment are undeterminable.
The logistics support plan
Personnel needs, recruitment and training,
A plan for personnel has already been submitted for a competent individual who, after adequate training, will take the leadership of the branch for Albania.
Two of the four new staff officers will be recruited by December 1956.
From the persons mentioned above, suitable individuals should replace the officers in Rome and Athens.
Apart from possible training in the Albanian language, no special training is needed. Language training will be carried out by former field agents.
Headquarters, structure and organization
The current structure and organization must be suitable for the needs of operations for Albania.
Operational structures in the US and abroad
No special structures and facilities are needed, since the Athens point is sufficient for the needs of operations.
Current supplies and accumulations
At the time when the North African base becomes ready, the list of material requirements for our 20 groups of four people will also be prepared. Current needs are small and are met from supplies.
The base in Africa
The matter of the North African base is believed to be receiving all possible attention from the competent authorities.
Communications requirements
The only operational requirement is Albanian currency, which it is believed will be achieved through purchase from the UDB.
Methods for infiltrating agents
– Use of capable and trained agents with contacts inside the country.
– Use of guides who know the border and the route toward the area of operation.
– Infiltration of agents into their countries of birth.
– Direct contacts should be made only with persons of proven reliability.
– Complete documentation.
– Limitation of border-crossing missions only to the objective of recruiting a limited number of important agents and not of groups left waiting for long periods.
– Limitation of the size of groups. Normally such missions should be kept to groups of two people or only one person.
– Missions should be carried out quickly and frequently, not long and occasional.
– Depending on opportunities over which we have no control, there are future possibilities for regular travel into the country, if it happens that travel to Albania becomes more frequent, activity with double agents, Albanian defectors.
– Recruitments in the area.
Statistics of border escapes
Operational data
Crossings and infiltrations successfully carried out.
1952- 5 groups 26 individuals; 2 groups 4 individuals
1953- 3 groups 15 individuals; 1 group 2 individuals
Losses during border crossings
1952: 2 captured alive, 1 presumed dead
1953: 4 captured alive, 3 dead, 1 presumed dead
Agents trained for infiltration: 18 (7 of whom trained as telegraph operators). Memorie.al
Continued in the next issue
