By Dashnor Kaloçi
Memorie.al / The Special Operative Group that was created immediately after the arrest of the former Minister of the Interior, Kadri Hazbiu and his deputy, Feçor Shehu, in mid-October 1982, headed by the Deputy Minister of Works of the Interior, Zylyftar Ramizi, and as his subordinates he had Enver Zeneli and Hasan Ulqinak, among other measures, such as; the study and analysis of a large number of archival files, which belonged to a long period of time (1945-1982), called and asked some of the former senior officials of the PPSh leadership and former cadres senior leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security officers, etc., to give in writing, what they knew, or had doubts, regarding the “hostile activity” of Kadri Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu, or other persons, with whom they were connected by work or not, during the period that they had served at that ministry, or in the Interior Branches in the districts, in the Political Intelligence sector, at our diplomatic missions accredited in different countries the world, etc.
Among the former senior officials of the PPSh and the leading cadres and officers of the State Security, etc., who responded to this call, giving their written testimonies to the Special Operative Group, were: Liri Belishova, (former member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the PPS Central Committee for propaganda, art and culture), Nesti Kerenxhi, (former major-general, Director of State Security and Minister of Internal Affairs), Xhule Çiraku (former-general- major, Director of Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Rexhep Kolli (former Major General, Director of State Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Zija Kambo (former Major General and commander of of the Guard of the Republic), Zoi Themeli (former Major-General, Director of State Security and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs), Nevzat Haznedari, (former Major-General and Head of the Investigation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Hekuran Pobrati (former colone and senior officer of the State Security), Feti Smokthina (former colonel and Commander of the Republic Guard), Zylfi Saliu (former colonel, senior officer of the State Security, head of the Internal Department in several districts, deputy of the People’s Assembly), Lelo Sinaj, (former major officer and Director of State Security), Halil Zeneli (former colonel of the Security and head of the Internal Branch in several districts), Ilo Manushi (major officer and head of the Directorate of Personnel of the Ministry of the Interior), Xhemal Bejto Fasllia, (former senior officer of the State Security in the Ministry of the Interior), Ibrahim Kubati (former senior staff, sentenced to political prison, together with his brother , Ali Kubati, former vice president of the Executive Committee of Tirana, friend and close friend of Myslym Keta), Mark Dodani (former lieutenant colonel and senior officer of the State Security), etc., etc.
From the letters or reports-information in question sent to the address of the Special Operative Group at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (in the years 1982-1983), or personally to Minister Hekuran Isai, in the previous issues, we have published the letters of Liri Belishova and Hekuran Pobrat, and in this article, we have selected for publication the letter of the former senior officer of the State Security, lieutenant colonel Mark Dodani, (also known as the screenwriter of several films of Kinostudio “New Albania” and writer and author of several books), which is extracted from a voluminous file found in the archive fund of the Authority for the Information of Files of the former State Security, where he informs the main leader of the Ministry of the Interior, with details and details, about some of the most important events the main thing is that he only had the opportunity to be present because of his duty, or the doubts that arose about those events and persons.
For example. the escape and the tragic murder in the cave with artillery, of Colonel Haxhi Hajdar, (former deputy of the People’s Assembly), on April 8, 1963, the mysterious death of Colonel Myslym Keta, on February 26, 1966 (where Mark Dodani writes that he was charged by ministers Beqir Balluku and Kadri Hazbiu, to eliminate him physically, as he had betrayed and wanted to escape), the escape to Greece and the mystery of the murder of Izet Osmani, the colleague of the Rear Admiral of the Navy, Major General Teme Sejkos , some of the combinations that Kadri Hazbiu had made with the Greek agency in the South of the country, where Kadri Hazbiu’s secretary, Xelal Shaqiri, who was imprisoned and then released by Feçor Shehu, was also implicated. etc. For more about these, we are familiar with Mark Dodan’s letter, published for the first time in several issues, by Memorie.al
Continues from last issue
ARCHIVE DOCUMENT WITH THE LETTER OF THE FORMER STATE SECURITY OFFICER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK DODANI, SENT TO THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, HEKURAN ISAI, IN 1982
Minister of Internal Affairs
Comrade Hekuran Isai
Dear friend Hekuran
Thus, the conclusion that enemy intelligence had a strong agency in our ranks was illustrated by work practice with various examples, such as Nuri Kosta’s; that’s why Kadri Hazbiu, who had been an agent himself, easily measured our pulse, that although we had legitimate suspicions that enemy intelligence had a strong agency in us, Kadriu was still calm that it never occurred to him that this agency had such a deep radius, up to Kadri Hazbiu himself and his friends. – Meanwhile, it was said that Kadri Hazbiu had company with the former Greek Intelligence agent, Thodhori Vreto, from Çiflik.
