Part Sixteen
Memorie.al / The CIA have described in detail how information was gathered for the infiltration of American agents into Albanian territory to overthrow the communist regime. In several declassified documents, various types of operations and attempts to overthrow the regime are shown, but in the end all attempts failed. Likewise, US suspicions toward the British are also shown, as they thought they had a secret alliance with Greece and Yugoslavia.
Paramilitary operations
On the night of September 7-8, the five-person group “FIG” re-infiltrated into Albania. They reported by radio that the entry zone was calm. An aerial supply mission was carried out on the night of September 19 for base “Apple-2”, mainly for supplying batteries for the radios. About 500 kg of leaflets were dropped over Albania as a diversionary measure. In addition to the new supply mission to “Apple-2”, on September 19 a container was also dropped in the “DZ” zone where the base of Hil Shllaku, the supposed leader of a resistance force of 35,000 people, is reported to be located.
In an attempt to verify the claims made by Genc Korça regarding the activities of Hil Shllaku, Korça has been moved from Rome to Athens for questioning. At the same time, efforts are being made to contact Zef Shllaku, who has left for Yugoslavia together with Korça and with Professor Prenk Gruda, who are located in the British zone in Austria. Zef Shllaku and Gruda should be able to provide further details on Hil Shllaku’s activities and his resistance possibilities.
The British have informed us that their group re-infiltrated successfully on the night of August 29. Regarding psychological warfare, our groups in Rome have reported that during September talks were held with Ali Këlcyra and with Koço Muka, the leaders of the “National Front” Organization, who split from the base organization at the end of the 1950s. Efforts to include them in the NCFA have so far been unsuccessful.
The members of the NCFA executive committee who were dissatisfied with the text of the letter sent by the secretary of state in response to requests according to our instructions, refused to allow the publication of the correspondence in the newspaper Shqipëria. The Committee opposed Mr. Dalles’s statement that the problem of Albania’s relations with its neighbors in the future was a matter primarily for bilateral discussions and solutions. Our representative in Rome reported that he had been forced to destroy all copies of the September 15 edition of the newspaper Shqipëria, due to an informative article on the Albania-Greece border. The newspaper was then reprinted without the article in question.
Both our representatives and the British ones are taking a harsh stance toward the Committee regarding this undisciplined behavior of exceeding obedience to directives. They were concerned about the event and sought that the possible dissolution of the Committee be taken into consideration. On the night of September 9-10 a successful leaflet drop over Albania was carried out. About 300,000 leaflets were dropped together with an undetermined quantity of sewing needles attached to the leaflets. The needles were the first item dropped after the policy review that allows the resumption of food and clothing items in Albania.
The monitoring station in Bari has reported continuous jamming of the clandestine radio “Voice of Free Albania”. Forces in the field report that the jamming comes from calls for desertion that are made twice a day, and there are indications that the jamming may come from Bulgaria. Despite the obstacles, the transmissions have been maintained according to schedule. The biweekly newspaper of the NCFA “Shqipëria” has been printed in Rome according to schedule. A smaller version of it, previously used in aerial drops, has been discontinued, while a summary version is printed every month and will be used in drops from the air into Albania.
11 January 1950
Operation “BGFIEND”
Suspicions about the British for “agreement” with the Greeks and Yugoslavs
Llewellyn Thompson informed me today that he had held a conversation with representatives of the British embassy, including Lord Jellico, and said that the representatives made great efforts to justify their position when he mentioned to them an “unclear” position of theirs regarding the situation. The product of the meeting is that the embassy representatives admitted that it was necessary for them to communicate with London for further clarification, and then to hold another conversation.
According to Mr. Thompson, the embassy representatives indicated in a certain way that they were aware of Italian suspicions about them, and speculated that this might be the reason why the British Foreign Office wanted to maintain a low profile. Mr. Thompson promises to send us a memorandum of his conversation as soon as it is completed. He further reported that a representative of the Greek embassy had recently come to the Department to express concern about the Italian proposal for a discussion of the “four powers” on Albania, which would exclude Greece (the State Department does not favor such a discussion at the moment, whether with or without the Greek side).
Reflecting on this whole matter, Mr. Thompson said he believed that as far as he knew so far, the British embassy, the British are not engaged in a three-party agreement with the Greeks and Yugoslavs regarding Albania. The British are concerned about Tito’s position and Mr. Thompson believes that such a three-party agreement is being concealed. One reason for his suspicion is the fact that the matter was discussed with Mr. Bevin and if they were to have tricks against the United States, they would not discuss them with him due to his open and straightforward character.
Conditions for Enver Hoxha
Although our informal relations with the Albanian authorities worsened after the establishment of relations with the USSR, we continued to seek understanding along the lines of our proposal for recognition of the regime. The fulfillment of two conditions for recognition had been set out; the first the holding of free elections, and the second the staying in force of the treaties in force between Albania and the USA, from April 1939. The first condition was fulfilled with the holding of elections in December 1945, while the second condition was being dragged out by the authorities, during which time the American mission in Albania was becoming the object of unfriendly, impolite and suspicious treatment.
Finally, on August 13, 1946, nine months after the American offer for recognition, the Albanian regime signaled acceptance of the treaties and multilateral agreements in which Albania and the USA were parties, but refused the bilateral agreements between the two countries. Not receiving these guarantees from the regime, the USA withdrew its mission on November 14, 1946. Another issue arose between Albania and the US government and the communist guerrilla movement in Greece, as the latter was being supported by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Albania’s participation in this adventure, as well as Albania’s obstruction of the work of the UN special committee for the Balkans, have been criticized several times by the United States.
