By Ali Buzra
Part Three
– LIFE UNDER PRESSURE AND SUFFERING –
(ASSESSMENTS, COMMENTS, NARRATIVES)
Memorie.al / At the request and desire of the author, Ali Buzra – as his editor and first reader – I will briefly share with you what I experienced during my encounter with this book. This is his second work (following the book “Gizaveshi through the years”) and it naturally continues his established writing style. The sincerity and candor of the narration, the simple language without modifications, the precision of the episodes, and the absence of a deliberate, later-processed or exploited imagination, have, in my opinion, served the author positively. He comes to the reader in his original form, inviting us at the very least to recognize unknown human fates and sorrows – whether by chance or otherwise – leaving us to reflect as a beginning of awareness toward a catharsis so necessary for the Albanian conscience.
Continued from the previous issue
But, is this a unique case? For those knowledgeable in Albanian history, it is not, because this has happened before. If we were to stop in time, it is well known that after the death of our national hero, Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg – the symbol of resistance for a quarter-century against Ottoman rule – Albania was conquered, becoming part of the largest empire of the time.
Under the conditions of occupation, from the earliest times until the Declaration of Independence in 1912, hundreds of sipahis, viziers, pashas, and finally, a considerable number of Albanian intellectuals – including the patriot Ismail Qemali – were part of the leading elite and the Government of the Ottoman Empire, holding important military, political, and cultural leadership roles. It is an undeniable fact that most of them, at different times, contributed to the strengthening of the Ottoman state.
Skanderbeg himself made peace and alliances with Venice, which occupied the entire Albanian Adriatic coast. Earlier, in the 18th century, a prominent figure of our national culture, the Archbishop of Skopje, Pjetër Bogdani [Note: referred to as Frang Bardhi in the text], at the head of nearly 20,000 Albanian insurgent forces, supported the Austrian army which broke the Ottoman defenses, capturing the cities of Prizren, Pristina, and Skopje, welcoming the Austrian army as liberators. Such examples are numerous; Luigj Gurakuqi, a well-known patriotic figure, served as Minister of Education during the years of the First World War when Albania was under Austro-Hungarian occupation.
In no instance was the Albanian Government during the Austro-Hungarian occupation called “collaborationist,” nor were the Albanian governing personalities of various times before World War II labeled as enemies or traitors to the nation. This was due to the fact that such were the circumstances. On the other hand, it is known that it was precisely those Albanian intellectuals, high-ranking officials of the Empire, who were the main authors and activists of the Declaration of Independence.
Nevertheless, we must accept the fact that the National Liberation Anti-Fascist War in Albania had its specific characteristics, its internal contradictions, and oppositions, which became clearly evident later in the great divide that followed the country’s liberation.
The establishment of the communist regime brought with it an unprecedented wave of terror and persecution against opponents, which lasted for years, installing in this country one of the harshest – and perhaps most long-lived – dictatorships, surpassing even other countries with the same form of government. This also occurred in Balkan countries under Slavic influence, with the exception of Greece. In Greece, both left-wing and right-wing forces participated in the anti-fascist struggle.
The EAM partisan forces, led by Greek communists, cooperated with other anti-fascist forces during the war until the final victory. However, Greece did not escape a civil war, which was brutal and resulted in great losses. The defeat of the EAM forces was influenced by the landing of British Allied forces, which fortunately averted the danger of establishing communism in post-war Greece.
In Albania, cooperation between political forces and resistance groups was not achieved. I believe that in the future, Albanian historiography will have its final say on the reasons for this negative outcome of the war period. However, I feel compelled to provide a possible version from my personal perspective regarding the reasons for this lack of cooperation. In this regard, we can say that:
First, the most determinant factor was the existence of the Albanian Communist Party (PKSH). No matter how different the political configuration in Albania was during the war, without the PKSH, cooperation for the struggle against the occupier would have been possible. There are plenty of historical facts for this. Even during the League of Prizren, there were different political currents within it – one for independence and the other for autonomy – but during the anti-Ottoman uprising, they found themselves on a single front. The same occurred in the uprisings of 1909–1912.
Second, the presence of two Yugoslav emissaries alongside the PKSH and their clear influence over it – as we discussed earlier – aroused mistrust and doubt regarding a true victory for the Albanian people. Interested in turning Albanians against Albanians, in Albania and Kosovo, they incited internal conflict, thereby undermining cooperation.
