By Ali Buzra
Part Two
– LIFE UNDER PRESSURE AND SUFFERING –
(ASSESSMENTS, COMMENTS, NARRATIVES)
Memorie.al / At the request and desire of the author, Ali Buzra, as his editor and first reader, I will briefly share with you what I experienced during this encounter with this book, which is his second (following the book “Gizaveshi në vite”) and which naturally continues his writing style. I believe that the honesty and sincerity of the narrative, the simple and unadorned language, the accuracy and precision of the episodes, and the lack of – or failure to exploit – a deliberate, subsequent processing of the imagination, have served the author positively. He comes to the reader in his original form, inviting us to at least recognize unknown human fates and sorrows, whether by chance or not, leaving us to reflect as a beginning of awareness toward a catharsis so necessary for the Albanian conscience.
To His Excellency,
The Honorable Anthony Eden, Member of Parliament, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
London
Albania was occupied by the Ottoman Empire for many centuries…! After 448 years of oppression, Albania won its freedom on November 28, 1912, with great difficulty. The war of 1914 led its existence toward a disastrous end and, above all other evils, the rivalries between its neighbors caused the people much damage during this period. Toward the end of this war, the Albanian people were forced to defend their own interests and took up arms against Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy.
When this blood and these sacrifices, which were imposed upon us, ended, were the rights of an independent state guaranteed to Albania in accordance with the documents and decisions of the Conference of Ambassadors? The borders of this state were not based at all on the principles of ethnic justice. …! I have the honor to set forth the most important events below.
You’re Excellency,
Yugoslavia has used all the cunning tricks of a fox to rule Albania. The development of its plans from year to year has been very well documented. In a revolution in 1924, Fan Noli took power for a short time, and it was clear that he sought to make Albania a center for communism in the Balkans, where he would be able to conduct propaganda for the spread of communism among other European states. He was forcibly expelled from Albania, and for a short time, the communist ideology here fell.
But two years later, communism began to organize again and continued its systematic efforts. The initiators and propagandists of this expansionist policy were Yugoslav groups. In 1924, Yugoslav diplomacy attempted to obtain from Zogu, who was then Prime Minister, the rights to the roads toward Durrës and Vlora and the rights to build naval bases in those ports. Zogu refused to fulfill these demands after he took control of the state. On one occasion, when I had left the country for political reasons in 1935, this proposal was repeated to me personally in Belgrade. Not only were these demands made, but others were added as well.
As a reward for an agreement between the Albanian state and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia would be prepared to give Albania the entire territory of Kosovo, up to the border that was defined before 1912 between the Serbian Kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, but this would be done only on the condition that the police, army, and finances of Albania would be controlled by Belgrade. Other rights of an administrative nature were to be reserved for the King of Albania. On my part, I rejected these proposals and immediately fled from Belgrade.
When Yugoslavia saw that it was impossible to achieve its goal through its own diplomatic maneuvers to take over Albania and perhaps other Balkan countries, it changed its system of tactics. It began to build an inter-Balkan communism, meaning Pan-Slavic, whose program continued on the same path as always. Belgrade had begun a preparatory organization within its army even before the war, with the aim of automatically declaring Yugoslavia a communist state.
After a period during which this program was laid out and put into implementation, the Yugoslav group split into two parts, in order to better perform a two-sided maneuver and thus be able to counteract with greater adaptability against whatever impression its policy might make in the diplomatic circles of the Great Powers. It is quite clear and certain that if this project is realized, communism will reach the shores of the Adriatic and the seas surrounding Greece, and the highway will be opened for its progress into the Mediterranean.
It remains to be examined whether the USSR has also collaborated on this program. Undoubtedly the answer is yes, and it will help the Slavic group to achieve its goal. We have fought communism in Albania and we still continue to fight it, because it absolutely does not suit the national interests and traditional principles of its people.
Your Excellency,
The Albanian people have always hoped to receive aid from Great Britain – political, moral, and material aid – and we state openly that we seek this assistance without any reservation. It is imperative that you help us prepare an organization to defend our rights within our national and ethnic borders.
To achieve this goal, we hope to lay the foundations in combat through an uprising against the German troops currently occupying our country. This will likely begin in the months of April and May 1944. Operations will expand in agreement with the British missions currently present here, or with others that may be assigned such a task. To set this uprising in motion and to develop it, we primarily require the following: …. (After listing 9 demands, the author continues)
-Once the ports and main roads are liberated, and the situation is generally consolidated, we will need regular support with supplies and funds to organize the state army. This matter can be examined and discussed later. Adding here that Greece must be organized as a national base and that it must stand by our side in this project. Albanians and Greeks together form the Pelasgian race, and together they must cooperate against the threat of communism.
