Dashnor Kaloçi
Memorie.al publishes an archival document issued by the Central State Archive in Tirana (fund of the former Central Committee of the ALP), which contains the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo, held on December 8, 1970, where The Secretary General of the Central Committee of the ALP and at the same time the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the People’s Republic of Albania, Enver Hoxha, in his discussion, analyzed the work done so far in the Ministry of Defense and in all The Albanian Army. Enver Hoxha’s full speech at that meeting of the Politburo, which as the main issue, had disputes, quarrels and conflicts that existed between the Minister of People’s Defense and at the same time the member of the Politburo, Beqir Balluku, with the Chief of Staff of the Albanian Army in The Ministry of Defense, Petrit Dume and the Director of the Political Directorate at the Ministry of Defense, Hito Çako. The accusations that Enver Hoxha made at that meeting against the three highest leaders of the Ministry of Defense, regarding the deep contradictions that existed between them, where he, among other things, said: “If we take the issue from the position, whether in the Party , whether in command, it is clear to everyone that from this point of view in the ministry, Beqiri is the main responsibility. He must have had some kind of anti-social disposition towards the criticisms that were made to him from time to time for many problems. It may have seemed to Beqir that someone was trying to show that he was more specialized than he was in military affairs, and that, with his arrogance and all his actions, he must have wanted not only to lower his nose a little, for example, “Petrit, if he had the opportunity, if I am not mistaken, to remove him or remove him from the General Staff at all, because the duty of the Chief of General Staff in the Army is a key and very important function, he is the right hand of the Minister of Defense” .
Discussion of Enver Hoxha at the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the ALP
“THE LEADERS OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ARE RESPONSIBLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AND SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE BEFORE THE PARTY”
December 8, 1970
The army has always had and still has an extraordinary importance for us. Our party, which is successfully leading the construction of socialism, has set the great task of training in the army, to educate politically, ideologically and technically, all the people-soldiers, so that at any moment he is ready for it defend the victories of socialism and win. Therefore there can be no higher duty than this. From the beginning and continuously, the Party has spared nothing for the Army, for its strengthening and modernization and we can say that thanks to this care, we have achieved satisfactory results.
As it results from all the analyzes we have done and as reality proves to us, our Army is prepared and continues to prepare at a satisfactory pace for the fulfillment of its great task. This means that the Party in the Army, the cadres, all the effective, be it the reserve cadres, the volunteers and the whole people, have correctly understood the importance of the Army, love it and make efforts to strengthen it more and more.
But a better preparation, which is constantly being perfected, and, in the first place, a sounder spiritual, political and ideological preparation of the Army (as all the comrades pointed out), depends mainly on us. We all have a responsibility to the Party for this great problem.
First of all, we, the Political Bureau, have a responsibility before the Central Committee and I would like to emphasize here on this occasion, that we have not reported to him for a long time about the work in the Army, how and in what condition is our Army. Therefore it is best to do this as soon as possible.
Next year, I think, we have to submit a report on the military situation to the Central Committee and thus fill this gap, not that the Central Committee is not up to date on the state of progress that has been made in the Army, because the members of the Plenum, in one way or another, have participated in the development and construction of the Army, in its exercises, etc., but the point is to report them as a leadership as a whole.
But the comrades charged by the Central Committee to work in the Army are directly responsible for its conduct and must be held accountable to the Party, as all comrades in the other sectors where they are charged are responsible for their shortcomings. , for the mistakes and gaps that are proven at work, and they do it well, as the communists are used to doing. The comrades in charge of important functions in the Army have had many mistakes and shortcomings, which have become known to us, sometimes on the spot, sometimes with difficulty.
The leadership, the Politburo, in the way of the party, has been able to reveal these flaws and mistakes and in the interest of the Party and the Army, has spoken openly with the military cadres, has criticized them and will continue to openly criticize anyone, when in the work of one or the other defects or errors are discovered.
This is done and is done in order to correct the cadres. First of all, it is necessary that the mistakes and shortcomings are not left to thicken, on the contrary, efforts should be made to make them disappear as soon as the tip of the ear is removed and in no way to be allowed to be rubbed, erased and repeated.
