“Among the principal leaders of the Party and the State, relations are not good; Prime Minister Shehu and Hysni Kapo have clashes…” / The Sigurimi (Secret Service) file with wiretaps from the Yugoslav Embassy, in ’82

By DASHNOR KALOÇI

Part Three

Memorie.al / In the middle of October 1982, immediately after the arrest of former Minister of Internal Affairs Kadri Hazbiu (at the time Minister of People’s Defence) and his deputy, Feçor Shehu (at the time Minister of Internal Affairs, arrested on March 22, 1982), upon the directive of Enver Hoxha and the order of Hekuran Isai, a Special Operative Group was created, headed by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and concurrently Director of State Security (Sigurimi i Shtetit), Zylyftar Ramizi, with Enver Zeneli and Hasan Ulqinaku as his assistants. The main task of this group was: “The discovery and investigation of the activity of the enemy group” led by Kadri Hazbiu, which also included Feçor Shehu, Llambi Ziçishti, Nesti Nase, Mihallaq Ziçishti, Llambi Peçini, Fiqret Shehu, etc., as well as the connections they had with former Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu.

In addition to other tasks, such as the review, study, and analysis of a large number of files and archival documents belonging to a long period of time (1945-1982), the “Special Operative Group” also called upon and requested several former high-ranking functionaries of the PLA (Party of Labor of Albania) leadership and former senior executive cadres of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security officers, etc., to provide in writing what they knew or had suspicions about the “hostile activity” of Kadri Hazbiu, Feçor Shehu, or other individuals with whom they had worked or not, during the period they had served in that ministry, or in the Internal Affairs Branches in the districts, in the Political Intelligence sector, near our accredited diplomatic representations in various countries of the world, etc.

Just as he had done since 1945 with almost all the “enemy groups,” where he had accused many of his close collaborators, former high-ranking party and state functionaries, such as Koçi Xoxe, Nako Spiro, Kristo Themelko, Pandi Kristo, Nesti Kerenxhi, Tuk Jakova, Dali Ndreu, Liri Gega, Panajot Plaku, Koço Tashko, Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Çako, Koço Theodhosi, Abdyl Këllezi, Fiqret and Mehmet Shehu, etc., of being “UDB agents,” Enver Hoxha would not spare the so-called “Kadri Hazbiu enemy group” that accusation either. Based on this, the Special Operative Group, led by the Director of State Security, Zylyftar Ramizi, which was established immediately after the arrest of Kadri Hazbiu in October 1982, immediately began work on studying the archival files concerning the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana, reviewing the documents belonging to that “object” from 1945 onwards.

For the selection of the documents in question and the preparation of a detailed report-information that would be made available to the Special Operative Group and then to the special investigation group led by Pelivan Luçi and Thoma Tutulani, which would conduct the investigative process against the “Kadri Hazbiu and Feçor Shehu enemy group,” State Security investigator Shkëlzen Bajraktari (part of that investigative group) was assigned. Due to his origin from the district of Tropoja, it was presumed that he would be more familiar with the “UDB agents” and the files against them. Within this framework belongs this archival document, which has been extracted from the Archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (now part of the fund of the Authority for Information on Documents of the former State Security), which is being published in full in this article along with the relevant facsimiles, by Memorie.al

                                  Continued from the previous issue

THE SECRET DOCUMENT DRAFTED BY STATE SECURITY INVESTIGATOR, SHKËLZEN BAJRAKTARI, ON THE HOSTILE ACTIVITY OF THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN ALBANIA DURING THE PERIOD 1945-1983, THEIR “AGENCY” AND THE WIRETAPS OF ITS DIPLOMATS

                                                                                                          Secret

                                                                                                     Single Copy

                                                                                                   Tirana, 7.2.1983

                                                INFORMATION

Based on the study by investigator Shkëlzen Bajraktari, from 4.2.1983, until 5.2.1983, the file of Object Yugoslav Embassy from the II Branch of the State Security Directorate was studied. The following main points attract attention from the study of this file:

List of Yugoslav individuals engaged in espionage activity against our country 1945-1950 – (page 141)

1. ..B…. – Deputy Director for railway construction.
2. …K… – Head of personnel for the exploitation of the railway enterprise.
3. ..S… – Professor, Director of the special course.
4. ..R…. Director of railway personnel.
5. ..B… Director at the railway.
6. ..A… – Until 1946, at the railway, in 1947, Legation Attaché.
7. ..D… – Deputy Attaché.
8. ..F… – Legation Secretary.
9. ..P… – Responsible for the airline.
10. ..K… – Legation Counselor.
11. ..F… – Counselor at the M.I.A. (Ministry of Internal Affairs).
12. ..K… – Counselor at the Army Security.

In the report on Janko Havllaçeku (page 147).

“….Janko asked to know the function of Behar Shtylla, Hysni Kapo, whether Nesti Kerenxhi has been arrested, whether a trade delegation will depart for Yugoslavia and what impression it made on the people; if he knew about a leaflet that was distributed talking about Enver Hoxha…”!

Report on the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana, Drago Flis, compiled on 29.3.1954 by Rexhep Kolli, requesting that Drago Flis no longer come to Albania because he is an Intelligence cadre (page 151). Mehmet Shehu placed this note: “Dir. II. Seen. His arrival cannot be prohibited. When he comes, actively process him.”

In the report dated 10.9.1956, (page 152), “On the hostile activity of Arso Mulatoviq,” addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated: “…On 20.1.1957, Arso Mulatoviq, driving his car to Yugoslavia, along the road to the city of Shkodra, picked up two villagers, whom he asked: ‘Does Sadik Bocaj come to Grilë and what do you think of him, is he some kind of man, how does he treat the people of Vraka?’”

In the report of the Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy, Millorat Komatina, dated 15.X.1975, page 208, it is stated: “…During contacts with the agency, Millorat Komatina was interested in the military gatherings at the University of Tirana, the dismissal of the Rector of the University, and the measures taken against Fadil Paçrami and Todi Lubonja.

He was also interested in the health of the principal Leader of the Party and the urgent trip of the Minister of Health to France….while in a meeting with diplomats from various countries, he was interested in the situation and changes in the Ministry of People’s Defence, the dismissal of Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Çako and who will replace them!”

File 3/1

In the information dated 24/1.1973, (page 6), “On the conversations of the Turkish Ambassador Erxhyment Tataragas and the Attaché of this embassy, Beqir Ersa, regarding the friendship they had with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy in Albania, Stojançe Stojnçiç,” among other things, they emphasize: “…one month before the military exercise in Albania took place, the Turkish ambassador says, he (Stojnçe) knew the exact date when it would begin and how many days it would last…he (Stojnçe) also had reliable information about the trip of the Prime Minister (M. Shehu) to France, even the exact date of his departure for Paris.”

In Information No. 58, (page 136), the Turkish Ambassador, Tataragos, told the collaborator (B.p.) “Airport”: “….where is the Minister of Defence, who is the Minister of Defence now, it is rumored that the former Chief of the General Staff will be appointed Minister of Defence!”

In Information No. 74, dated 22.11.1974, (page 139), the Counselor of the Yugoslav Embassy, Millorat Komatina, told one of our sources: “we have heard that Hito Çako is also a collaborator of Beqir Balluku…we have heard that Petrit Dume is also not in good standing, they have removed his guard and driver. It is also rumored that relations between the principal leaders of the Party and the State are not good.

The Prime Minister and Hysni Kapo do not have good relations. Beqir Balluku also had friction with the Prime Minister. There must be something serious here, perhaps something related to China, because the Chinese military attaché left Albania unexpectedly. There are rumors about Beqir Balluku having been in the service of the Soviet Union.”