With this, he often went hunting. Later, Thodhori Vreto, as far as I remember, was implicated as an agent with the rank of major of the Greek Intelligence and as such, he was arrested. In the investigator it was broken down, but I don’t remember the details. It is known that Theodhori Vreto was our cadre, in the army and in power.
Regarding the combinations we led against Teme Sejkos, with his own mind, to his ex-brother-in-law, to Rexho the Elder. This was processed; actively. Teme Sejko, having his sister, Rexho’s wife, leaves for his house. The Operative Worker comes forward and says to Temes, in his head; “not to go to Rexhua, because he was suspicious of the spy, who was followed by Sigurimi”.
This information, as far as I remember, was given to Kadri Hazbi, because it was linked to new information that was obtained about Teme Sejko, who informed Rexho to be guarded by Sigurimi. As far as I remember about this matter, Dhosi Pecani and Flamur Sinoimer know the details, the first former Head of Branch in Saranda, the second Operative Worker, and now in the Internal Affairs Branch of Durrës. After hearing this, Rexho Plaku started to escape across the border, but was killed as an enemy of the people. We understood at that time, that Rexho the Elder was on an illegal channel, important for the Greek Discovery, but now we realize that; why didn’t Kadri Hazbiu direct us to focus on this object, instead of wasting time with that ordinary object, which I mentioned in Mursi.
All of us thought that we had dealt with Rexho Plaku correctly. We were given the wrong opinion (as I now judge), as if we could no longer make sharp moves, combinations, and games, as in the days of the gangs, because supposedly enemy scouts could no longer be drawn into our traps as before, that they had learned strong lessons against Albania. Therefore, instead of a sharp job, we waited for what the investigator gave us to make arrests. For this demoralizing opinion, I say that the evil was in the methods with which Kadri Hazbiu and Mihallaq Ziçishti, that were in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, used to torture us.
The issue of “Kabaheti” impresses me now, in which Kadri Hazbiu was interested. “Kabaheti” provided some information that had to be verified in the period after the unmasking of the conspirators with Teme Sejko, and others related to him. “Kabaheti” and the object were from the Durres-Tirana districts; therefore the combination was coordinated by the Durres Branch, with the Directorate of Internal Affairs, Tirana. I was personally commissioned by Kadri Hazbiu, to help with the combination with the TO (Operative Techniques), to reveal what there was about the suspected object. The combination of the “collision” of “Kabaheti” with the object was built, in a house in the neighborhood of the former Catholic Church (as far as I remember), “Konferenza e Peza” street, Tirana. Here I was with an Operative Worker, of T.O. of the Ministry (I think it was also that of TO, of the Durrës Branch).
From listening, interesting things came out, personalities were implicated, it is mentioned that there were people in the Central Committee, Ministers and others, who were connected to abroad, in the service of foreigners. I personally informed Kadri Hazbiu. He ordered us to bring the tape to him so he could listen to it himself. I tasked T.O.’s friends to take out the tape cleanly and prepare it for listening, personally to Kadri Hazbiu. Meanwhile, from the TO offices, I return to the Minister, waiting for the tape to come out clean. But in these moments, comrades Xhemal Bejto and Jorgo Kareco, bring me the order of comrade Pilo Shanto, to withdraw the file of the former officer of the Military Intelligence, Izet Osman, who was deciphered as an agent of the Greek Intelligence.
Izet Osmani, who may still be alive today, had long been at the service of Teme Sejko. The latter, as Izet Osmani, had been “martyred” in Greece. Bile, Teme Sejko, brought the clothes from Greece and arranged in the state way, so that the “martyr’s” pension was paid to the family. This combination of the Greek Discovery with Teme Sejkon was deciphered by us, and on the very day of the recording of the conversation of “Kabaheti” with the object, the data on the entry of Izet Osmon as a saboteur coincided. A strict search was required to be organized against him, therefore according to the order brought to me by my friends Xhemal Bejto and Jorgo Karecon, on behalf of Pilo Shanto (former head of the 1st Branch), we immediately decided to deal with the organization of the pursuit of Izet Osmani .