There are communist comrades who, for all their good sides, for all their determination for the Party, have some remnants in their conscience, which prevent them from acting properly, make mistakes and deepen them, without seeing their dangerousness on the platform of the great interest of the Party and the people. Given this, I think comrades, of course, would suddenly withdraw from the wrong positions.
Shows of this nature, which start at the beginning as shows of the individual, personal sphere, if left unchecked, intentionally or unintentionally, pass on political platforms. On the other hand, when analyzing issues of this nature and criticizing peers, or when they criticize others at work, one should keep in mind and try to be simple, not in the show, but in the life and soul of each, that is, to fight within oneself the ambition, the megalomania, the tendency to appear, the garbage that sometimes covers the external performances.
Therefore, if every comrade fights in himself to get rid of them and makes an effort to truly preserve the simplicity of the communist, he, when he makes mistakes, should welcome them with an open heart, and not suppress the criticism from friends, to wait for them with full conviction that with them he is healing, that friends are making efforts to heal him and not to hit or lower him.
I mean the critic should not come out killed and shrunk in such a case, if he comes out as a criticized man whom his comrades try to help correct. Now let us come concretely to the issue for which we have gathered. The comrades of the Army, of the command, I mean those of the Ministry of Defense, I think they have made a mistake in their leadership work. The leadership in the Ministry of People’s Defense has not been at the required level.
He has limped a lot and this, in the first place, because of Beqir and Petrit, but also the director of the Political Directorate, Hito Çakos. However, the main culprits are the first two. I think that in their work, as pointed out by the comrades who spoke, there has been a strong tendency to conceited, in terms of trying to point out who is better, one or the other, who is more militarily capable etc.
If we take the issue from the position, whether in the Party or in the command, it is clear to everyone that from this point of view in the ministry, Beqiri is the main responsibility. He must have had some unsocial pre-disposition towards the criticisms that were made to him from time to time for many problems. It may have seemed to Beqir that someone was trying to show that he was more specialized than him in military matters.
With his arrogance and all his actions, he must have wanted not only to lower his nose a little, for example, to Petrit, but if he had the opportunity, if I am not mistaken, to remove him or remove him from the General Staff, because the duty of Chief of Staff in the Army, is a key function of great importance, he is the right hand of the Minister of Defense.
For this reason, the closer cooperation of the minister, it is necessary to be realized in the first place with the Chief of Staff, with whom he must consult on all issues. Of course, the minister can have and has connections with the deputy ministers of defense, but the chief of staff, who has all the directions in hand, is there the main subordinate of the minister.
Beqiri, like any other friend, had the right to point out Petrit’s flaws, because he also has many such, such as those related to his character, flaws at work, in planning, in the method of work, in subjective ways and in individual influences and other things of this nature, as pointed out by his peers. In party and state ways, individually and collegially, Beqiri had the duty to point these out to Petrit and, if he did not correct them, the issue could be brought to an end even higher.
We see that in the Army, in addition to large cadre movements in general, key cadres often move there as well. Such work has now been cut, because we have stressed to Beqir Balluku to put an end to unjustified movements, but what I want to point out and that has to do with this problem, is the issue that Beqir’s views on the cadre, often are contradictory and very shaky. Why is this coming? For many reasons, it is also coming because Beqiri, I think, underestimates the capacity of the staff.
But by underestimating others, he overestimates himself, thus abusing to some extent his authority. Beqiri’s thoughts on the cadre, in many cases are shallow, superficial and these cases are not only repeated, but are emphasized in his character, so in this matter he must make a strong turn. I listened very carefully to the discussion that Beqiri made here today. It seemed as if he posed and defended the problems in a principled and energetic way. But in reality, in his work such a thing has not been fully proven and always.
As the consultation that took place in the apparatus of the Central Committee showed, as the collegium of the ministry analyzed the issue and as all the others in turn said, Beqiri suffers from many shortcomings in the organization and control of the strict implementation of tasks. . We, who have contacts and a long time working with him, have noticed this flaw of his. I think that Beqiri, after taking the task given to him and it seems as if he sets it in motion, further, in pushing it forward, in controlling its implementation, in dismantling and leading it to the end, this is where it falters ai.
With these and many serious flaws in his character, Beqiri has created a difficult situation in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. This has been influenced by another negative thing, Petrit’s attitude, and the fact that he also has serious flaws in his person, because he is a bit like a “knight” and not very deep in problems, apparently to me. Petrit has pointed out problems, but looking at them through a sick prism.