These two peoples, who are outside the borders of Slavism, must be consolidated in a stable and permanent manner, safeguarding the rights they have earned. Otherwise, they will be in danger of losing not only their independence but undoubtedly their languages and their racial roots as well. The nationalist parties of Serbia and Bulgaria must be aided discreetly, and an alignment of actions must be achieved with the Albanian command and the Allied missions, who will share among them the responsibility for directing the war.
In the event that Serbia and Bulgaria do not cooperate, but act otherwise, aid must be refused to them, so as not to leave them any opportunity to dare take any measures against the interests of the Albanian people. The importance of this policy will be understood in the future, because the interests of the Balkans align perfectly with those of the United Nations, and this policy will ensure a true friendship among the peoples.
Please convey these thoughts to His Excellency, Prime Minister Mr. Churchill.
And finally, Your Excellency, please accept my respects and my most distinguished and heartfelt greetings.
Colonel
Muharrem Bajraktari
Clearly, the content of this report speaks plainly about the danger of Slavo-communism for Albania. His proposed ideas for the war and post-war Albania are clear. They best reflect the national as well as ethnic interests of our people. In his letters (of Muharrem Bajraktari), the construction of a modern European Albanian state is envisioned.
1.3 Contradictory Positions Between Forces of Different Political Convictions and the Breakdown of the Mukje Agreement
In September 1942, the Conference of Peza was convened, in which the CPA (Communist Party of Albania) was already represented as an organized political force. The protagonists for its assembly were 20 initiators from various regions of the country, with different political convictions and religious beliefs. The conference was prepared by Ndoc Çoba, Mustafa Gjinishi, and Ymer Dishnica. There was a broad participation from the nationalist circles of the country. Miladin Popović was also present. The joint decision at the conference to create the National Liberation Antifascist Front, with the idea of “The union of all Albanians in the war against the enemy, regardless of religion, region, or political conviction, for a free and democratic Albania,” was a significant achievement in the framework of the war against the occupier.
The conference elected the National Liberation General Council, consisting of 7 members. From its inception, the Communist Party sought to take the leadership role. The commanders of the various “çetas” (guerrilla units) created up to this time were not communists, but the CPA sent political commissars to them, through whom it attempted to place them under its full control. Under these circumstances, the nationalist element consolidated the Balli Kombëtar (National Front) Party. Nevertheless, during 1942-1943, the units of the National Liberation Front, represented by the CPA, and those of Balli Kombëtar, organized several joint armed actions against the Italian occupier.
The most significant were the Battle of Gjorm in the Vlora region and the Battle of Reç in Shkodra. This cooperation, which was in the interest of the liberation war and the national cause – and which found solidarity, support, and backing throughout Albania – was successfully crowned at the Mukje Meeting. It was organized on the initiative of Balli Kombëtar in early August 1943, in the village of Mukje, Kruja. Representatives of the Albanian Communist Party and Balli Kombëtar participated in the meeting.
After two days of talks, August 1 and 2, both sides expressed their commitment to a joint war against the occupier. It was decided to create a Joint Committee for the Salvation of Albania, where both sides would be represented in equal numbers. The Committee would later be transformed into a Provisional Government, while the form of the regime would be decided after the country’s liberation through free and democratic elections. Both sides agreed there to support the idea of Ethnic Albania.
This was an ideal cooperation, well-thought-out and visionary for the future of the nation and the Albanian state. The representatives of the Front (CPA), the signatories of this agreement, Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi, were experienced personalities and visionary men, ready to cooperate and contribute in the interest of the nation. Albanian historiography has already had its say regarding the Mukje Agreement.
This high act of solidarity, which was leading the country toward national unity, was undermined, sabotaged, and broken by the Albanian Communist Party, along with the Yugoslav emissaries. In truth, it could not have happened otherwise, because the agreement had three strong points that could not be accepted by the CPA and the Yugoslav representatives:
- First: The Committee for the Salvation of Albania, which was to be created with 6 members from each side, would in the future assume the attributes of the future Government. This could not be accepted because any communist party with a pure Marxist-Leninist orientation, such as the CPA led by Enver Hoxha, did not recognize the sharing of power with other political forces.
- Second: It was agreed that the form of the regime would be decided by free and democratic elections.
- Third: The idea of Ethnic Albania, which implied the unification of Albania with Kosovo and other Albanian territories unjustly left outside the borders of the Albanian state, sparked an immediate reaction from the Yugoslav representatives. Thus, in September 1943, at the Labinot Conference, the National Liberation General Council, now dominated by the CPA, decided to reject the Mukje Agreement. With this act, the cooperation of the resistance groups in Albania came to an end.
