The fifth part
Memorie.al publishes some archival documents extracted from the Central State Archive in Tirana (Fund of the former Central Committee of the ALP), where there is a voluminous file with the initials “Top Secret” which belongs to the year 1982, where the Group of The Army Instructors at the Central Committee of the ALP, the Army Security Branch, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Zylyftar Ramizi and Minister Hekuran Isai, inform the Central Committee and personally Ramiz Alia, or the Secretary of the Central Committee, Simon Stefani ( covering the organs of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, after the death of Hysni Kapos), related to: “various hostile activities and espionage” as well as extraordinary events that occurred during that year in some districts of the country, mainly those who were subordinate to the Branches of Internal Affairs of Shkodra, Lezha, Durres, Vlora, Gjirokastra, Saranda, Pogradec, Kolonja, etc.
All full documents with report-information compiled by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hekuran Isai, sent to the Central Committee and personally Ramiz Alia and Simon Stefani, starting from: The document with information about the Shkodra event, where the non-commissioned officer of the Artillery Regiment The anti-aircraft gunner, Hasan Sulejman Hyseni, after firing four times with a pistol at the commander of Prapavija, officer Hilmi Gavoçi, set off towards the village of Zogaj, where dressed as a shepherd with sheep, crossed the clone, but was killed in an attempt by the Border forces. , after previously injuring the Border Non-Commissioned Officer, Misto Osmani.
Document with information-report of the Army Security Branch, for October 1982, where 37 persons (officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers and civilian employees), “implicated in hostile events and espionage activities”, etc., such as: former Commander of the Shkodra Corps, Tefik Ruçi as the Commander of the Voluntary Forces of the district, accused as “UDB agent”, officer Nasi Bakuli, effective of the 8th Elbasan Group, for “agitation and propaganda”, etc. ., officer Sami Sokoli, lecturer of the Aviation School in Vlora, is being pursued in active processing 2 / A, for “espionage activities”, etc., Xhelal Stojku, originally from Dibra and resident in Tirana, employee of the Army Repair Company , is accused of: “he was mocked by the speeches of the main leader of the Party”, “officer Beqir Xhaxho, effective of the Free School, Dema – Fier”, says that they killed Mehmet Shehu himself and treat the people like cattle, officer Petro Mile , in the Infantry Brigade in Himara, “lost a document secret with the planning of the Border service ”, officer Riza Cara, of the Free Military School in Melan of Peshkopi, has lost the Bulletin no. 1 of the Central Committee of the ALP “, officer Petrit Jarnexhi, former secretary of the basic organization of the” Skënderbej “School Party,” kept hidden the materials of the enemy Mehmet Shehu “, officer Spiro Adhami, the Commander of the Military Academy, documents of the enemy Kadri Hazbiu in the safe ”, etc.
The document with the report-information where for the period January-November 1982, the Border forces of the Internal Affairs Branch of Durrës and Saranda, have seized 16 foreign naval vessels with 49 people on board (Italians, Greeks, Australians, West German , etc.), who had entered our territorial waters, “allegedly for tourist walks”, the killing by border forces of two Italian citizens near the military point of Kakome and the Gulf of Karaburun, for: border violation, espionage activities, smuggling “, Etc., the arrest of a large number of violators within the territory of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania,” after the discovery of the hostile activity of Mehmet Shehu, Kadri Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu, etc., for the purpose of landing as happened with the gang Xhevdet Mustafa ” , etc.,
Information report for the four athletes: Ali Kastrati, Arjan Bimo, Halim Durimi and Petro Ruci, who belong to the football teams: “Partizani” -, “Shkëndija”, “17 Nëntori”, and “Flamurtari” -, where during the activities sports developed abroad, “took with them large quantities of foreign currency, buying various goods and upon return, were caught by our customs authorities, after smuggling them”, etc.
Information-report on the extraordinary event that took place in mid-October 1982, when near the Pashaliman Military Base, “a foreign submarine was spotted and although the Navy fought, it was ordered to force it to come to the surface and then shoot her, she did not perform this combat task, due to… ”!
Information report on Officer Nasi Bakuli originating from the villages of Gjirokastra and acting as Group Commander 155 m / m. in Peqin, effective of the 3rd Artillery Brigade in Elbasan which “develops agitation and propaganda against the popular power and speaks with insulting words against the children of the leadership…”, etc.
Information report on the “70 km release operation. water surface of the Yugoslav side near the Buna River, by Mehmet Shehu, Kadri Hazbiu and Nesti Nases, which came after several years of continuous contacts between the relevant commissions, related to the event of 1975, when a Yugoslav ship shot down our ship “Ismal Mustafa” and killed the captain Fran Ivanaj “, etc.
Fund: CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY
(GROUP OF ARMY INSTRUCTORS)
Title and content
INFORMATION OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, DIRECTED BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALBANIAN LABOR PARTY,
Continued from the previous issue
The “Top Secret” document, drafted by the military sector near the apparatus of the Central Committee of the ALP, sent to Ramiz Alia, regarding the “problem of the foreign submarine that was introduced near the Pashaliman Base”!