Meanwhile, Xhemali and Jorgua tell me about Izeti’s file that was in Military Intelligence. I urgently went to the Directorate of Military Intelligence of Llazi Jakova, whom I knew personally as the head of the Branch for Greece, therefore I thought that he would also have Izeti’s file. My visit to Llazi Jakova was called a mistake, because it “turned out” that the secret came out before Llazi, who should have been suspected, for the case of Izet Omani, since he was the head of the Branch, who had Izeti’s file.
Without any justification, Kadri Hazbiu communicated to me the disciplinary punishment of 10 days of arrest, through Rexhep Kolli. Consequently, I didn’t find out more about “Kabahet”, whether I listen to his tape or not, Kadri Hazbiu. As for the case of Izet Osmani, after they sentenced me with a warning with the motivation that; I had deconspired before Ilazi Jakovo, I found out like all my friends, that one or two days before, Beqir Balluku had spoken openly to the people, on the occasion of the festival of Bogaz of Saranda.
Beqir Balluku had also spoken about the legend of the “martyr” at a time when Kadri Hazbiu spoke to me about the case of disciplinary punishment, which saved me without punishing me more severely, only the fact that I had a functional duty to deal with the issue of Izet Osmani. That for this, there was an agreement between Beqir Balluk and Kadri Hazbiu that anyone who would be interested in Izet Osmani and his file, as an agent of enemy intelligence, should be treated as suspicious and Beqiri and Kadriu should be notified immediately.
In this case, Llazi Jakova and I presented ourselves to Andon Sheti and with this to Vehbi Hoxha. This apparently, Kadri Hazbiu announced urgently and told me to return to the Ministry, that he (Kadri Hazbiu) would clarify. Meanwhile, I guessed that the request for Izet Osmani’s file was different from that of other bandits, with whom I normally dealt. Now I suspect that; Kadri Hazbiu and Beqir Balluku, who knows what fear they would have had from the burning of Izet Osmani’s combination. Otherwise (all those alarms and measures they took against me instead of taking these for the pursuit of Izet Osmani), he understood them differently now, from what I could understand them at that time.
Without breaking away from the period of the pursuit of the conspirators Teme Sejko and others, I remember that when we were in the situation of suspicions about the conspirators in question, Kadri Hazbiu, “orientated us that we had to guard against disorientation and provocation, because it is now known that enemy discoveries, they try every hour, every moment, to misinform us”.
Therefore, we were advised to take every step cautiously and carefully. The subtext of this, as I understood Kadri Hazbiu at the time, was that Teme Sejko, with other traitors of his category, could be good and we could fall on their necks. I am very impressed today, that to be honest, it seemed the same to me at that time, when Kadri Hazbiu, speaking to us competently about the activity of enemy intelligence, made a comparison between Yugoslav and Greek intelligence. Said that; while the Yugoslavs work thickly, on the contrary, the Greek Discovery works much more thinly.
As Kadri Hazbiu appreciated, in the direction of the Yugoslav Discovery, there was no need to worry as much as in the direction of the Greek Discovery, at least in front of me this was the impression his talks left. Today they impress me, like any other conversation of these enemies.
The problems of the “People’s Hero”, Lym Keta, thought it worth recalling before you, based on the fact that Kadri Hazbiu and Beqir Balluk have personally dealt with this issue. I don’t remember the dates, but I think it was before the Central Committee’s open letter in 1966, when Rexhep Kolli called me to the office. He told me that Lym Keta, having ended in hostilities, had decided to flee abroad. In order to avoid this, I undertake to follow him and in case of an attempt to escape, I would organize the confirmation of this tendency. I would hold back until Lymi took the lead to cross the pyramid.
Rexhep Kolli spoke to me about the data proving the tendency of Lymi and his group to escape. He also mentioned Safet Kurti in the group with him. Today A.P., partisan, pensioner (reserve officer). If he tried to cross the border, I was authorized to kill him.
After I wanted to know with what decision this action was taken, Rexhepi read me an order, with the signatures of Beqir Balluk and Kadri Hazbiu, where it was decided to follow Lym Keta, who was killed when he tried to cross the border.
In front of Rexhep Koll, I committed myself to the task and took responsibility that I would better bring him alive. This was also approved by Rexhepi, but he emphasized that it was the authorization to kill him, if he would not surrender. I immediately went to the place where Lymi would pass. I waited with the available car for several days and nights, Mati’s bridge. I had two or three friends with me, but none of them knew the specific task. I would tell them this at the necessary moment.
