Part Seventeen
Memorie.al / The American secret service fought for years and years to overthrow the communist regime in Albania, but despite its efforts it could not accomplish such a thing. However, in 1951, the Americans began to withdraw somewhat, as they feared a movement from the neighbors, especially Greece and Italy. According to a document declassified by the CIA, they were afraid that if Enver Hoxha’s regime were overthrown, there could be a military intervention from the neighbors. For this reason, with the help and of Great Britain, they began negotiations with the neighbors to prevent such a thing. On the other hand, the document also shows the interests that the Soviet Union had for our country.
20 June 1951
Subject: The Independence of Albania
- The Problem
If the internal power were to collapse or if Yugoslavia were to be attacked by the Cominform, it would occupy Albania and Greece would do the same. Since the Yugoslavs have slightly touched upon the subject of cooperation with Greece, and the Greeks have consulted with the USA, consequently leading to a request for consultation with the British as well, Britain and the USA, if they wish Albania to remain independent, must demand from Greece and Yugoslavia a guarantee that their occupation will be temporary.
While if the independence of Albania is no longer important, our efforts should focus only on preventing a clash between the forces of the two occupying countries. The British general would prefer an independent Albania friendly to the West, but this not at the cost of weakening Greece or Yugoslavia. He also wants an approved border demarcation line between the two countries.
The following facts argue in favor of independence:
Ethnic and historical reasons
The existence of the National Committee of “Free Albania”
The difficulties of an alternative solution and the possible conflict between the interested countries such as Greece and Yugoslavia
Facts against independence:
The smallness and instability as a state, which makes one think whether it would be better as a republic of the Yugoslav federation. This could be acceptable to Yugoslavia and even to Greece. Albanians could distance themselves from Italy, but since the Yugoslavs are orienting toward the West this would not be a very unacceptable solution for the Albanian population.
This could be carried out also with the assumption that Albania will continue to be independent
Recommendations:
As soon as possible, urge the Yugoslavs and Greeks not to enter Albania if attacked by the USSR satellites, but if they do, to accept a border line.
As soon as they begin the action, declare publicly that the occupation is temporary.
Advise the countries that if the regime falls, we wish to be consulted on the succeeding regime, with them and with the Italians.
Yugoslav Interests
Serbia opposed in principle the independence of Albania in 1912 until 1918. After the First World War, the Yugoslavs occupied Albania until 1921, while in 1926 Yugoslavia accepted the Albanian border determined in 1913. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, Italian domination prevented Yugoslavia from exercising influence. But the situation changed greatly during the Second World War when Tito’s regime through the Albanian communists took control of the National Liberation Movement.
Tito exercised control through his emissaries in the Albanian Liberation Army and from 1944 until 1948 Albania was a puppet of Yugoslavia. In 1948 Hoxha separated the country from dependence on Yugoslavia after the conflict between Tito’s regime and the Cominform (International Information Bureau of Communist Countries). From 1948 Tito defended the principle of an independent and sovereign Albania, condemning Greek claims for the partition of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia fears most the re-establishment of Italian influence in Albania. In recent months, Yugoslav propaganda means have accused Italy of encouraging Albanian ethnic plans for the inclusion of Kosovo and Metohija in an independent Albania, through Albanian emigrant groups there. Tito’s aim seems to be the creation of an anti-Soviet regime in Albania and the restoration of its status of the years 1944-48.
Apparently for this purpose, in May 1951, the League of Albanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia was created in Yugoslavia. The League claims to represent about 5000 Albanians in Yugoslavia and is controlled by communists who left Albania after 1948. It was created by Belgrade as an instrument of Yugoslav policies and has as its declared objective a “free, independent, indivisible, democratic and republican” Albania.
The League has carried out several espionage, cabotage and propaganda operations, and possesses potential for wider operations. But it is perhaps Yugoslavia’s currently exposed position after the split with the USSR that has prevented Tito from using the League at full power. Yugoslav officials have said that serious efforts to overthrow Hoxha’s regime could become a pretext for the Soviet Union for military actions against Yugoslavia.
The Importance of Albania for the Russians
Politically, Albania is important to the Soviets as a temple of communism in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean. The USSR would consider its loss as a loss of prestige, especially after the defection of Yugoslavia. But although it has a strategic position at the entrance of the Adriatic Sea, the modern conditions for the development of its military capacities are small.
The island of Sazan has been a small Italian submarine base and according to some rumors the Soviets are also trying to rebuild these bases after the war. There are unconfirmed reports of reconstruction of airfields by the Soviets. Albania has a good position for early warning air defense installations, but so far there is no evidence of the installation of Soviet radars.
Since its distancing from Yugoslavia, Albania has lost its strategic importance due to the lack of communication with the Soviet orbit. But it could be important for a land campaign in the Balkans, since possible operations in cooperation with Bulgaria, if successful, could separate Greece from Yugoslavia.
The Stability of the Regime and the Extent of Soviet Control
Before the split between Yugoslavia and the Cominform in 1948, Albania was closely linked politically and economically with Yugoslavia. But instead of following Marshal Tito’s deviation, Hoxha chose the Moscow camp and began a harsh campaign against Albanian nationalists. He not only excluded the country from ties with Yugoslavia, but on this occasion eliminated all competition for power within Albania.
