Part Nineteen
Memorie.al / The overwhelming majority of Albanians did not want Enver Hoxha at the head of the country. This has been made known in a document published by the CIA, which states that around 1948, 80% of Albanians did not agree with the communist regime. It states there that the war against religion, the economic situation and the iron hand of the regime had brought great dissatisfaction among the people. For this reason, in the North and South of the country, a series of guerrilla groups had been set up, working against the regime. According to the CIA, their attempts to overthrow Hoxha were very difficult, because the material base, the armaments they had were very old and their possibilities were insufficient. On the other hand, those in the North were different, since in some cases they were helped with armaments and material base, and through the territory of Yugoslavia of that time.
Continued from the previous issue
Dissatisfaction with Hoxha
Information on the extent and quality of guerrilla resistance in communist Albania is difficult to find, as much as that on the regime. But information has increased recently, so that we can determine a general trend. In mid-1948, it is reported that silent opposition to Hoxha’s regime predominates in about 80% of the population. The factors that suggest this are the suppression of the traditional resistance of the mountainous areas, the regime’s persecution of all religious faiths.
The heavy economic situation in the country, the lack of prestige of the political and military leaders and certainly a widespread hatred of Slavism in general. Most of the active resistance is found in the central and northern mountainous areas, among the Catholic Ghegs, who consider their rivals the Tosks as responsible for the lands of the South. Thus to the negative factor of the antagonism between the regime’s secret police and the tribal communities, the positive factor of ethnic hostility has been added. Current reports refer only superficially to resistance in the South of Albania.
None of the reports on these groups speaks of the weapons they possess, but it is assumed they use old means such as muskets, or some light Western weapons left over from the war. Ammunition is also believed to be scarce. For food, the guerrilla groups undoubtedly rely on the goodwill of the mountain people. In these circumstances it seems most likely that resistance against the regime is limited only to harassing actions, without being able to control territories or community centers.
Resistance in the Diaspora
All the surviving members of the middle and upper classes of Albania have now left the country. The groups consist of merchants, artisans, professionals and some landowners. Most of them were forced by collaboration, some less and some more, with the Germans during the war; most of them remain in Europe and live in poverty, or on charitable aid. Centers of exiled Albanians have been created in Italy, Greece, Egypt and the USA.
With the exception of those in the USA, the emigrants are divided mainly into three political groups: the Zogists or Legaliteti, which is found in Cairo around King Zog himself, created in 1943 by the Gheg activist Abas Kupi. While the ‘Balli Kombëtar’ has the majority of its members in Italy, spread also in Greece and less in the Near East, founded in 1942, under the chairmanship of Mit’hat Frashëri. Meanwhile, the “Blloku Kombëtar Indipendent” is a republican, anti-Italian, mainly leftist and reformist, strongly anti-communist grouping, founded in Italy in 1947 by the fascist collaborators, headed by Ismail Verlaci, son of former Prime Minister… Shefqet Verlaci. The group has a conservative and capitalist nature.
Although the “Balli” and the “Blloku” publish newspapers in Italy, neither of them can sustain a regular publication. There is also an Albanian liberal brochure in London by Tajar Zavalani and Dervish Duma, with some followers in Turkey; we also have a Committee of Kosovars led by Xhafer Deva. Until Tito’s split from the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist countries) in 1948, the three main groups, although they had in common hatred of Hoxha’s regime and of Greek territorial claims in the South, were continuously antagonistic toward one another, and the institutional question was the main point of debate among them; the republicans of the “Balli Kombëtar” proposed that according to the results of a referendum after the liberation of the country from the communists, a government representing every group should come to power. The Blloku Kombëtar Indipendent had sympathies for the Monarchy, the monarchists themselves sought the return of Zog, but let it be understood that they accepted the referendum.
“Balli Kombëtar”
Other issues were the reformist program of the “Balli,” which raised doubts in the other two groups, or the territorial claims toward Kosovo that the Zog grouping had. The leaders of the “Balli” and the “Blloku” could tolerate these issues for the moment. There were also clashes of characters that prevented the union of the groups. During the years 1947 and 1948, Zog showed initiatives toward unity, and proposed the formation of a National Liberation Committee, on condition that all accepted: 1. The holding of the referendum after clear recognition by the leaders of the three groups of the constitution of 1928, in which Albania was recognized as a Monarchy; That the leaders of the groups work for the resettlement in Albania of those who had left, after the liberation of Albania. Anti-Zog propaganda among the refugees was to be prohibited.
The first point and the third point clearly do not seem to have been realistic, while the second was considered an attempt by Zog to bring all the refugees into one zone, so that he could control them. Almost at the same time, Zog sent representatives to the American embassy in Cairo, to declare his friendly intentions regarding Greece. The envoys said that Zog was ready to form the “Free Albanian Government,” from which would be excluded the refugees who had collaborated with the fascists and the Germans.
They also said that Zog was committed to the principle of the referendum. Further, there was talk of British and American mediation in the Greco-Albanian debates, but Zog’s effort failed, because the Greek minister in Rome was discussing with Frashëri and his followers; that is, when Zog understood that there would not be full control of the joint movement of the diaspora.
August 21, 1950
The situation of resistance in Albania
From one of our missions in Albania, which is in close contact with the resistance movement, we have received the information elaborated in the following paragraphs. According to our mission, many members of the Albanian resistance believe they can no longer endure the sufferings they are undergoing and have decided to escape toward Yugoslavia at the first opportunity. They would prefer to go to Greece, if it were not for the long distance from the North of Albania to the Greek border. Despite the efforts made to convince them to stay in Albania, it is clear that they cannot stay another winter in the mountains, as life is so difficult that it is driving them toward madness.