After some time (I think about two weeks), the measures were withdrawn, because Lymi gave up the tendency to escape. Rexhep Kolli told me this himself. The documents that talk about this action, I don’t know if they exist or not, but Rexhep Kolli thought he could provide other details. Later Lym Keta was killed accidentally (!) as is known, traveling by car on the road Pukë – Fushë Arrëz.
Regarding the Cape Stillos – Llogara coast, I informed in 1971, in the capacity of the vice-president of the Sarandë Department of Internal Affairs, that the necessary protective measures had not been taken. In this regard, after I had sent to the Ministry the data and the conclusions that emerged at that time, I had the opportunity to meet comrade Xhafer Spahiu, who was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. I informed Comrade Xhafer about some details about the data that we had related to this and the fact that the 6th American Fleet was constantly in the waters of Corfu, in front of Saranda. Meanwhile, I pointed out that it seemed wrong to me that our Navy base, in Saranda Bay, was completely open.
It was only a few days after this information, when Petrit Dume, Muhamet Prodani, and other members of the Corps Headquarters from Gjirokastra arrived in Saranda. They asked me in the meeting, by name. At the meeting, Petrit Dume suspended Comrade Diogjen Gjergji from office, with the motivation that he had cooperated with me without the permission of the Ministry. Then turning to me, he tried to scare me, that I was wrong to enter their affairs. I defended myself by mentioning Comrade Enver and his teachings, which we all apply to the solidarity of arms, even more so, who got up three times a night for the various data we collected along the land border and especially the sea border, being the front in front of enemies.
Meanwhile, I added that; to “forgive” the former Chief of the General Staff (Petrit Dume), that at least in this matter, Comrade Diogen Gjergji, not only was not at fault, but on the contrary, he had helped us. Therefore, with my interventions, I messed it up, that’s why I told Petri Dumas that I would appeal to Kadri Hazbiu, and even to my friend Hysni Kapo, in the Central Committee of the Party, to suspend me, instead of Diogenes. In response, I remember well, that Petrit Dume changed his tone, on the spot.
“Hey kerrata, kerrata”, he said with a laugh and added that it was really quite normal for me and Diogenes and my friends in Saranda to get up two or three times a night, because in the end, said Petriti – “our strategy is supported at speed”. He gave the meeting a different tone, he reassured me about Diogenes, that he had not done anything to suspend him, but said that the army has it that way.
Bile, with my main friend in the district (comrade Telo Mezini was the first secretary), also took me to a banquet they hosted in Butrint. After that, Comrade Qazim Kondi came to me at the Saranda Branch, thinking that I had only informed Comrade Xhaferr. We were fully clarified (with the file I kept in the safe), that the information had been sent regularly and at the right time to the ministry (the First Directorate of State Security and that of the Border).
Comrade Qazim felt very sympathetic to this information, which apparently would have criticized me as a display of arrogance (as Kadri Hazbiu had this on the tip of his tongue against me), if the information had not been sent from the branch to the ministry. After Qazim Kondi, comes Kadri Hazbiu. He did not tell me anything about this information, although I expected he would tell me something, if he had told Petri Dume, with whom I had the argument I stated above.
Kadri Hazbiu ordered (in meetings with him) that when Beqir Balluku came, we should take care of everything, especially his health. He informed us that Beqiri would come soon. We had to create the best possible conditions. He emphasized that Beqir Balluku, at the same time, had the right to interfere in any of our affairs, as the vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers that he was.
Kadriu left, Beqir Balluku came. The only thing I found out was that he was looking for fish and herbs, and with us, unlike Petrit Dume, he behaved very gently. He did not say anything to me about the information I had given to comrade Xhafer and sent in writing to the ministry, about leaving the coast exposed and unprotected. He talked here and there, that even if the coast was disguised, it doesn’t matter, that the enemy armies, through their means of detection, especially those with infrared rays, have great detection capabilities, they detect us no matter how we hide.
He used to have these conversations openly and then I understood them as well, as that enemy told him, unlike now, which is clear why he spoke in that way. I have not raised this problem until now, because I thought that Kadri Hazbiu would be fine and he was aware of these things, but now that it has been proven that he is a fierce, dangerous enemy, he also highlighted the issue that I elaborated above, as an issue with which they seem to be connected, like each other. / Memorie.al
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