In 1948 the State Department informed its liaison offices in the Balkans that American objectives regarding the USSR’s satellite countries were the identification of democratic countries that did not provide human rights for their people and countries that discriminated against the interests of the USA and other friendly states. The directives stated that although the USA accepted Albania’s participation in general regional and Balkan agreements for the welfare of states, we would oppose its adherence to bilateral federations or broad groupings of states that created ideological unions, since such a development was contrary to the will of the Albanian people.
Conclusions
Soviet obstacles to US access to Albania have not caused significant strategic or military disadvantages. The country’s economic resources have only limited local advantages. Access to the terrain, which is a broad primary coastline in the Balkans, in the event of a major conflict would also be insignificant due to the lack of suitable ports, airfields and weak communications in the country. Likewise, Soviet control over Albania gives it only a weak advantage in the event of a major conflict.
The country’s economic resources cannot be reached by land, and their development would require large investments in people and machinery, which would be out of proportion to the benefits, therefore even the USSR, cannot carry them out. Although the use of advanced submarine bases or suitable airfields would have advantages in wartime, the possible sites for them are limited in number and capacity, and would be unusable against a superior air or naval military force. And in fact, Albania’s importance for the Great Powers is mainly negative and consists of the possibilities for use as a guerrilla base for military harassment in major operations.
Soviet control of Albania seems to be complete. It is exercised mainly by Albanian communists and by Soviet personnel there; in the event of internal conflict the Soviet government, having no direct access to Albania, would think of saving its military personnel, since they could not do more without risking starting a general conflict.
The current sporadic resistance in Albania cannot overthrow the regime without help from outside Albania. There is no alternative other than Hoxha’s regime in Albania, and the only possibility comes from groups outside Albania.
No government or power in Albania can exist without the help of one or several great powers. The current economic and social standards are not favorable for the functioning of a democracy, in the Western sense of the word. A non-communist regime must necessarily follow democratic forms of action and ensure human rights in the country.
Of Albania’s neighbors, Yugoslavia, increasingly in difficulty with the Kremlin and Cominform, seems to be creating problems for Hoxha’s regime. They come in the form of guerrilla attacks, economic sanctions and propaganda. As long as there is a regime like Hoxha’s in Albania, Tito’s government cannot attempt to overthrow the regime without risking being struck by the Soviets from the north and east. If the communist regime in Albania falls for other reasons, the situation or timing would determine whether the Kremlin would oppose Tito’s attempts to advance there.
Therefore in the event of anti-Hoxha developments, the circumstances of relations between Albania, Tito and the Kremlin should be carefully examined, as well as those between Tito and the non-communist world. Actions to overthrow Hoxha would have an advantage for us only if the situation is such that Tito cannot enter Albania, or if he can be influenced not to do so out of a desire to consolidate his own regime.
Greece has not advanced with its territorial claims in Albania nor to neutralize the resistance against claims based in Greece. Diplomatic pressure would be needed to make Greece not interfere in Albania in the event of any internal crisis.
- Italy currently has no claims, while it is Albania that has claims against Italy. Italy has condemned and even supported activities against Hoxha’s regime, especially when prompted by the USA.
The situation is being prepared for a careful unification of anti-communist émigré groups, under the direction of the United States and the Allies. Some émigrés have created committees for anti-regime activities from outside Albania and in connection with the internal resistance. But they need monetary and material support. They would be hindered if King Zog participated personally, just as it would not work if members of the groups participated.
The overthrow of the Hoxha regime by Albanian anti-communists and the establishment of an anti-communist regime in Albania would have a significant psychological effect in raising the morale of resistance groups, as well as in other communist countries under Soviet domination, in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe.
The current policy of the United States toward Albania should be reviewed, in order to benefit from the current situation in Albania and the Balkans.
The instruments at the disposal of the USA for the execution of policy in Albania are insufficient for the implementation of the desired policy. Therefore full cooperation with the British government, the French government and their agencies is needed and must be gained. In later stages, cooperation with the Turkish government could also be considered.
Types of operations
a) Preliminary operations – The development, organization, equipping and training in Yugoslavia, Greece and other foreign countries of the joint forces needed for the preliminary phase of the coup d’état. The development of strong resistance units inside Albania, which would support and increase the number of forces coming from outside Albania, obtaining all the operational intelligence needed for the successful execution of the coup.
b) Attack operations from selected points in Yugoslavia and Greece and joint command points, to launch night operational movements toward targets in Albania together with supply deliveries. Joint forces in the field to attack during the night to capture and secure the targeted areas. The attack elements to neutralize border soldiers and take control of military installations, to interrupt communications and cause desertion or isolation of opposing military and security forces.
All airfields and aircraft together with transport centers to be secured. Furthermore, all important government leaders to be captured and held. The provisional government to be composed of the leaders of the NCFA (Committee for a Free Albania). They to publicly announce the creation of the free and independent government of Albania, and to force the leaders of the Hoxha regime to publicly accept removal from power in order to encourage support for the provisional government. Through pre-organized cells and with the field groups, the raising of local resistance groups is to be done to complete the coup d’état.
c) Consolidation of the operation. To eliminate the remaining elements of the opposition. To reorganize and strengthen the forces of the provisional government and the agencies and other friendly forces.
Method for recruiting agents within the country
“OBOPUS” – is the name for the overall project of fulfilling these objectives in Albania. “OBHUNT” is the sub-project according to which the border crossing operations are carried out. At the moment we have 18 agents ready in Greece (7 of whom trained in radio communications), who can continue the program during the 1954 operational season. It is believed that these operations will continue in the following two years to fulfill the operational tasks.
“OBOPUS-OBTEST” is a project for a clandestine anti-communist radio station, broadcasting on short waves to Albania, on behalf of the National Committee for a Free Albania” (NCFA). This station has been operating in Athens since September 1951./ Memorie.al
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