The leader of this mission has asked to know whether the Yugoslav political activists in Albania (reported earlier to you) are known to us and whether they represent the effort of the Allies. They also asked whether anti-communist activists from Albania would be welcomed in Yugoslavia. Regarding Yugoslav support for the allies, it was asked what Yugoslavia’s policy was regarding Korea.
The above message informs us that Tropoja is the center of Albanian and Yugoslav espionage, with Yugoslav and Albanian agents continuously crossing the border. The Yugoslav agents are described as all having previously been members of the Albanian resistance groups. On August 10, 1950, our mission in the country sent a contact to investigate the invitation to meet an unidentified person who wished to supply the mission with Yugoslav weapons and ammunition.
The movements of the Yugoslavs
Among the populations of Northern Albania there is a great conviction that the Yugoslavs are planning an armed movement in Albania, with the aim of raising the morale of the mountain resistance groups. Some quantities of weapons are reported to be distributed every day by the Yugoslavs, which have also been accepted by Albanian nationalists, to whom they had also approached before, but who had refused, waiting for approval from our mission.
The leader of the mission fears that such generosity on the part of the Yugoslavs will have the effect of gaining the sympathy of many persons who have suffered a great deal, working for us. In conclusion, the leader of the mission said that his convincing work would not be sufficient; therefore he needed urgent instructions on the manner of action he should follow.
The plan for the election of the new government
To elect the important leaders to organize the provisional government and the police force in free Albania. As soon as the establishment of the government is secured, to install the important officials to create the initial structure of the provisional government. To announce the establishment of the power of the provisional government of Albania. Through the cores created beforehand, to expand the internal resistance and to strengthen the elements of the central and regional government.
Before the day of the attack, to develop the resistance units and internal elements for the provisional government. For them, detailed operational intelligence is to be obtained. All operations before the day of the attack are to be completed beforehand by the joint headquarters. The secondary commands are to prepare their plans and submit them to the joint command headquarters for approval.
The aims of the Committee for “Free Albania”
– To lead and encourage our brave people toward resistance to the cruel communist regime and to effectively organize Albanians abroad in aid of the resistance. Our people in Albania must become aware of the worldwide opposition to communist oppression and of the growing power of nations with free parliamentary elections.
– All the activities of the Committee are directed toward the restoration of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Albania.
– The NCFA is aware of the great responsibility it takes upon itself on account of the Albanian people and seeks the help of free nations and democratic states.
– The NCFA also publishes a newspaper in the Albanian language, “Shqipëria,” which has a circulation of almost 4,000 copies. It is published once every two weeks in New York and copies of “Shqipëria” are sent to Albanians in the United States, England, Australia, Greece, Italy and Turkey.
A copy of it is attached here for your information.
The letter of the emigrants on the occasion of Independence
Seven years ago Albania lost its independence, gained with much struggle, falling under the regime of the communists and their puppet leader, Enver Hoxha. This move of the communists left a bad mark on the country that for 2000 years has fought to gain independence. This also marks the loss of the freedom gained on the day of the country’s independence, which was November 28, 1912. On that day, in the midst of the Balkan wars, a group of noblemen gathered in Vlora issued the declaration of independence.
With this act these people took a major step, continuing the legacy of our national hero, Skanderbeg, who fought nobly for the independence of Albania in the 15th century against the invading Turkish hordes, marking one of the most glorious periods of the country. From this victory comes also Skanderbeg’s flag, which is now our national emblem, that of the double-headed eagle.
Here is the conversation of the American major with the CIA agent
- August 19, 1953 – I met with Major General Elmer J. Rogers of the USAF, a member of the Joint Observance Committee of the JCS, at his request, to discuss our agency’s latest document on Albania. The document has been referred for comments to the branches of the PBS and JCS.
- The conversation was mainly a discussion of the latest proposals for the possible detachment of Albania from the Soviet orbit. We agreed that the document in its current form and in the current circumstances was of importance to the State and the CIA, and that military interest would be minimal, until the time when diplomatic negotiations had advanced beyond the current point of developments.
- General Rogers said that from a purely military point of view, the detachment of Albania from the orbit would have very little strategic advantage, but the psychological benefits would be considerable. He also spoke on two points: (a) although the detachment of Albania would not be a cause of war for the Soviet Union, this action would provoke its revenge in other elements, and (b) an unsuccessful attempt at the detachment of Albania would have serious psychological and diplomatic consequences in Western Europe and elsewhere.
The document of the British and the CIA
After several meetings we and the British drafted a document describing an accepted course of action: this was the domination of the Ermenji group in the efforts to settle the differences with the dissidents and the solutions of the problem with the “Balli.” If this failed, other steps should be considered. A little later in Rome, Hasan Dosti was given a “verbal note,” which stated that; the joint Anglo-American view was action along two paths:
Either to accept the inclusion of representatives of the dissidents in the executive committee of the NCFA, or to make a compromise with them within the “Balli.” The Balli chose the second alternative and gave us a written statement saying that they would take quick steps to achieve the desired re-counseling. In any case, the discussion of the methods they would use showed that the “Balli” was only fulfilling the obligation to talk about the idea of re-counseling. / Memorie.al
Continued in the next issue