Third, the leaders of the Balli Kombëtar (National Front), as the largest political organization after the PKSH, believed the communist threat was more menacing to Albania than the German occupation. Furthermore, they thought that the liberation of the Balkans could be left primarily to the Allies, while Albanians should preserve their forces against traditional Slavic and Greek enemies who held territorial claims on Albania.
Another fact, not widely known, which Balli believed in, was that during the war, German propaganda – which even the Germans themselves believed – spoke of a possible alliance between the Allies and Germany at the end of the war to break the Soviet Union, something that in reality did not happen.
Fourth, both major political forces in the country – the PKSH as well as the Nationalists – saw each other as rivals for future power, which made cooperation impossible; instead, they turned their weapons against one another.
A well-organized and general uprising of Albanian nationalists against the occupier would have expanded and strengthened the war front, and the nationalist movement itself would have been empowered as a military force. However, after liberation, I do not believe a civil war could have been avoided; on the contrary, there might have been even more victims. In that case, only a British intervention could have saved Albania from communism.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that many Balli units, as well as other nationalists, including the Zogists led by Abaz Kupi, fought against the Germans. Yet, I believe that Albanian nationalists bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the course of events during and after the war. I say this because they represented the social class with a known spirit of patriotism and the moderate political views of the time. Knowing the danger that Slavo-communism posed to Albania and Albanians, they did not take the necessary measures to organize a regular army.
Their participation in the war remained limited to small units (çeta), lacking a leading and well-organized staff. Had such an organization been achieved after the Mukje Conference, more forces might have rallied around Albanian nationalism than around the Front. It was precisely this professional military organization that led a significant number of people to align with the National Liberation Front by the spring of 1944.
The alignment of the lower, economically disadvantaged classes was also significantly influenced by the PKSH (Communist Party) propaganda regarding the “establishment of equality and justice” in the future – a promise most believed. After the Congress of Përmet, where the PKSH significantly strengthened its political positions, the ranks nearly doubled – not only through volunteering but also through military mobilization. This included the central and northern regions of the country, where, according to declared figures, the National Liberation Army reached 70,000 forces.
Regarding the evaluation of the 1939–1944 war periods, it must first be said that to deny the partisans’ struggle against the Nazi-Fascist occupiers would be a biased and unfair stance. The National Liberation War cannot be denied; it must be valued as a liberation struggle of the Albanian people for freedom and independence. However, this should not be inflated or overvalued. Overvaluation does not constitute value. Meanwhile, it is a historical fact that the partisan army was led by a radical political force with terrorist tendencies, whose primary goal was the seizure of power and the establishment of communism in Albania.
This led the struggle of the National Liberation Front to be accompanied by acts of terror and violence, which strip away its glory – though the sacrifice of ordinary partisans and the blood of the fallen martyrs is never lost. They constitute the monument of the nation. During the years of communism, false figures were mentioned and “documented.” For instance, it was claimed that 20,000 Germans were killed in Albania by partisan forces, whereas accurate data now shows that a total of 2,400 Germans were killed, including many suicides.
At the First Congress of the PKSH, Enver Hoxha declared that during the war, 26,594 enemies were killed by partisan forces, 21,245 were wounded, and 20,800 were taken prisoner – meaning, according to him, approximately 68,000 enemy forces were neutralized. They claimed 700,000 occupying forces entered Albania, yet accurate data from Italian and German documents show otherwise. In reality, a total of 20,000 Italian forces and 36,500 German forces entered – totaling about 56,000. How could 68,000 forces be neutralized when that exceeds the total number of enemy troops?
It has been declared and heard thousands of times that 28,000 martyrs fell during the National Liberation War. This figure is far from reality, as it would mean 40% of the partisan army (out of the 70,000 it reached by the end of the war) was killed. The actual number of those fallen in battle is estimated to be around 5,000–6,000. We cite this approximate figure because an exact verification is still lacking.
Furthermore, by decision of the Politburo and the communist government, many who fell in combat against anti-communist armed groups in the first years after liberation were also declared “Martyrs of the Homeland.” It is regrettable that the propaganda of the communist years inflated and misused the National Liberation War period. One cannot boast so much about the war against German forces when the fact remains that nearly 34,000 of them left Albania unscathed, while only 2,400 were killed.
A realistic and significant assessment of this period is given by Ismail Kadare, who states: “Although Albania’s contribution to global clashes was modest, its participation was to its honor.” Sooner or later, this period will receive the proper attention from Albanian historiography. The National Liberation War also had grave issues.
