By Erald Kapri
Part Two
Memorie.al / The document we publish in this article is a report by British Major Kemp, a highly skilled military expert who participated in the organization of the First Partisan Brigade, led by Mehmet Shehu. He recounts in detail the circumstances of the creation of this brigade, which had about 700 men, well-armed by the Allied forces. Meanwhile, the British major testifies that this force failed in the fight against the arrival of the Germans in August 1943, because it was not properly organized and its leaders acted against British advice. Kemp confirms that organizing the brigade into battalions was absurd, as it offered no opportunity for effective guerrilla warfare.
“Unfortunately,” notes the Western soldier, “the leadership of the National Liberation War used the word brigade or battalion only for propaganda purposes, while they never accepted the advantage of guerrilla warfare.” “Later,” specifies Major Kemp, “we came to the conclusion that this form of organization was needed mostly to strike the forces of Balli Kombëtar, rather than the Nazi ones”!
On the other hand, he states that this brigade was formed for frontal, pitched battle, but it never succeeded. Among its failures, he mentions the first actions against the Germans on the Leskovik-Korçë road, the conflicts with Balli Kombëtar bands, the numerous reprisals against the civilian population, etc.
Of particular interest, especially for researchers in the field, are Major Kemp’s professional analyses of the fighting methods of the German and Italian forces in Albania. His report is part of the documents in the Archive of the Ministry of War, where Kemp collected the work done in our country, from August 1943 to March 1944…!
Continued from the previous issue
THE DOCUMENT
Report on Albania, August 1943 – March 1944.
Written by Major P.M.M. Kemp, Mission in Albania
TACTICS OF THE GERMANS AND ITALIANS
It is interesting to compare the tactics used by the Germans in these operations. They had a disregard for the courage and character of the Albanians and usually moved with small troops of 50 to 150 men, equipped only with automatic weapons and light mortars. With these small patrols, they usually managed to be successful, scattering the partisans before they could organize resistance, causing the British missions to quickly withdraw, even abandoning the equipment we had with us.
Our attempts to guard against these kinds of surprise attacks were not considered worthwhile by our partisan allies, for, even though we had posted guards, we rarely received any warning from them. On the other hand, the Italians seemed afraid of the Albanian guerrillas, believing that they could not take the hills and that this could only be done with large forces assisted by artillery and aircraft. This allowed for the element of surprise, and we saw this in Shtyllë, where we had two days to prepare for withdrawal.
It is a surprise and a good opportunity to reflect on how, in the north of the country, where the terrain is so suitable for guerrilla warfare, the Germans were so successful with only a small number of forces and light armament. They managed to succeed in every area with few losses, when the opposite should have been the case, especially since the Germans had fewer than 35,000 troops in Albania, most of who were not first-class combat forces.
This happened for two reasons: First, they managed to instill a sense of terror in the country, and second, the timidity, jealousy towards one another, squabbles, and ambition of the Albanians themselves, who had no desire to unite and had a lack of patriotism. It was hard to imagine how afraid the Albanians were, even the bravest among them, when the German name was mentioned.
The Germans did their best to provide some examples of terrorism in the country, to instill fear. The typical case is the burning of the village of Borovë, where they even threw women and children into the flames. I remember that in Shtyllë, a small boy was badly burned but managed to survive. Wherever the Germans were to attack the partisans in villages, they would also shoot civilians, who increasingly would not drive the partisans away.
Few countries have understood what “divide and rule” means, something the Germans achieved so well in Albania. Rarely did the Germans engage in direct operations with their own troops. In Pezë, in Orenjë, or in Dibër – but I could mention other examples as well – they had help from the locals, either because they were afraid or simply because they did not like the partisans. I must emphasize that the Germans never wasted their forces on operations, but instead engaged mainly in areas where their lines of communication might be threatened.
For example, they thoroughly cleared the Pezë area of partisans, in order to remove any threat to the road between Durrës, Tirana, and Elbasan. Certainly, the Germans made several attempts to capture our missions or the Central Committee of the NLF, but they did not succeed because of our location in remote areas where they didn’t really bother us.
REASONS FOR FAILURE
After carrying out these two actions, we were depressed by the fact that our efforts to train and equip the First Brigade as best as possible had been almost in vain. I will give several reasons: A) First, the Albanians were not accustomed to regular combat. The partisans had no discipline, nor the desire to cooperate properly, nor the desire to fight the Italians, except when they learned that the Italians were few in number.