He says that Beqiri has seen him in all matters as a completely worthless man and that there is no consideration at all for his ability. So Beqiri does not consider Petrit to such an extent as himself that he does not assess his ability at the level that the Chief of Staff can and should have. Thus, when it comes to thinking about who might be the Chief of Staff, Beqiri can easily propose a candidacy that comes close to the characteristics of his nature, that is, a man who neither seeks nor clashes with to. But what is dangerous in this work and not in the party way on your part, Beqir and Petrit, is the issue that your mistakes are being repeated.
Mistakes can be made, but for the Army and the Party, they are very dangerous when they are repeated. This shows that you, not that you did not understand when we submitted and discussed in the Politburo 4-5 years ago your mistakes and wrong views regarding the relationship between you, why the fact is that then you accepted them, but life proved that you were not convinced, or you were not able, you did not have that communist strength to defeat the garbage that pushed you to the mistakes where you fell before and they stuck their heads back at you.
For this reason, the criticism of you by the Politburo this time should be, in my opinion, much stricter, because now you have committed many times more serious guilt than the first, so you deserve to receive the punishment much more heavier than then. At that time we did not take any punitive measures against you, but now I think the Politburo should give you both a sentence and reflect deeply, that this is the second time you are repeating the same mistake, causing damage to the issue of Party and army.
Of course, we have the conviction, and we have always had this conviction and belief in our comrades, that you will correct your mistakes, but this measure should be understood as being for the good of the Party, the Army and yours, and it will help you correct mistakes, in case you will reflect and try not to repeat them again. If such a thing comes to us for the third time in the Politburo, if it is repeated again, it is understandable and I fully agree with the opinion of my friends, that then we will take much more severe measures.
The question arises: While you are well aware that the Party has resolved issues even more difficult than yours, why did you let this issue get so thick? The friends are right when they say that you two, Beqir and Petrit, tried to leave the impression here that you did not come to me to settle these disputes, because, according to you, these were for cornet things, but you yourself understand that these were not.
There is no doubt that there may and should be opposing views on cornet issues in our efforts to find the right solution to the problems, but yours did not have the character of the discussions we always have with each other. The character of your objections, especially of the two of you, is not about expressing opinions; it is quite different from these. You have said to each other the views: No, “the apostates do this to me”, not “do you want to not card me”, etc., and you say these not at the right time, but now at the end. If you could not tell one another, why did not you both come to me and settle the matter?
It is clear to us, comrades, why you did not come, because, if you came to me, it would come out exactly for the second time that between you, the two main comrades of the General Command, there are disputes and unprincipled quarrels over labor issues, but that have degenerated.
Both of these friends, knowing that this situation is not on the right track, have thought “to settle this issue between us”, that is, to keep it closed. Such a working method is crooked, so it should be abandoned immediately and in no way repeated. It will not be repeated only if it walks on the right path of the Party. We do not agree with the assessment that Petrit made to the Army at the last meeting.
Then he made our situation black, and today, at the beginning of the discussion, he made us a flower square, but in the back of the discussion he also started criticizing. Objections to the views of military comrades at the meeting of the Politburo were presented in these three directions: In the field of military preparation and readiness of the Army. On the effectiveness of Party committees in the Army and their relations with staffs, commanders and commissars.
3) In the meaning and implementation of regulations, orders, etc. Of course, the Politburo was very concerned about this state of affairs in the Army, so it rightly made it a problem. From the analysis of this issue, it turned out that there is an unhealthy situation in the ministry, which we had to clarify and clarify.
The military comrades, who took part in the consultation organized for this purpose, with their discussions, in general, were optimistic in everything about the objections mentioned above, they pointed out the positive sides of the work, put in appearance, too, the downsides.
Now we have to think even more deeply about this issue, because your work in the Army has left its mark, it is not that simple, you yourself said that there is talk about your relationship. This is very dangerous, because it is not the issue that in the General Staff, as in the Government or in the Politburo, there are fruitful and heated discussions about the problems and through them one really comes to the right conclusions, but it is very worrying when in the ministry and down in the wards, everyone says that Beqiri and Petrit are not okay, they have disagreements. Memorie.al
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