Unnecessary attacks and battles were carried out in high-risk areas with tragic consequences for the civilian population. There were controversies between the Balli Kombëtar and the National Liberation Front about not attacking in populated areas to protect settlements and civilians. The case of Borova in the Kolonja region illustrates this.
The Borova Massacre was carried out by troops of the Wehrmacht’s Alpine Division on July 6, 1943, prior to the official German occupation of Albania. This military force was coming from the Eastern Front, destined for Yanina. Unable to follow the planned itinerary because the Kalabaka–Yanina segment was damaged and bridges were blown up by Greek partisans, it was decided the division would pass through Albania.
The route was Florina–Bilisht, Korçë–Ersekë, Leskovik–Yanina. When they arrived in Borova, the leaders of the German convoy stopped and spoke with the village leaders, asking if the road posed any danger. The latter assured them they could pass safely. During the march, about 10–15 km from Borova, in the village of Barmash, they were attacked from a partisan ambush. Considering this a betrayal of trust (besë), the convoy stopped and carried out the massacre in Borova. According to testimonies from survivors, not all German soldiers participated in the reprisals.
Some of them, contrary to orders, helped the civilian population escape. Thus, the fact is that the leaders of the partisan unit provided the pretext for the burning and massacre of Borova. Attacking a German division equipped with powerful motorized assets was a mistake, especially near a populated area. After the attack, the partisan forces fled in all directions and failed to protect the innocent people of Borova.
The February 4th Massacre in Tirana is also frequently mentioned, where 84 people were reportedly killed, most of them innocent citizens. It was indeed a grave, unjustifiable massacre carried out in cold blood during the night of February 4, 1944. It has been said that the massacre was carried out by Xhaferr Deva and the quisling government in cooperation with the Germans. Current studies of documents show that the Germans had no connection to this massacre; they did not involve themselves in it.
It was a personal vendetta of Xhaferr Deva. But what triggered such an act of terror – condemnable and unforgivable?
Communist guerrilla units had carried out numerous assassinations against nationalist leaders, whether members of the Regency or not. Under the orders of Dushan Mugosha, communist guerrilla units killed many Kosovars who had come to Tirana to visit their relatives serving in the government of Rexhep Mitrovica.
Attached to the government was a Kosovar military regiment commanded by Bajazit Boletini, the son of Isa Boletini. This 400-man Kosovar regiment served as the government’s defense unit. In the wake of these assassinations, an attempt was made on February 3rd against Xhaferr Deva and Kadri Cakrani.
The latter was the General Commander of the Balli Kombëtar (National Front) for Southern Albania. In this assassination attempt, Xhaferr Deva’s nephew – a 13-year-old adolescent – and Kadri Cakrani’s uncle were killed. This action, intended to kill Xhaferr Deva and Kadri Cakrani, became the catalyst for the February 4th massacre.
This grave event led to a conflict between Xhaferr Deva and the head of the Regency, Mehdi Frashëri, which ended with the departure of Xhaferr Deva and the “Kosova” Regiment. Mehdi Frashëri then summoned Xhelal Staravecka and appointed him Commander of the Gendarmerie under Rexhep Mitrovica’s government, thereby eliminating the “Kosova” regiment’s role.
Xhelal Staravecka had abandoned the National Liberation Front, disillusioned by the terrorist actions of the 1st Brigade, instigated by Dushan Mugosha. In his press statements from America after the country’s liberation, Xhelal Staravecka denounced the atrocities and terror exercised by the 1st Brigade against the civilian population and those considered opponents of the National Liberation Front.
The division sown by Tito’s envoys within the PKSH (Albanian Communist Party) between Albania and Kosovo was present and evident throughout the war period. It was part of the Yugoslav Communist Party’s strategy for the re-annexation of Kosovo after the war. Dozens of Kosovars were killed in Tirana and Shkodra by guerrilla units, including Adem Boletini, another son of Isa Boletini.
The perpetrator of the murder, Petro Bullatoviç (known as Petro Bullati), belonging to the Slavic minority of Shkodra, was the brother-in-law of Vasil Shanto. After the liberation, he became the Chief of State Security (Sigurimi) for Shkodra. Later, he was labeled a collaborator of Koçi Xoxe and was eliminated, as he carried many secrets regarding terrorist actions carried out in that city by order of the PKSH./Memorie.al
Continued in the next issue…