A rivalry between Hoxha and the interior minister Mehmet Shehu seems insignificant since both are controlled by the Kremlin. Albania is totally dependent on Soviet aid. Without it the country’s economy would be shaken within a few months. Soviet control in the country is reinforced by about 1000 to 1500 “experts” in important positions such as the army, police, and civil administration and in the ranks of the party.
With Soviet support Hoxha and Shehu have governed the country until now with the police methods of terror and with harsh economic control. Although there is evidence of lack of loyalty and opportunism in the ranks of the security forces and the army, they have proven effective in suppressing the opposition. Soviet support in Albania has not been accompanied by a mutual assistance pact, perhaps because the Soviets want to leave a situation open without commitments that could later put them in an awkward position.
Albania has such a pact only with Bulgaria (16 December 1947). But in any case any change in the Albanian situation that could threaten the Kremlin’s control would immediately affect Soviet prestige, at a moment when another satellite has deviated from its order. Therefore such a development would bring a worsening of the international situation. Soviet action in the event of such a development would depend on the priorities of their world strategy.
Conclusions
Soviet obstacles to US access to Albania have not caused significant strategic or military disadvantages. The country’s economic resources have only limited local advantages. Access to the terrain, which is a broad primary coastline in the Balkans, in the event of a major conflict would also be insignificant due to the lack of suitable ports, airfields and poor communications in the country.
Likewise, Soviet control over Albania gives it only a weak advantage in the event of a major conflict. The country’s economic resources cannot be reached by land, and their development would require large investments in people and machinery, which would be out of proportion in relation to the benefits, therefore even the USSR, cannot carry them out.
Although the use of advanced submarine bases or suitable airfields would have advantages in wartime, the possible sites for them are limited in number and capacity, and would be unusable against a superior air or naval military force. And in fact, the importance of Albania for the Great Powers is mainly negative and consists of the possibilities for use as a guerrilla base for military harassment in major operations.
The Position of the USA on the Independence of Albania
The USA continues to have as its objective the preservation of Albania as an independent state and friendly to the West. Any policy that aims at the disappearance of Albania’s independence or the partition between Yugoslavia and Greece will not be supported. The main reasons for this are as follows: The Albanian people have a character of their own and strong feelings for independence. Moreover, it has been a country, at least nominally independent since 1912. The right of Albanians to be independent has been recognized and supported in many public statements of the US government, and also by Britain.
If there were no independent Albania, there does not seem to be another way for the resolution of the territorial conflict between Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy in this strategic zone, which affects the security of others. None of these states would support the establishment of the influence of their rivals in this region, and no agreement for partition is likely to be stable and permanent. The handing over of Albania to one or more neighboring countries would sow the seed of minority problems that could undermine the security of the region.
Diplomatic Actions
The support we have given to the National Committee for “Free Albania” has been made with the assumption that an independent Albania is important for American interests. Actions that neglect Albania’s right to independence, apart from moral factors and the difficulty of justification before public opinion, would give a powerful propaganda weapon to the Soviet government and its puppets in the Albanian government.
But in any case it may be necessary to accept some measures of neighboring nations for armed intervention in the event of the start of fighting in the Balkans. The US government believes that the continuation of diplomatic efforts and other ways should aim at an independent Albania friendly to the West, but at the same time we must be vigilant for the preservation of American policies and interests in the region and the preservation of good relations with Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia.
It is believed that the desired goal is the transition from an Albania dominated by the Soviets toward a free country not dominated by neighboring countries, which will have the general support of the West. The measures to be taken in this direction must be coordinated between the American and British governments, and as the case may be also with other Western governments.
Encouraging Internal Conflicts
As conceived from the beginning, the project for Albania has a minimal objective, the encouragement of internal conflict in Albania, with the aim of reducing its ability to support guerrilla groups in Greece, and a maximal objective the overthrow of the Hoxha regime. Currently we have a close coordination of policies with the British, but not operational engagement. Since the approval of the project, two major changes of the international situation have occurred: the cessation of the guerrilla war in Greece and the worsening of relations between Tito and the Soviet countries.
The increase of the Kremlin’s pressure on Tito has brought changes in the policies of the USA, which wishes to preserve Tito’s regime as a blocking bloc of Soviet influence in the region. The recent changes have brought shifts also in the basic conditions of the project and a revision of its objectives. Thus, on 6 September 1949, the State Department and the British Foreign Office decided that the maximal objective of overthrowing the regime in Albania should be abandoned for the moment.
Propaganda Center from Greece
In addition to the almost open propaganda establishment mentioned above, the OPC has also created a propaganda center in Greece for the preparation of “black” and “gray” propaganda for Albania and Bulgaria. This center currently also has at its disposal two short-wave radio transmitters, mobile, which are expected to begin transmissions in September. In addition to these, a medium-wave transmitter has been installed on a naval vessel that sails in the Ionian or Adriatic Sea, which is used for propaganda transmissions to Albania.
The ship is based in Greece and capable of operating for periods of two weeks, before returning to base for supplies. Transmissions from this ship are expected to begin in late autumn, possibly on 15 November. As an addition to the ship’s transmitters and the two mobile transmitters, procurements are also starting for another medium-wave transmitter of 50 kilowatts, which will have a greater power than the apparatuses mentioned above./ Memorie.al
Continues in the next issue