In the analysis dated 29.8.1975, (page 168), “On the hostile activity of the Yugoslav Embassy against our country during the years 1971-1975,” prepared by Feçor Shehu and Kadri Hazbiu, they placed this note at the end: “I studied the material. It seems to me to be the fruit of a good analysis of the work – well-considered politically and ideologically, and especially permeated by good professional judgment. I think that:

1. Some good forms of work of this qualified center of Yugoslav Intelligence should also be highlighted.
2. Some tasks that arise from this fruitful state of work that must be done on our part should be brought out better.
3. Finally, we can send it for lessons. Familiarization and taking measures by the organs below.
4. It can also be useful for Comrade Hysni, Comrade Ramiz and Nesti.
5. The III Directorate of Security should also take it (30.8.1975).”

In the T.O. (Technical Operation) information, No. 55, dated 14.2.1977, among several members of the Yugoslav embassy, Qemal and Nexhmije Muhaxheri, Ranko and Senko Marković, and Shaban Hyseni, it is stated that: “…..Mehmet Shehu is increasingly characterized as a devoted, loyal, and capable man to be in the Party Leadership, whom Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo had characterized as a man who lacked abilities, alongside the opinions and expressions that linked him to Enver, as the main person, the Party’s General Secretary,….Enver needed Mehmet, as a well-known man in his country and as an experienced strategist of the Spanish Civil War.

Therefore, he would do his utmost to support Mehmet in raising him to a Leadership post and as his supporter. This is where Mehmet’s stance on Enver’s side lines. Mehmet was not even a member of the Party’s Central Committee until 1948….he is strong, a great strategist, when the First Assault Brigade was formed, Mehmet was appointed its commander and distinguished himself in many battles and fights against the Germans….Ranko once told me that the main factor for Enver’s victory was Stalin, his stance against us,…Enver was almost losing, almost isolated, but it was the letter from the Central Committee of the Russian Party, sent to the Central Committee of the Party, that saved him.

Otherwise, the situation was almost in the hands of Koçi and Pandi. Enver had been disregarded for a full year, he remained isolated and alone, but then Stalin happened and saved him,…the entire stance of Koçi and Pandi, throughout the development of the situation, had led to Enver’s isolation, but if his text had been different, not leading to the murder of Nako Spiro, which gave support to Enver’s views, the situation would have developed differently and Stalin would have influenced, but with great difficulty, because the situation would have been secured before this intervention, it would have been completely in our hands.”

At the end of the information, Comrade Isa Dervshi places the note: “I think we should prepare information for above. It is of interest to be known.” Below Rakim Beqaj places the note: “The family knows these things much better.” (Date 16.2.1977).

In the information dated 26.2.1977, (page 270) which discusses the conversations of the Turkish Ambassador, Bulent Kesteli and the Yugoslav Ambassador Trajko Lipkovski, it is stated:

Trajko Lipkovski: “My meeting with the Prime Minister was warm. He did not hide anything from me, he told me positive and friendly things. He spoke extensively about the situation in the Balkans, but did not directly accuse anyone. Regarding Albanian-Yugoslav relations, despite the already known contradictions, he expressed the opinion that areas for cooperation exist. He reiterated their position on not allowing anyone to attack Yugoslavia from their territory.”

Bulent Kesteli: “My meeting went very well. His attitude towards our country was very friendly. I noted that the Albanian Prime Minister was quite concerned by a further Russian expansion in the Mediterranean. He said that the Russians want to make the law in the Mediterranean and, on the other hand, want to enter the Adriatic through the Yugoslavs.”

From the entirety of the materials we studied in the files of this object, the time of the so-called “period of normalization” is not evidenced, in the sense of the cessation of operative work towards the Yugoslav embassy, for which there is no written document, except for oral affirmations from various Security cadres, for that period.

Based on the fact that the Yugoslav representation in Tirana served as the outpost of all revisionist intelligence services, these enemies made no proposal or attempt for the establishment of Operative Technique, to discover in depth and breadth the agency activity of the cadres of the Yugoslav embassy in Tirana, with their agents in our country./ Memorie.al

      Operative  Workers

Selman Rada      Ylli Birçe