The breakdown of the Mukje Agreement coincided with the capitulation of fascist Italy and the arrival of German troops in Albania. Meanwhile, Germany had begun a general withdrawal after being struck on all war fronts. Thus, the German forces on the operational line were now in retreat. With the arrival of the Germans, the configuration of the resistance groups in Albania would also change. Unlike other countries like Yugoslavia and Greece, where there were both Italian and German forces during the occupation, in Albania, there were no German forces initially.
They arrived immediately after Italy’s capitulation. Their arrival was accompanied by careful propaganda to avoid conflict with the resistance groups operating in the country. They formally recognized Albania’s Independence and declared their support for the unification of Albania with Kosovo and Chameria, including Mitrovica, which had not been included during the Italian occupation. The Albanian Communist Party was in unison and determined to continue the war against them, labeling the Balli Kombëtar organization as collaborationist and subsequently giving orders to strike its forces.
Meanwhile, Balli Kombëtar’s stance on this issue was not unified. Several alternatives emerged within its ranks. Thus, a portion of its units continued the war against the Germans. Another part chose a “wait and see” version to observe how events would unfold, while a minority accepted cooperation with them.
The new Legality Party (Legaliteti), led by Abaz Kupi, expressing in its program a free Albania under King Zog, declared itself for the war against the Germans. British missions, which operated alongside all political groupings as well as non-party nationalists, attempted to incite and encourage armed struggle against the German forces.
CHAPTER II
Reasons for the differing positions of the resistance forces regarding the war following the German occupation. Perspectives of Albanian historiography. The balance sheet of this war, including physical and intellectual human losses. The stance of the CPA (Communist Party of Albania) toward prominent figures of the time, during and after the war.
If one were to take stock of those sentenced – both during the war and after liberation – the “traitors and enemies” of the country constitute a significant number, reaching into the hundreds and thousands of Albanians. This is not only unsustainable but, by today’s standards, truly absurd. This group also includes dozens and hundreds of former leaders of the partisan struggle, Enver Hoxha’s closest associates, first-rank members of the CPA, and leaders of the highest institutions of the communist state. The fact remains that a portion of the leaders in the south, as well as the majority of leaders in central and northern Albania, maintained a more reserved and expectant stance toward the war against the Germans.
Meanwhile, Muharrem Bajraktari and the Kryeziu brothers in Kosovo did not cease their struggle against the Germans until the very end. By analyzing the events and the political situation of the wartime period with level-headedness, the conclusions would be more realistic. Taken as a whole, one cannot accuse of treason all the leaders of Albania from south to north – the authors and heirs of the Albanian people’s struggles for freedom and independence, the nation’s intellectual elite at home and abroad, and distinguished figures and patriots who fought until the end of their lives for an Ethnic Albania and national unification.
Today, there are many historians who analyze the period of the German occupation separately from that of the Italian occupation. This does not mean that the Germans were not occupiers, as any foreign army that enters the territory of another state uninvited is, by definition, an occupying force. But how did it happen that a significant number of Albanian intellectuals and politicians, with a distinguished history and tradition of patriotism, did not engage in organized warfare against them? Some of the reasons can be listed below:
- First: They were convinced of the fact that the Germans had no strategic plan for a permanent stay in Albania.
- Second: The experience with Austria-Hungary was that it had been the primary supporter of Albania’s Independence at the Conference of Ambassadors in London in 1913.
- Third: At the beginning of 1914, it was Ismail Qemali himself and the Government of Vlora who accepted, as a solution to the conflictual situation in the country, the arrival of the German Prince Wilhelm von Wied to head the Royal Crown of Albania.
- Fourth: It was precisely that pleiad of intellectuals – among them signatories of the Act of Independence, as well as that class of patriotic intellectuals, particularly from the north of the country and from Kosovo – who looked toward German support for salvation from the centuries-old Serbian yoke and for the unification of the country.
Thus, seeing that no cooperation could be discussed with the National Liberation Front, the head of the German legation in Tirana hosted a dinner to which he invited members of the local elite. On this occasion, he told them that it would be better for them to form their own government and cooperate; otherwise, the Germans would establish their own military administration to govern the country for the duration of their stay in Albania.
Under these circumstances, and with the aforementioned convictions, some of the most well-known figures of the time – such as Mehdi Frashëri, Lef Nosi, Father Anton Arapi, etc. – accepted to be part of the Regency Council and the government created upon the arrival of the Germans. Rexhep Mitrovica was placed at the head of the Regency Government, while Xhaferr Deva became the Minister of Internal Affairs. This was an Albanian government that functioned under the conditions of the presence of German troops in Albania – that is, under the conditions of the German occupation. / Memorie.al
To be continued in the next issue