Divided into small groups, fighting on the lines of communication, carrying out concentrated strikes against isolated enemy forces, and withdrawing from major forces after these attacks – only in these ways could they be of value. Despite the fact that they do not like to fight the enemy at close range, from long distances they are good marksmen and could be trained better in this, also given the fact that the terrain protected them, and also because their efforts should be valued as individualistic fighters.
But to place them to fight united in regular units and to stand and fight the enemy, German or Italian, was almost impossible. Unfortunately, the National Liberation War used the word brigade or battalion only for propaganda purposes, but also because they could not understand the advantage of guerrilla warfare. Their failure on the Leskovik-Korçë road on August 21 was an ideal case to illustrate their failure, as were several other cases in the village of Shtyllë.
On the morning of the 27th, while contacting Mehmet Shehu, I discovered that none of his battalion commanders had any idea what was happening, they didn’t know which way to go to the front, and Mehmet Shehu himself had no idea what the situation was, and it was revealed that they didn’t even have any liaison between the command and the troops on the front line.
Despite these lessons, the partisans did not abandon the idea that they should be organized into brigades and battalions, nor did they even try to become a regular fighting force, which they never developed as a possibility. Later, we came to the conclusion that this form of organization was needed more to strike the forces of Balli Kombëtar than the occupier.
The partisans’ losses were not so great as to abandon the good positions they had overlooking Vithkuq. The artillery was not so heavy or destructive, but the morale of the partisans was such. My interpreter, a small man with a black mustache, who told me he was brave in battle, very proud of himself and contemptuous of the Italians, spent the whole day of August 27 hiding, so much so that you felt sorry for him, even though we were far from danger.
As soon as the battle was over, he raised his “tail” high and proudly informed us that the Italians could never take Shtyllë and that Italian soldiers didn’t have the stomach to fight. Even Mehmet Shehu, when explaining to me the fact that one of his battalions had failed because of heavy enemy fire, concluded with the words: “The battalion was forced to withdraw and we lost only 3 men and only 2 wounded.”
FEAR OF REPRISALS
C) One of the main problems limiting the possibility for action was the behavior of the local population and especially of Balli Kombëtar. Our target was precisely the Leskovik-Korçë road, and most of the villages near the road were with Balli Kombëtar. Many of these villages had already been burned by the Italians and Germans, due to actions carried out mainly by the partisans. Shortly before I came, a German armored force had come down from Leskovik, burning and massacring inhabitants along the way.
These events were fresh in the memory of the inhabitants. Their complaints, which were made to me by Safet Butka, were that the partisans, without waiting or thinking, would launch an attack near a village and then disappear, leaving behind the inhabitants who suffered all the consequences. Safet Butka asked me that any action on this road be carried out in uninhabited areas, but such an area hardly existed. The partisans complained that when they attacked the enemy, the inhabitants of the Balli villages would go and warn the enemy, but of course they did this to stop reprisals against themselves.
As I mentioned, after the action against the German car, Major Maclean and I left through the villages, but with a great lack of hospitality, and in one place they even tried to shoot at us. This problem, seen throughout the country, came from the fact that the guerrillas had to be separated from the civilian forces, and then certainly the enemy would have a harder time carrying out reprisals. In Albania and Serbia, the Germans and Italians were able to instill in the civilian population a certain sense of responsibility for the guerrillas’ attacks against them.
If this sense of responsibility did not exist, then reprisals would almost cease to exist, since the enemy was not keen on the idea of displacing people into the hills; in fact, that was the last thing they wanted. In fact, the collaboration with the occupier did this service for the enemy that the population felt responsibility for what happened in the actions. Without their help, the enemy would have had a hard time, but they contributed indirectly to neutralizing our efforts.
It is unacceptable that another organization should be formed that was separate from the fighting part, even though the National Liberation War contributed to separating itself. Balli Kombëtar and the nationalist bands did not separate themselves from the civilian population, nor did they try to do such a thing. This fact I did not like at all, although their strength would gradually decline. Another factor that convincingly influenced the Albanians was that the Germans, as temporary residents in the country, would leave quickly and would not cause any harm to them or their country.
They argued: why should they fight, put their lives, property, and homes at risk against an enemy known to be leaving soon? In this sense, it must be understood that there was little patriotic feeling in Albania. For about 600 years, the population has been forced by barbaric and conquering dominations to live “beneath” them, a reality that began to change after 1912. / Memorie.al