I N F O R M A T I O N
ON SOME PROBLEMS RISING FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TASK FOR DETECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE FOREIGN SUBMARINE THAT ENTERED THE BAY OF VLORA
In mid-October, a foreign submarine was discovered near the Pashaliman Base. The Navy was ordered to force the foreign submarine to come to the surface and, when it disobeyed, to destroy it. This combat mission, by the Fleet ships, was not fulfilled. In addition to the work done by the Ministry of People’s Defense, on its way to find the causes of non-fulfillment of combat duties, the Military Sector of the Central Committee, ordered the basic bodies and organizations to analyze with a sense of responsibility, the causes that led to failure military.
From what was discussed in the Party, some serious problems arise concerning the degree of combat readiness and readiness of the Navy. Vigilance in the surveillance and intelligence service was not at the required level.
The foreign submarine entered the Bay of Vlora without being observed by any service of the Naval Combat Fleet of the Coast Artillery, of machine gun battalions, which are stationed in this region. She was spotted by the Anti-Aircraft Battery service soldiers, located on the hill of the city of Orikum.
On the island of Sazan, we have a hydro acoustic apparatus for detecting the movement of ships in the southern channel, whether over water or underwater, but because it is not kept on standby, it does not work properly.
The effectiveness of submarines, in carrying out the task of searching and destroying the submarine, and in carrying out demining, was presented with marked weaknesses in combat preparation. Not well known and used were weapons and technical equipment, ammunition for deep-sea bombs, and naval deminers. The commander of the ship did not know the use of radio communication equipment, while other cadres did not have full knowledge of the attack against the submarine, landmines, demining and defense against the submarine, did not know how to interact in groups of ships, etc.
During the deep bomb attack, the ships, instead of their maneuvers intensifying the fire, became an obstacle to each other. Defective and the command of the ships were done. The effective did not know how to act because the commands were given contradictory and by the cadres and sailors, for their implementation there was slowness and liberalism.
Some of them felt some shyness about the use of ammunition, reluctance to carry out the combat order to open fire, and the deputy commander of a ship, after returning from the sea, began to correct the cruise log and radiograms received, for cover mistakes. These weaknesses and shortcomings were found because education and training take place in gaps, omissions and simplifications are made, and there are drawbacks to difficult training.
The Command of the Ship Regiment in Sazan, has not done any training with the ship crews for the fight against submarines for two years. During 1981, no ship commander had conducted training in the submarine firing cabinet. The Command of the Durrës Naval Military Base has not conducted for a long time, practical exercises at sea for dropping demining equipment and collecting them on ships, but they have remained only for their theoretical knowledge in the classroom.
Rightly in their discussions some sailors expressed that: “we are being discharged from the army, without appropriating these duties”. Interactive exercises between the ships of the Navy, for the solution of concrete tasks are little organized, while exercises with search and strike ships against submarines, are not organized at all. There is a general tendency, to do only lessons in the classroom, practical and compacting exercises of ship operation, for the solution of common tasks at sea, are underestimated.
There is not enough demand from the commands and organizations of the Party, to increase the level of theoretical knowledge and for a practical preparation and high combat readiness. In some cases, the exercises are planned and conducted in facilitative conditions outside the requirements of combat duties. Torpedo shootings are planned to take place at night and in difficult conditions, but in practice the opposite is done. The staff is not well placed to study and raise their theoretical and practical knowledge.
Manifestations of indifference and arrogance have not been fought with due force. The control and request of the account, for the keeping of the ships, of the means and its armament in combat readiness, are carried out with defects. This is the reason why sometimes there is not enough war to solve the problems, while the headquarters does not recognize the situation and loads the ship with combat tasks that are not on standby. The Naval Warfare Command, although responsible for the condition and level of combat readiness of the ships of the Sazan regiment, does not show sufficient care.
During 1981, it organized only in March, an aid and control for the island’s ships. As part of the drafting of the new regulations, the command of the Navy has removed from use the code of common navigation signals of ships without replacing it. This has resulted in the signaling staff not being prepared to maintain liaison, and coordinate ship-to-ship operations.
The mentioned shortcomings and weaknesses that emerged in the analysis made in the basic organs and organizations of the Party, where the ways for the improvement of the situation were determined. In accordance with the degree of responsibility, party measures and commands were taken, up to dismissal from duty and reduction in responsibility. To strengthen the situation, the Ministry of Defense tended to design a special aid and control for the island of Sazan.
MILITARY SECTOR OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Note of Ramiz Alia in the document for Kadri Hazbiu
You certainly know, but that caught my attention. This report, which has emerged from the analysis of the meetings of the Party organizations, I am sending it, it seems that the comrades of the Fleet must carry out important tasks. The shortcomings are serious./Memorie.al
The next issue follows